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Abstract
Taking Sides with the World: Between Politics and Poetics from 1794 to 1960

Irina Kogan
2021

This dissertation traces moments in the German intellectual tradition in which poetic or aesthetic
pursuits find themselves confronted with the question of the political: during the period of Weimar
Classicism, the Weimar Republic, and after the Shoah. I illuminate the underlying progression
from a sharp separation between politics and poetics to a revision of what it means to be human:
away from the notions of autonomy and universality and towards those of plurality and alterity. I
first explore the frame narrative of Goethe’s novella cycle Unterhaltungen deutscher
Ausgewanderten (1795), arguing that its specific textual complexity subverts its apparent narrative
of positing a program of sociability and founding a closed community based on it. I then examine
the program of aesthetic autonomy and political abstinence posited by Friedrich Schiller in the
Announcement for his journal Die Horen (1794), for which Goethe’s Unterhaltungen were written.
Through a close reading of both texts, I show that Goethe’s frame narrative subverts the gestures
of autonomy and foundation that are central to Schiller’s program. Turning next to the Weimar
Republic, I investigate the paradoxical reversal, in 1933, of Gottfried Benn’s poetics of artistic
autonomy into a subordination of art to political ends. Arguing that this reversal amounts to Benn’s
misguided aestheticization of politics, I also examine the implications of public address in Benn’s
poetics before and in 1933. In the second part of my dissertation, I consider three authors
profoundly informed by their experience of exile. For a critical, post-Shoah revision of the

relationship between intellectuality and politics, I examine Hannah Arendt’s two pivotal texts
written about and addressed to the postwar Germany: her 1950 article “The Aftermath of Nazi
Rule. Report from Germany” and her 1959 Lessing prize acceptance speech “Von der
Menschlichkeit in finsteren Zeiten.” I show that in these two texts, Arendt offers a political theory
that revises the very notion of human existence, illuminating its irreducible plurality and
difference. I then turn to Osip Mandelstam’s 1913 essay “About an Interlocutor,” in which he
highlights the in-between space inherent to poetry as address and encounter. With Mandelstam in
the background, I finally consider Paul Celan’s 1960 radio essay “Die Dichtung Ossip
Mandelstamms,” in which the poet begins to articulate his own groundbreaking poetics of alterity.
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Introduction
The readings presented in my dissertation do not offer specialized studies of any of the
discussed authors and their extensive oeuvres. Each one of these authors – Johann Wolfgang von
Goethe, Friedrich Schiller, Gottfried Benn, Hannah Arendt, Osip Mandelstam, Paul Celan – has
propelled ever-expanding philological orbits whose level of nuance may prove prohibitive for nonspecialist readers in the field of German Studies and beyond. Mindful of these microcosms’
specificity, I aim, rather, to trace a possible constellation of situations, questions, and echoes
between them. By bringing these authors, some of them rarely associated, into conversation, my
dissertation contributes to opening up hitherto unexplored avenues for investigation.
Without being strictly contained within it, my project can be broadly paraphrased through
the framework of the tension between something like “culture” and something like “politics” in
the German-language context: from this tension’s programmatic articulation through Weimar
Classicism in the wake of the French Revolution; via its intensification at the cusp between the
Weimar Republic and the National Socialist regime; to its critical revision in postwar Germany.
Defining what the notoriously vague notions of “culture” and “politics” are supposed to mean
proves difficult: Just as their relationship shifts in the course of the timespan outlined above, so
too their individual meanings and implications change. That is, these terms – as much as the
distinction between them – are themselves situationally conditioned and determined constructs.
Therefore, the working principle of my dissertation is to avoid static definitions of either term as
its point of departure; in fact, the terminological binary of “culture” and “politics” does not figure
prominently within the dissertation itself.
For the purposes of this introductory paraphrase, however, “culture” is broadly understood
as referring to intellectual and creative phenomena, while “politics” is understood as referring to
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those phenomena that in some way determine the constitution of human communities. In this light,
the gesture of separating “culture” and “politics” into opposed spheres has to do with two different
and conflicting conceptions of the human being: conceived, on the one hand, as a self-sufficient
being endowed with spirit or Geist and, on the other, as a being constrained by material needs of
sheer subsistence. The former is seen as capable of autonomy and spontaneity; the latter is seen
as, of necessity, determined by inescapable limitations of embodiment. Whereas one’s existence
“dem Geiste nach” has one’s inner, infinite source of vitality at its sovereign disposal, material
existence “dem Leibe nach” necessitates a struggle for the power to regulate and distribute
externally located, finite resources for mere survival.1 On the most basic level, then, the tension
between “culture” and “politics” appears to be rooted in the long-standing and persistent binary
between essence and accident, spirit and matter, interiority and exteriority, infinity and finitude.
The tension between something like “culture” and “politics” is a well-known topos in the
field of German Studies. A brief overview of its complex history would be helpful at this point.
As indicated above, this distinction is not so much a naturally given fact that has always already
existed as it is rather a historically conditioned circumstance. Historically, German-speaking
territories experienced cultural unification – in itself no “natural” occurrence – before political
unification. That is, their common self-identification through religion and language preceded their
unification under a common jurisdiction.2 The schism between culture and politics crystallized at
the beginning of the nineteenth century: When it became clear that the subjects of the various
German states would not be granted a say in policy-making, the realm of cultural achievement

Friedrich Schiller’s letter to Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, quoted in Wulf Köpke, “‘[...] das Werk einer glücklichen
Konstellation’: Schillers ‘Horen’ und die deutsche Literaturgeschichte,” in Friedrich Schiller. Kunst, Humanität und
Politik, ed. W. Wittkowski (Tübingen: Niemeyer 1982), 376.
1

2

The following overview is based largely on Wolf Lepenies, The Seduction of Culture in German History (Princeton:
Princeton UP, 2006), 10-26.
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emerged as a “noble substitute”3 for unavailable political participation. The unilaterally decreed
insulation of politics, not without intellectual legitimation from precisely the cultural realm,
promoted individual withdrawal into the private sphere – a sphere that could be cultivated within
the limits of individual, autonomous intellect and creativity.4 In this binary split, “politics”
acquired a negative reputation as a realm of ultimately self-serving and ephemeral power struggles.
“Culture,” in contrast, was regarded positively as a retreat for reflective and creative activity
unadulterated by ulterior motives.
By the time of national German unification in 1871 after Prussia’s victory in the FrancoPrussian war, “culture” saw itself incorporated under the aegis of the ever-stronger centralized
state. Friedrich Nietzsche’s suspicion of an imminent regression of culture into a mouthpiece of
politics – with “politics” understood specifically as macro-egoistic geopolitical strife – proved
justified at the outbreak of the First World War when precisely German “culture,” Kultur, was put
forward by leading figures in the intellectual and creative spheres as a rallying cry to mobilize
patriotic mass self-sacrifice.5 The struggle between culture and politics saw itself take on the guise
of yet another binary: the one between “culture” and “civilization,” such that the former carried
positive and the latter negative connotations. “Culture” was supposed to embody the purportedly
German and superior values, such as reflection, spiritual depth, introspection; “civilization,” on
the other hand, represented such supposedly Western and degenerate phenomena as political

3

Lepenies, Seduction of Culture in German History, 9.

On the crucial connotation of “cultivating” in the barely noticeable metaphor of “culture,” see Katrin Kohl, “The
Metaphor of Cultural Impact and the Cultural Impact of Metaphor,” in: Cultural Impact in the German Context:
Studies in Transmission, Reception, and Influence, eds. R. Braun and L. Marven (Rochester: Camden House, 2010)
19-35, esp. 21f.
4
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On this point, see Lepenies, Seduction of Culture in German History, 18; on the psychosis of patriotic fervor at the
outbreak of World War I, see Peter Gay, Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider (New York: Harper & Row, 1970),
11f.
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calculation, democratization, and materialism. At the core of the opposition between culture and
civilization resided the deterministic theory of Germany’s special path, Sonderweg.6 The hitherto
intranational divide between “culture” and “politics” now took on an international dimension. In
this manner, culture thus saw itself emerge from the distant islands of detached reflection and
autonomous creation onto the forefront of worldly affairs. It became a battle cry organizing human
beings into opposing geopolitical camps. The coveted autonomy of spirit thus emerged as capable
of animating containers quite a bit larger than the individual human body.
It was culture, too, that developed into a central point of contention during the troubled
period of the Weimar Republic.7 The devastating aftermath of World War I, crowned
simultaneously with the diagnosis of doom in Oswald Spengler’s Untergang des Abendlandes and
the prescription of passivity in Thomas Mann’s Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen, propelled
wide-ranging theorization of the immense socio-economic crises in terms of cultural decline.
Politics was marginalized once again. The faltering project of political democratization,
significantly inhibited by concurrent consolidation of economic power, proved utterly incapable
of counteracting the concrete material challenges of the day.8 Conservative visions of various
stripes professed knowledge of the remedies necessary to counteract the purported cultural decline
and to foster cultural regeneration and renewal.9 With the National Socialists’ ascent to power in
1933, culture once again emerged as a propeller of unification, this time on the basis of exclusion

6

Lepenies, The Seduction of Culture in German History, 9.

7

On the innate problems of the Weimar Republic as a political project, see Gay, Weimar Culture: The Outsider as
Insider, 1-22.
On the decimation of the working class in the Weimar Republic, see Eric D. Weitz, “State Power, Class
Fragmentation, and the Shaping of German Communist Politics, 1890-1933,” The Journal of Modern History 62.2
(1990): 253-297
9
On the intimate connection between apoliticism and conservatism in German-speaking territories, see Fritz Stern,
The Failure of Illiberalism: Essays on the Political Culture of Modern Germany (New York: Knopf, 1971), 3-25.
8
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and expulsion: The overly enthusiastic patriotism and cultural chauvinism of the pre-World War I
period morphed into full-blown racism during the reign of National Socialism.
In the wake of the Second World War and the atrocities perpetrated by the National
Socialist regime, the credibility of “German culture” had been profoundly shaken. The classical
literary and intellectual legacy of the German-language canon became a fundamental point of
contention. Together with a revision of “culture” came a revision of “politics.”10 Often, however,
this revision reverted to the long-standing ideal of human reason as autonomous and sovereign in
its innate purity: Envisioned as subsumable under the broader activity of thinking, politics was
conceived as a common enterprise of intellectually reformed individuals. The long tradition of
diminishing the purview of “politics” and subsuming it under the all-encompassing aegis of
“culture” had apparently not clearly revealed itself as untenable through the recent geopolitical
cataclysms.
The aim of the individual investigations included in my dissertation is neither to advocate
for nor to castigate a particular approach to intellectual activity or political engagement. The
project’s initial impulse stems, rather, from the very fact of separation between the realm of socalled “culture” and that of so-called “politics”: a separation ultimately inherent in the
disengagement from public affairs as much as in the so-called “engaged” literature. Both stances
draw a line of demarcation between intellectual activity and worldly action, dissociating or
associating them according to the specific exigencies of the moment. I am thus less interested in
individual definitions of “culture” and “politics” than in the very fact of distinction: in the fact that
a distinction has historically been made and has resulted in a tension fraught with significant
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On the democratic projects of rethinking political participation, see Sean Forner, German Intellectuals and the
Challenge of Democratic Renewal: Culture and Politics after 1945 (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge UP, 2014);
Jakob Norberg, Sociability and Its Enemies: German Political Theory after 1945 (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 2014).
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implications. For, if the culture/politics binary itself may appear quite innocuous on the surface, I
contend that implicit in it are much more dangerous tendencies of separation, exclusion, and
expulsion, and that this binary therefore calls for special attention and investigation. Without
purporting to offer a comprehensive sociological explanation or systematic literary-historical
interpretation of this tension, my project highlights several of its crucial manifestations,
illuminating recurrent concerns and assumptions as well as critical revisions through close reading
of specific texts.
In Chapter 1, “Politics in Exile: Schiller’s Die Horen and Goethe’s Unterhaltungen
deutscher Ausgewanderten,” I begin with a close reading of the frame narrative from Goethe’s
1794-1795 novella cycle Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten. Illuminating its complex
textual articulation, I relate this frame narrative’s apparent set-up of prescribed sociability via
political abstinence to its larger context within Friedrich Schiller’s journal Die Horen, the central
periodical publication of Weimar Classicism. Schiller’s project, issued in the wake of the
momentous political event of the French Revolution, was an ambitious undertaking of intellectual
and humanistic edification. The path to the latter was programmatically prescribed by Schiller
through a prefatory program of abstinence from political discourse in favor of the purportedly
universal human values of beauty and truth. Arguing that Goethe’s text experiences a
programmatic codification in Schiller, I examine the latter’s publishing program within his broader
project of an apolitically accomplished betterment of humanity through aesthetic education.
Drawing upon Bonnie Honig’s consequential observation of political theory’s peculiar tendency
to displace politics,11 I call into question the common apologia of Schiller’s project of aesthetic
education –specifically, as it is concisely articulated in the poet’s preface to Die Horen – as an

11

Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2016), esp. 1-17.
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arguably metapolitical theory and thus politically relevant. This relevance notwithstanding, I insist
on Schiller’s explicit expulsion of “politics” and its fateful implications.
Almost a hundred and fifty years later, the question of the relationship between politics and
culture – or politics and art more narrowly – resurfaced with renewed vigor during the Weimar
Republic in Germany. Chapter 2, “Artistic Autonomy: Gottfried Benn’s Poetological Polemics,”
is concerned with a key figure in this revival: physician and poet Gottfried Benn. Having acquired
fame with his starkly innovative lyric poetry, Benn devoted himself to essayistic writing in the late
1920s and early 1930s. In his highly idiosyncratic prose, the poet developed a theory of artistic
autonomy, which he often propagated to a wide audience from the isolated podium of a radio
studio. For Benn, true art sidestepped societal concerns and abstained from civic engagement.
Defying the intellectual legacy of the Enlightenment, his artistic theory focused on the force of the
lone poetic psyche, even as it emerged within a socially embedded context of consequential socioliterary polemics. Benn’s apolitical stance experienced an ostensible reversal in the pivotal year of
1933, when the formation of a totalitarian regime in Germany abruptly annulled the possibility of
an aestheticist literature voluntarily disinterested in politics. In two radio-broadcast addresses –
“Der neue Staat und die Intellektuellen” (April 1933) and “Antwort an die literarischen
Emigranten” (May 1933) – Benn not only declared allegiance to the Nazi regime but also
rhetorically banished all dissent from discourse in and about Germany. Reflecting on the mediatheoretical implications of Benn’s radio addresses, I argue that, rather than representing a reversal
of Benn’s pre-1933 position, this unexpectedly politicized stance proved to be a conversion of his
earlier insistence on artistic autonomy into a deeply misguided aestheticization of the Nazi regime.
The second part of my dissertation deals with two authors whose personal experience of
exile profoundly informed their approach to thinking and language. In the wake of the cataclysmic
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events of the Shoah, the binary split between politics on the one hand and poetics on the other
became deeply unsettled: both required a fundamental rethinking. Political theorist Hannah Arendt
and poet Paul Celan recognized this indelible destabilization of formerly certain disciplinary
divisions. In two occasional texts – Arendt’s 1959 Lessing Prize acceptance speech “Von der
Menschlichkeit in finsteren Zeiten” and Celan’s 1960 radio essay “Die Dichtung Ossip
Mandelstamms” – these two exiled thinkers reflected on their respective fields of inquiry not
through a specialized jargon but rather through a fundamental rethinking of the human being’s
relation to the world. By undertaking the difficult step of addressing German citizens in Germany,
Arendt and Celan offered a critical revision of the post-war public sphere, often characterized by
attitudes of complacency, facile reconciliation, and forgetting.12
Chapter 3, “Hannah Arendt: Rethinking Humanity Politically,” is devoted to Hannah
Arendt, who in the fall of 1933 emigrated from Germany, accepting the precarious status of a
refugee for the next eighteen years – an experience that propelled her to an attitude of political
engagement, both practically and theoretically. Examining Arendt’s 1949 article “Aftermath of
Nazi Rule: Report from Germany,” I unfold some of the key elements of her political theory: a
theory that fundamentally rethinks the meaning of politics. Rejecting the prewar dismissal of
politics in the field of intellectual engagement just as much as the postwar enthusiasm for an
idealized model of political participation through sociable discourse, Arendt proposed to rethink
politics as an in-between space, a space between the irreducibly plural and diverse human beings
who, as political beings, cannot be subsumed under the aegis of universal human reason. With her
1949 “Aftermath of Nazi Rule” as well as 1959 acceptance speech “Von der Menschlichkeit in

12

On the act of speaking publicly by exiled Jewish and German intellectuals after the Shoah and their critical revision
of the postwar public sphere in Germany, see Sonja Boos, Speaking the Unspeakable in Postwar Germany (Ithaca:
Cornell UP, 2014).
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finsteren Zeiten,” Arendt offered inadvertent but poignantly relevant responses to Benn’s 1933
banishment – both “dem Geiste nach” and “dem Leibe nach” – of critically minded intellectuals
and emigrants from Germany.
In Chapter 4, “Poetic Address: Osip Mandelstam’s ‘About an Interlocutor’ and Paul
Celan’s ‘Die Dichtung Ossip Mandelstamms’,” I turn to two poets, Osip Mandelstam and Paul
Celan, and their critical revision of what poetry might mean. With his 1913 essay “About an
Interlocutor,” the Russian-Jewish Mandelstam raised a hitherto unheard-of question: Whom do
poems address? No narrowly aesthetic consideration, this is a fundamentally ethical and ultimately
political question insofar as it turns away from a self-contained lyrical I and toward someone or
perhaps something outside it. By focusing on the accidental and providential character of poetic
address – which Mandelstam’s essay dramatizes through the poignant metaphors of shipwreck and
wandering – Mandelstam illuminates the in-between space inherent in, and created by, poetry.
Highlighting this essay’s evasion of a narrowly programmatic function, I examine the worldopening, political potential in its theory of the poetic interlocutor.
Persecuted into exile by the totalitarian Soviet state for failing to conform to the language
and thought prescribed by it, Mandelstam and his poems were posthumously erased from the statesanctioned cultural discourse. In this light, Paul Celan’s 1960 radio essay “Die Dichtung Ossip
Mandelstamms” – in which Celan, himself a German-speaking Jewish emigrant living in France,
introduced the Russian-Jewish poet and his poems to German speakers in Germany – is no
perfunctory act of cultural transmission and translation. Significantly, some of this essay’s most
pivotal poetological reflections reemerge in Celan’s prize acceptance address and central
poetological statement “Der Meridian” just several months later. For Celan, the poetics of otherdirectedness he traced in Mandelstam was not just one poetics among others: rather, the gesture of
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turning toward the other is what poetry – as opposed to the autonomous Artistik in Benn’s sense –
must do. Illuminating possible traces of Martin Heidegger’s language and their critical revision in
Celan’s essay, I highlight its irreducibly occasional character as well as the tensions surrounding
its ostensible project of introduction and familiarization.
Thus, while the parallel between the poet Friedrich Schiller and the poet Gottfried Benn
has been extensively studied,13 my project productively interrogates this parallel and its political
implications through the work of the political theorist Hannah Arendt. It is then also Arendt who
offers a crucial lens through which to connect the work of Gottfried Benn and Paul Celan – another
widely explored parallel. Finally, Arendt’s writings allow my project to illuminate the political
implications of Osip Mandelstam’s theory of poetic address, thereby unfolding yet another widely
studied connection – between Mandelstam and Celan – from a slightly different angle.
As bound up with particular spatiotemporal coordinates as the socio-literary circumstances
outlined above appear to be, they are no historical relics. Quite on the contrary, they define many
of the urgent questions that inveterately animate our discourse to this day. As political decisions,
electorally as well as governmentally, carry existential weight for the very survival of the
language-endowed species, “politics” and political engagement can no longer be set aside as just
one insular sphere of human life among others. The political crises we face today make it ever
harder to engage in intellectual activity unperturbed, without further ado. In this light, providing
an opportunity to examine the long tradition of separating off the question of politics from
intellectual and creative pursuits, the considerations proposed in my dissertation begin to outline
possible revisions of this long-standing tradition. They begin to imagine, too, what the gesture,

13

Antje Büssgen made a groundbreaking contribution in this area with her book Glaubensverlust und Kunstautonomie.
Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen bei Friedrich Schiller und Gottfried Benn (Heidelberg: Winter Verlag,
1996).
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proposed by Hannah Arendt, of taking sides with the world (“Parteinahme für die Welt”) might
mean.
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Chapter 1
Politics in Exile: Schiller’s Die Horen and Goethe’s Unterhaltungen deutscher
Ausgewanderten (1794)

Part I: Goethe’s Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten

Genre, Form, and Text
Originally published in 1795 as a contribution to the first two issues of Friedrich Schiller’s
programmatically

apolitical

journal

Die

Horen,

Goethe’s

Unterhaltungen

deutscher

Ausgewanderten is often discussed in terms of its generic classification as a novella cycle,
Novellenzyklus, and, indeed, as the very foundation of this genre in the history of German
literature. This classification is often corroborated retrospectively, with a reference to Goethe’s
later remark: “[...] denn was ist eine Novelle anders als eine sich ereignete unerhörte
Begebenheit.”14 Although made specifically in reference to Goethe’s text titled “Novelle” and
published in 1828, this remark is often extrapolated to the novella genre in general, under which
Goethe’s Unterhaltungen are then classified: a “lehrreiches, nützliches und geselligkeitsstiftendes
Gefäß für ein unerhörtes Ereignis, den merkwürdigen Fall, die seltsame Begebenheit und die
wunderbare Geschichte.”15 As a novella cycle, Goethe’s Unterhaltungen are often explored for
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Johann Peter Eckermann, Gespräche mit Goethe in den letzten Jahren seines Lebens, ed. Christoph Michel (Berlin:
Deutscher Klassiker Verlag 2011), 221.
Joachim Müller, “Zur Entstehung der deutschen Novelle,” in Gestaltungsgeschichte und Gesellschaftsgeschichte,
ed. Helmut Kreuzer (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzlerische Buchhandlung, 1969) 152-175. On the generic significance of
Goethe’s Unterhaltungen, see See Andreas Gailus, “Chance and Form,” in The Novel, ed. Franco Moretti (Princeton:
Princeton UP, 2006) 739-776; Chenxi Tang, “The Transformation of the Law of Nations and the Reinvention of the
Novella,” Goethe Yearbook 19 (2012): 69-92; Müller, “Zur Entstehung der deutschen Novelle,” 173; Jocelyn Holland,
“Singularität und ihre Verdopplung: Goethes Aufnahme französischer Literatur,” in Singularitäten, eds. Marianne
Schuller, Elisabeth Strowick (Freiburg i.B.: Rombach Verlag, 2001), 345-360, here: 345. For a critique of this generic
assumption, see Andreas Beck, Geselliges Erzählen in Rahmenzyklen, (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag WINTER,
2008), 67; Michael Saman, “A Discourse of a Different Kind: On Fabulation and Method in Goethe’s Unterhaltungen
deutscher Ausgewanderten,” Monatshefte 108 (Winter 2016) 465-484.
15
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their fulfillment of the corresponding generic requirement to narrate an unprecedented occurrence
that exceeds existing means of conceptualization.16 Thematically, the event of the French
Revolution and its aftermath in the subsequent Coalition Wars has been interpreted as precisely
such a novel occurrence, which Goethe’s text has arguably accommodated within its borders.17 In
this light, Andreas Gailus identifies systemic vulnerability as a central concern of Goethe’s text,
citing the memorable mention of a badly preserved gap, Lücke, in the opening of Goethe’s text:
“In jenen unglücklichen Tagen, welche für Deutschland, für Europa, ja für die übrige Welt, die
traurigsten Folgen hatte, als das Heer der Franken durch eine übelverwahrte Lücke in unser
Vaterland einbrach [...]” (UdA, 995). Already at the level of genre, then, the question of borders
and their transgression is at the forefront of the Unterhaltungen scholarship.
Related to this generic premise is the formal emphasis on the framed structure of the
Unterhaltungen as a set of tales contained within a narrative frame.18 This formal feature gives
rise to a compelling interpretive logic. According to this framing, the cycle’s frame narrative
thematizes a politically fueled communicative crisis; it then responds to that crisis by positing a
theory of successful communication; finally, this framing theory is carried out by the framed
narratives in a practice of interactively peaceful story-telling.19 In this light, then, Goethe’s text is
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See Andreas Gailus, The Passions of the Sign, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 2006) 74-106, esp.76; Tang,
“The Transformation of the Law of Nations,” 69-92; Saman, “A Discourse of a Different Kind,” 465-484.
17

Gailus, Passions of the Sign, 76

See, for instance, Jane K. Brown, Goethe’s Cyclical Narratives (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1975); Bernhard Gajek, “Sittlichkeit statt Revolution,” in Vielfalt der Perspektiven. Wissenschaft und Kunst in der
Auseinandersetzing mit Goethes Werk, ed. Hans-Werner Eroms, (Passau: Passavia Universitätsverlag, 1984), 149163. For a discussion of this narrative frame as the defining feature of Goethe’s Unterhaltungen qua novellas, see
Tang, “The Transformation of the Law of Nations,” 75ff.
18

The literature on Goethe’s Unterhaltungen often takes the hierarchy between the framing text and the framed one
as its point of departure. See Brown, Goethe’s Cyclical Narratives; Gajek, “Sittlichkeit statt Revolution”; Gerhard
Fricke, “Zu Sinn und Form von Goethes Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten,” in Formenwandel. Festschrift
zum 65. Geburtstag von Paul Böckmann, eds. W. Müller-Seidel and W. Preisendanz, (Hamburg: Hoffmann und
Campe Verlag, 1964), 273-293.
19
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seen as a poetic-therapeutic artifact: be it for the purpose of community-building20 or for the
purpose of mending the contemporaneous crisis in international law.21
While these formal and generic assumptions are undoubtedly illuminating, I would like to
try to slightly loosen their conclusive grasp on the text which – or on the basis of which – they
theorize. For, even as their generically definitional treatment of the unprecedented is emphasized,
the textual uniqueness of the Unterhaltungen themselves is often minimized. Considered as an
instantiation of a general class – the novella – this text is often underappreciated for its own textual
complexity. I would like to propose that the Unterhaltungen can offer relevant and fruitful insights
beyond the interpretive vehicles of genre and form. To support this claim, I will focus on the frame
narrative itself and, specifically, on the border that separates the frame and the framed narratives
– a kind of liminal space in this so-called “cyclical” text that often gets overlooked in genreoriented theorizations. Drawing upon the rich scholarship on the geographic and legal borders in
the Unterhaltungen, I will call attention to the irreducible moments of tension and complexity in
this text’s specifically textual border.22 As I will argue, these moments, by way of a peculiar
resistance to programmaticity, can offer a productive challenge to efforts at interpretive closure as
well as a unique response precisely to the political events addressed in Goethe’s text.
Parallel to the manifest linguistic registers of theorization and interaction, a peculiarly
spectral kind of Unterhaltung – a particularly polysemic notion23 – can be discerned in the

20

J.W. Goethe, Sämtliche Werke, ed. D. Borchmeyer (Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1985), 1554. For a skeptical
assessment of this text’s pedagogical success, see Bernd Bräutigam, “Die ästhetische Erziehung der deutschen
Ausgewanderten” Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie 96 (November 1977): 508-539.
21

Tang, “The Transformation of the Law of Nations,” 79.

22

Gailus, The Passions of the Sign, 76; Tang, “The Transformation of the Law of Nations,” 79.

For a discussion of the possible senses of “Unterhaltung,” see Rüdiger Campe, “To be Continued. Einige
Beobachtungen zu Goethes Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten,” in Noch einmal anders. Zu einer Poetik des
Seriellen, ed. Elisabeth Bronfen et al (Zürich: diaphanes, 2016), 119-136, esp. 119, 125.
23

14

Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten, which is possibly hinted at in a prefatory statement
by the character of the Old Man: “[...] und ich sage voraus: alles, was ich vorzubringen habe, hat
keinen Wert an sich.”24 At first glance, this enigmatic statement seems to prescribe the treatment
of the embedded narratives that will follow the framing set-up. However, upon closer inspection,
this very principle appears to have been at work already in the language of the frame narrative
itself. In a barely noticeable manner, the theory of absent intrinsic value – “keinen Wert an sich”
– emerges at the border between the framing narrative and the framed ones: Here, in close
proximity, there appear two almost identical formulations whose near-identity highlights their
relation rather than individual value. The first formulation occurs when the Old Man excuses his
refusal to contribute a story to the announced round of story-telling: “Wenn aber die Gesellschaft,
nach einer ernsthaften Unterhaltung, auf eine kurze Zeit ausruhen [...] wenn sie sich [...] nach
einem leichten Nachtische umsieht, alsdann werd ich bereit sein [...]” (UdA, 1016, emphasis mine).
To be sure, the Old Man’s postponement of his narrative can be explained as an instantiation of
the common topos of humility.25 However, several lines later, the frame narrative seems to echo
his words, introducing the first round of the announced story-telling in the following manner:
“Abends nach Tische, als die Baronesse zeitig in ihr Zimmer gegangen war [...]” (UdA, 1016,
emphasis mine). The narratively unmotivated resonance between the word “Nachtische” and the
words “nach Tische” is a small enough detail, to be sure. However, located at the border between
the framing and the framed narratives – two parts of the text that, according to its narrative logic,
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should be served separately – this textual detail could prove more significant than might appear at
first glance.

Laying Down the Law of Sociability
I would now like to take a closer look at the circumstances under which the frame of the
Unterhaltungen takes shape. In the plot of the opening narrative, a heated argument has just
occurred between two members of the group of the German émigrés26: the young man Karl, an
outspoken supporter of the French Revolution, and the Privy Councilor, its outspoken opponent.
Although the character of Karl is often singled out as the perpetrator of this conflict, 27 Goethe’s
text uses quite similar vocabulary to characterize both Karl’s and the Privy Councilor’s unyielding
adherence to their convictions. Karl is described as a passionate thinker and speaker – “[…] er
hatte sich vielmehr von der blendenden Schönheit verführen lassen, die unter dem Namen Freiheit
sich erst heimlich, dann öffentlich so viele Anbeter zu verschaffen wusste […]” (UdA, 1000). The
Privy Councilor is likewise portrayed as argumentative: “[...] nicht zu leugnen war, dass er
manches mit hypochondrischem Gemüte betrachtete und mit Leidenschaft beurteilte” (UdA,
1000).28 In their verbal confrontation, both parties use vivid language of hope – a language that
envisions a future actualization of their present allegiances. Referring to those supporting the
French troops, the Privy Councilor declares, “[...] er hoffe sie alle gehangen zu sehen” (UdA,
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1004). Karl, in turn, retorts, “[...] er hoffe, daß die Guillotine auch in Deutschland eine gesegnete
Ernte finden und kein schuldiges Haupt verfehlen werde” (UdA, 1004).29 This battle of hopes30
results in a dramatic exit of the Privy Councilor, causing a profound fissure – “Die traurigen
Augenblicke des Loslösens und Scheidens” – within the group of the émigrés (UdA, 1004). It is
then this linguistically induced division that motivates the project of conciliation by way of
peaceful conversation, which emerges as the manifest theme of Goethe’s Unterhaltungen
deutscher Ausgewanderten.
This crisis in communication is followed by a brief hiatus, in which the law of future
Unterhaltung is laid down, its potential for manifesting as confrontation preemptively curbed. The
Baroness, the group’s leader,31 deploys a pacifying maneuver of excluding from future
communication any conversation on current events:
Kommt her, ihr Kinder, rief die Baronesse: wir haben eine ernsthafte Unterredung gehabt,
die, wie ich hoffe, Friede und Einigkeit unter uns herstellen, und den guten Ton, den wir
eine Zeitlang vermissen, wieder unter uns einführen soll; vielleicht haben wir nie nötiger
gehabt uns an einander zu schließen, und, wäre es auch nur wenige Stunden des Tages, uns
zu zerstreuen. Laßt uns dahin übereinkommen, daß wir, wenn wir beisammen sind,
gänzlich alle Unterhaltung über das Interesse des Tages verbannen? Wie lange haben wir
belehrende und aufmunternde Gespräche entbehrt [...] (UdA, 1009)
With this sovereign gesture of an enlightened monarch, the Baroness hopes to secure the group’s
peaceful coexistence. The effort is noble enough, and the benevolently proposed censorship does
not seem too high a price to pay if it should guarantee to the group its integrity in the future.
However, the appeasing appearance of this proposal is at least somewhat unsettled by the
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Broness’s use of a word that has just prominently figured in the belligerent sparring between Karl
and the Privy Councilor, which necessitated peace-making provisions in the first place. The
Baroness, too, appeals to hope: “[...] wir haben eine ernsthafte Unterredung gehabt, die, wie ich
hoffe, Friede und Einigkeit unter uns herstellen [...] soll” (UdA, 1009, my emphasis). Addressed to
a narrowly circumscribed audience, her directive that future speech correspond to its presently
articulated prescription has drawn a kind of circle, or frame, by divesting that future speech of the
ability to respond to and alter the trajectory of that which has been said before.32 In this way, then,
the Baroness appears to reproduce the future-prescribing gesture at the core of Karl’s and the Privy
Councilor’s battling visions. The structural resemblance between the narration of conflict and the
conciliatory frame posited by the Baroness disrupts the central line of demarcation between
conflict and harmony that is often presented as the thematic backbone of Goethe’s Unterhaltungen
deutscher Ausgewanderten.
Soliciting this future act of expulsion (verbannen) in a unilateral plea for agreement (“Laßt
uns dahin übereinkommen”) – a performative rather than constative statement – the Baroness has
simultaneously envisioned it as a homogenizing procedure: “Aber das kann ich von dem Zirkel
erwarten, in dem ich lebe, daß Gleichgesinnte sich im Stillen zu einander fügen und sich angenehm
unterhalten, indem der eine dasjenige sagt, was der andere schon denkt” (UdA, 1007). Notably, the
execution of this pleasantly monolingual Unterhaltung is imagined as a non-verbal act (im Stillen).
Authorized by an originary, unwritten law, this exclusively inclusive conversation – a “literally
repressive conception of sociability”33 – is grounded in silence and brings about silence.34 The
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underlying temporality of this vision is that of conserved time.35 The impasse of homogeneous
language that emerges at this crucial turning point of Goethe’s text strikes one as hardly compatible
with its often-theorized generic feature – as a novella – of being confronted with and having to say
something new.
The Baroness is introduced in the following manner: “Nun musste sie sich als Führerin
einer kleinen Caravane darstellen und wusste auch diese zu leiten, für sie zu sorgen und den guten
Humor, wie er sich zeigte, in ihrem Kreise, auch mitten unter Bangigkeit und Not zu unterhalten”
(UdA 995). What does it mean that the Baroness is said to have to present herself (“sich darstellen”)
as the group’s leader? This emphasis on the act of presentation appears to subvert the natural
givenness of her authority. It is also here, in this presentation of the authority figure, that a version
of the titular word “Unterhaltungen” first appears. Here, of course, the sense of “to maintain”
differs from the sense of “conversations” most apparently intended in the title. This irreducible
polysemy undermines the ostensibly simple notion of Unterhaltung as a univocal procedure – both
in terms of its own denotation and in terms of the process it denotes: an intersubjective interaction
carried out by self-conscious subjects towards the harmoniously shared telos of sociability and
conversation.
The Baroness’s idealizing vision is premised upon a temporality of continuity which allows
her to switch fluently from the present tense to the preterit in order to recite a mythical past and to
call for its reproduction in the future:
Überhaupt, fuhr die Baronesse fort: weiß ich nicht, wie wir geworden sind? wohin auf
einmal jede gesellige Bildung verschwunden ist? Wie sehr hütete man sich sonst in der
Gesellschaft irgend etwas zu berühren, was einem oder dem andern unangenehm sein

On the media-theoretical implications of Goethe’s text and its resulting ability to exceed the program of peaceful
conversation declared by the Baroness, see Campe, “To be Continued,” 135. On the constitutive implication of the
reader in the transformation of the Unterhaltungen from the register of opinion to that of interpretation, see Wetters,
The Opinion System, 175
35

19

konnte! [...] O laßt uns künftig, meine Kinder und Freunde, wieder zu jener Art zu sein
zurückkehren! (UdA, 1008, my emphasis)
“Gesellige Bildung,” whose recent disappearance is here lamented by the Baroness, can be
understood both as education of sociable individuals but also as society formation more broadly:
congregation of individuals in sociable coexistence. The Baroness casts her vision of ideal
Unterhaltung in the form of a nostalgic invocation of an ideal past. In that past, one was careful
not to offend one’s neighbor, yet not so much for the sake of that neighbor herself as rather for the
sake of society, Gesellschaft, and capacity for society in the first place. Mutual politeness
supposedly secured the ability of the precarious common project of society to be maintained. By
appealing to her fellow emigrants (“O laßt uns [...]”), the Baroness moves from reminder to
exhortation, attempting to reinstate her theory of sociable coexistence.
The Baroness proceeds by legislatively codifying the remedy against political discord in
the following manner:
Ist die Lust gänzlich verschwunden, mit der ihr, von euren Spaziergängen, einen
merkwürdigen Stein, eine, uns wenigstens, unbekannte Pflanze, ein seltsames Insekt
zurückbrachtet, und dadurch Gelegenheit gabt, über den großen Zusammenhang aller
existierenden Geschöpfe wenigstens angenehm zu träumen? Laßt alle diese
Unterhaltungen, die sich sonst so freiwillig darboten, durch eine Verabredung, durch
Vorsatz, durch ein Gesetz wieder bei uns eintreten. (UdA, 1010)
Progressing from a bilaterally arranged Verabredung to a somewhat less autonomously undertaken
Vorsatz to an altogether heteronomously prescribed Gesetz, the Baroness arrives at her legislative
proposal of Unterhaltung as edification. Its merit consists in the ability to counter conflict through
unification. This unification is in turn established by way of an overarching epistemic cohesion:
the cohesion of that which is cemented through its commonly shared cognition as a
“Zusammenhang aller existierenden Geschöpfe.” In this manner, the absolutist legislator creates
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future discourse in her image, envisioning a direct lineage of narrators. 36 Significantly, however,
the Baroness is not the only character in Goethe’s tale who is presented as an authority on the
course of future Unterhaltung.

Legislative Dissent
Precisely the ideal of narrative and communicative continuity, prescribed by the Baroness,
cannot be accommodated by the theory of Unterhaltung that, several passages later, is offered by
the character of the Old Man, a kind of shadow authority figure. Unlike the Baroness, he does not
speak of the future and its language in prescriptive terms of envisioning. Indeed, in his prefatory
theorization, the future-indicating preposition and prefix nach is caught up in a movement of
deferral, implicating with it the solemn notion of Unterhaltung:
[...] und ich sage voraus: alles was ich vorzubringen habe, hat keinen Wert an sich. Wenn
aber die Gesellschaft, nach einer ernsthaften Unterhaltung, auf eine kurze Zeit ausruhen,
wenn sie sich, von manchem Guten schon gesättigt, nach einem leichten Nachtische
umsieht, alsdann werd ich bereit sein, und wünsche daß das, was ich vorsetze, nicht
unschmackhaft befunden werde. [...] (UdA, 1016, my emphasis).
In the Old Man’s vision, Unterhaltung is figured as a supplemental afterthought – a light Nachtisch
after the satiating main course, whose posteriority is further dispersed into two senses: temporal
(“nach einer ernsthaften Unterhaltung”) as well as spatial (“nach einem leichten Nachtische
umsieht”). The two respective objects of the preposition nach are thus inevitably associated:
shadowed by einem leichten Nachtische, the ernsthaft[e] Unterhaltung suddenly turns less earnest,
even as it simultaneously echoes the ernsthafte Unterredung invoked earlier by the Baroness. In
this manner, the futurity at the core of the Old Man’s prediction (“und ich sage voraus”) emerges
as quite different from that of the Baroness’s vision (“O laßt uns künftig [...]”). Contrary to the
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latter’s holistically envisioned future, the Old Man uses internally heterogeneous vocabulary: The
forward-looking verbs of speaking – voraussagen, vorsetzen, vorbringen – are syncopated by the
backward-looking vocabulary formed around the preposition and prefix nach. Consequently, the
likely interpretation of the Baroness’s speech about peaceful conversation as the theoretical
manifesto of the Unterhaltungen37 becomes problematic in light of the counterpoint between this
speech and its staging vis a vis the Old Man’s competing theorization.38
Even though the Unterhaltung on the interest of the day (“über das Interesse des Tages”)
has, with the Baroness’s legislative pronouncement, been banned, a residue of it remains, albeit in
disguised terms. Namely, before the Baroness’s ideal of communicative homogeneity can be
carried out in practice, an Unterhaltung on the topic of Unterhaltung – and thus precisely on the
topic of the day’s interest – intervenes in the form of a brief polemic between Luise, the Baroness’s
daughter, and the Old Man. Situated right at the border between the framing and framed narratives,
this polemic has been interpreted as a peaceful dialogic alternative to the belligerent confrontation
between Karl and the Privy Councilor.39 Granted, whereas that earlier polemic ended in a schism
within the group, this one does manage to end with both of the interacting parties in the same room.
Upon closer inspection, however, one will notice that this second polemic, too, is marked by
absences.
After the Baroness has laid down the exclusionary law of Unterhaltung, we find out that
the Old Man had not been in attendance during its pronouncement, an absence that is rarely
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emphasized in the secondary literature:40 “So waren Mutter und Tochter eine Zeitlang still neben
einander geblieben, als der Geistliche herein trat, der von einem langen Spaziergange zurückkam,
und von dem was in der Gesellschaft vorgekommen war nichts erfahren hatte” (UdA, 1010).
Certainly, the stilles Nebeneinander, walked in on by the Old Man, could be interpreted as a
fulfillment of the Baroness’s vision of peaceful communication im Stillen.41 However, by setting
foot on this scene, the Old Man also inadvertently disturbs it. Namely, even though he has missed
the Baroness’s recommendation of sharing one’s daily observations as a preferred mode of
interaction, the Old Man wants to do just that – "Er legte Hut und Stock ab, ließ sich nieder und
wollte eben etwas erzählen [...]” – when he is suddenly interrupted by another Unterhaltung: “[...]
Fräulein Luise aber, als wenn sie ein angefangnes Gespräch mit ihrer Mutter fortsetzte, schnitt ihm
die Rede mit folgenden Worten ab [...]” (UdA, 1010, my emphasis). Here, an Unterhaltung is
somehow preemptively cut off not just by another Unterhaltung but by a mere semblance of one.42
It appears, then, that the Baroness’s vision of sociability proves unprotected against disruption,
subverted as it is by nothing like the kind of open confrontation against which it seemed to secure
its borders with such prudence.
Likewise, after the Old Man, on the grounds of incomplete attendance, has turned down
Luise’s request for a preliminary sample from his collection of stories,43 we are told, in passing,
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that the Baroness has left for the night: “Abends nach Tische als die Baronesse zeitig in ihr Zimmer
gegangen war, blieben die übrigen beisammen, und sprachen über mancherlei Nachrichten, die
eben einliefen, über Gerüchte, die sich verbreiteten” (UdA 1016-17).44 Seemingly nothing more
than an inconsequential detail on the level of the plot, the phrase “nach Tische” interpolated here
nonetheless carries with it some unexpected echoes. On the more obvious level, the table scene
elliptically mentioned here echoes back to the Baroness’s conclusion of her constituent assembly,
in which she envisioned precisely the act of gathering for a communal meal, presumably around a
table, as the site of the newly legislated practice of Unterhaltung: “Und nun geht, es ist ein schöner
Abend, genieße ihn jeder nach seiner Weise und laßt uns beim Nachtessen, seit langer Zeit zum
erstenmal, die Früchte einer freundschaftlichen Unterhaltung genießen” (UdA, 1010, my
emphasis). Less obviously, however, the phrase “nach Tische” echoes the Old Man’s vision of
Unterhaltung as a Nachtisch. Whereas the Baroness envisioned the Unterhaltung as the main meal,
the Old Man proposes Unterhaltung as a posterior supplement: as a Nachtisch – as Unterhaltung
after Unterhaltung – and one that is, moreover, inadvertently echoed in the Baroness’s departure
for the night, nach Tische. Notably, the semantic tension generated by this arguably accidental
homonymy unsettles the very site of the communal meal – the “table” or “Tisch” – implicitly
envisioned by the Baroness as the locus of social harmony. Evocative of gatherings of all kinds,
not least those meant for political peace-making negotiations, this table is present only
ambivalently in Goethe’s text.45 Ultimately, the narratively unmotivated Unterhaltung disrupts the
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continuum between the Baroness’s forward vision of harmonious Unterhaltung and its
actualization in the space of Goethe’s text.
The absences of the Baroness and the Old Man are especially odd given this text’s prevalent
vocabulary of collecting (sammeln) and congregating (versammeln).46 Why did Goethe have to
take the extra narrative step of specifying the barely noticeable absences of the Old Man and the
Baroness instead of swiftly proceeding to orchestrate full attendance (Versammlung) at the two
key moments at which the program of proper Unterhaltung is declared and inaugurated? In light
of the dramatically thematized absence of the Privy Councilor – “Die traurigen Augenblicke des
Loslösens und Scheidens wurden sehr lebhaft empfunden” – the absences of the Old Man before
and of the Baroness after the momentous Unterhaltung about Unterhaltung seem entirely
unmotivated, almost superfluous (UdA,1004). Yet they may speak to more than an accident of plot.
For absent before and after this Unterhaltung are two structurally key figures, who in some
way sanction the parameters of speech thematized and carried out in this text. The Old Man misses
the Baroness’s announcement and vision of Unterhaltung as a culmination of being-together in a
communal meal (Nachtessen), according to which the Baroness does in fact leave nach Tische.
Yet the Unterhaltung as promised by the Old Man – Unterhaltung as Nachtisch – begins nach
Tische, after this main course. In other words, the Old Man is absent at the critical moment when
the Baroness lays down the law of future Unterhaltung; the Baroness, in turn, is absent when the
law of Unterhaltung postulated by her is instantiated in the first round of stories initiated by the
Old Man.47 In this way, the theory of Unterhaltung that is supposed to be taking place in Goethe’s
“Diese Unterhaltung wird für die versammelte Gesellschaft aufgespart [...]” (UdA 1016, emphasis mine). As he
gradually enters into the social contract of polite conversation articulated in his absence, the Old Man declares, “[...]
indessen hab’ ich doch eine Sammlung gemacht, die vielleicht eben jetzt dieser Gesellschaft, wie sie gestimmt ist,
manche angenehme Stunde verschaffen könnte” (UdA, 1013, emphasis mine).
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Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten appears to be affected by a kind of split at the outset.
What does it mean for the narrator of the Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten to
have as his proxies two figures who disappear at structurally crucial moments of narrative
inauguration?48 Contrary to the Baroness’s vision of communicative homogeneity – “indem der
eine dasjenige sagt, was der andere schon denkt” – precisely the two authorial figures, the Baroness
and the Old Man, present no homogeneous group: Each one is absent during the other’s narrative
spotlight, their visions of Unterhaltung at odds (UdA, 1007). Whereas the Baroness envisions that
stories will be told and of what kind, the Old Man emphasizes the reception of those stories. The
Baroness envisions the stories as a community-building tool, whereas the Old Man presents the
stories themselves as an inextricable part of the community, one that not only does not guarantee
its cohesion but may even contribute to its pluralization.
Finally, the ambiguity of community is foregrounded when the Baroness’s early (zeitig)
exit nach Tische is specified by one other recurring word: “[...] als die Baronesse zeitig in ihr
Zimmer gegangen war, blieben die Übrigen beisammen” (UdA, 1016, my emphasis). Beisammen,
namely, is precisely the configuration the Baroness herself had envisioned as the scope of her
legislation: “Laßt uns dahin übereinkommen, daß wir, wenn wir beisammen sind, gänzlich alle
Unterhaltung über das Interesse des Tages verbannen” (UdA, 1009, my emphasis). Having thus
emerged as a decentralizing crossroads of crucial terms, the frame of Goethe’s Unterhaltungen
deutscher Ausgewanderten can hardly be deemed capable of statically encircling an aggregate of
texts. Beyond its own multiple senses, the notion of Unterhaltung thus appears to give rise to an
irreducible polysemy around it, which comes through precisely at the narrative border of Goethe’s
Novellenzyklus, namely, the text of its frame narrative. Perhaps, in spite of its future-oriented
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formulation, the Old Man’s remark that none of his stories has a value unto itself could be read not
only in relation to the framed narratives that follow but, just as well, in relation to the narrative
that has preceded this theoretical announcement. Driven thematically by a rupture between two
linguistic subjects who fight with words as with fixed, established names,49 Goethe’s text is
syncopated by a much less ostentatious rupture: namely, one between Nachtische and nach Tische,
a hardly dramatic non-convergence within what is indisputably a collection of the same ten letters.
The textual exhaust that remains in the wake of this non-convergence might offer an alternative to
the language of posited names – language as “blendende Schönheit,” which is said to have seduced
Karl, and which set off the narrative logic of this text in the first place.50
Through a close reading of an admittedly small yet crucial part of Goethe’s Unterhaltungen
deutscher Ausgewanderten, I have tried to demonstrate those tensions in it that exceed the thematic
closure accomplished by an opposition of political convictions. In my interpretation, I have tried
to suggest that the frame narrative is compromised not just at the level of the signified, as Andreas
Gailus argues,51 but already at the level of the signifier. Compromised, that is, is not only that
which is being narrated but also the narration itself. As I have tried to demonstrate, Goethe’s text
allows barely noticeable ruptures to emerge within the structure of presence.52 Drawing upon a
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kind of movement of temporalization as it is articulated by Jacques Derrida in his theory of
différance, I have discerned in this text a certain compatibility with a deconstructive reading. This
has allowed me to illuminate in it a productive remainder that exceeds narrative and theoretical
logics.53 Highlighting such an excess is particularly relevant in this text insofar as it deals with
gestures of inauguration, foundation, and legislation, which are often deployed with the
conservative goal of prescribing, containing, and regulating.
The arguably peripheral details of textual articulation that I have highlighted in the frame
of Goethe’s Unterhaltungen illuminate what I see as a productive tension in a text that is all too
often considered in its instrumental functions of illustrating, exemplifying, or accompanying.
Granted, the instrumental character of the Unterhaltungen is usually justifiably construed on the
basis of its literary-historical context. The context in question is a journal project that, in retrospect,
has been considered as a definitive moment of the literary-intellectual period known as Weimar
Classicism. Lest my reading of the Unterhaltungen appear as too zealous an effort at a kind of
critical autonomy, as it were, I will devote the remaining sections of this chapter to a discussion of
this very moment and context. Given that the journal project in question has proved quite
momentous for the subsequent development of the German letters, this should be a worthwhile
undertaking.

Part II: Schiller’s Die Horen
In December 1794, the poet, playwright, and philosopher Friedrich Schiller made an
ambitious announcement to the world. Accompanied by illustrious collaborators – “die besten
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Köpfe der Nation”54 – he would undertake the publication of a new journal. In doing so, Schiller
not only set out to compete in an already crowded field of periodical literature, in which
“Almanache und Journale schossen wie Pilze aus der Erde,”55 but also did so in a highly polemical
intellectual climate.56 Occasioning a close collaboration with Goethe, the new journal was to be
titled Die Horen and issued monthly with a lofty goal: “wahre Humanität zu befördern.”57
Schiller’s vision of the journal was novel:58 Rather than dealing with particular scholarly subjects,
as had been common with Enlightenment periodicals, it was going to be a publication of broader
scope, open to “sowohl philosophischen Untersuchungen als historischen und poetischen
Darstellungen.”59 Accordingly, rather than appealing to specific groups of readers interested in its
subject matter, the journal had the ambition of appealing to as wide a readership as possible.60
Crucially, the positively articulated aim of Die Horen was left emphatically broad: “Sie wird sich
über alles verbreiten, was mit Geschmack und philosophischem Geiste behandelt werden kann.”61
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However, the path to its realization was determined more narrowly through a specific constraint –
a strict abstention from political topics: “[...] vorzüglich aber und unbedingt wird sie sich alles
verbieten, was sich auf Staatsreligion und politische Verfassung bezieht.”62 In this way, the
ambition of Schiller’s undertaking consisted not only in having the audacity to bypass the highway
of political discourse during a time of undeniable political upheaval but also to do so on a path to
the ecumenical goal of forming the universal essence of humanity.
As Schiller declares in his announcement, Ankündigung, of Die Horen, this project is
propelled by an aversion to conflict. The conflict in question is twofold: It comprises the
contemporaneous geopolitical strife but also, and more significantly for Schiller, the polarization
and pluralization of discourse about it. In fact, Schiller sees the “allverfolgenden Dämon der
Staatskritik” as a discurisve outgrowth of the geopolitical conflicts that, as Schiller sees it,
reinvigorates and perpetuates them: “Zu einer Zeit, wo das nahe Geräusch des Kriegs das
Vaterland ängstiget, wo der Kampf politischer Meinungen und Interessen diesen Krieg beinahe in
jedem Zirkel erneuert [...]” (A, 870). In an effort to will the geopolitical conflict out of existence,
Schiller wants to eliminate the intellectual strife accompanying it. To that end, he prefaces his
journal Die Horen with a programmatic statement that draws a clear boundary defined by what
cannot be said in the projected publication. This preface imposes “ein strenges Stillschweigen”
around the “Lieblingsthema des Tages,” prohibiting any discourse related to current political
events. Programmatically turning away from politics understood as “politische Verfassung,” the
journal proposes to interrogate history “über die vergangene Welt” and philosophy “über die
kommende” (A, 870). Notably, however, Schiller’s noble intention to circumvent the struggle of
political opinions and interests with his publishing project belies the inescapable struggle of
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interests this project itself is entangled in: As Christa Bürger argues, epochal shifts in the German
book market at the end of the eighteenth century brought about not only a “Kampf rivalisierender
literarischer Zirkel um Marktanteile und

künstlerische Anerkennung” but also an

“Auseinanderfallen des Publikums in eine Elite kompetenter Leser und eine Masse bloßer
Literaturkonsumenten.”63
The central apolitical clause of Schiller’s program caused some consternation. The
philosopher Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, one of the invited contributors to Die Horen, expressed
skepticism precisely on this count: “‘Diese Einschränkung, im strengsten Sinne genommen, wäre
zu hart für den Philosophen, der es in vollem Ernste ist; denn worauf kann dieser sich am Ende
überall beziehen wollen, wenn nicht auf Staatsverfaßung und Religion?’.”64 Schiller offered the
following explanation:
Sie verlangen zu wissen, wie weit sich das Interdict erstrecke, das wir auf politische
Gegenstände gelegt haben [...] Sie finden, daß wir dem philosophischen Geist keineswegs
verbieten, diese Materie zu berühren: nur soll es in den jetzigen Welthändeln nicht Parthey
nehmen, und sich jede bestimmte Beziehung auf irgend einen particulären Staat und eine
bestimmte Zeitbegebenheit enthalten. Wir wollen, dem Leibe nach, Bürger unserer Zeit
seyn und bleiben, weil es nicht anders seyn kann; sonst aber und dem Geiste nach ist es das
Vorrecht und die Pflicht des Philosophen wie des Dichters, zu keinem Volk und zu keiner
Zeit zu gehören, sondern im eigentlichen Sinne des Wortes der Zeitgenosse aller Zeiten zu
seyn.65
As Schiller reassures his fellow man of letters, political discourse is not prohibited as such – it is
only prohibited in its specific iteration as references to the specific world in which one finds oneself
currently (“irgend einen particulären Staat und eine bestimmte Zeitbegebenheit”). However,
Schiller reassures Jacobi, an excellent remedy for this restriction is available, and it resides in
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philosophy: As a matter of philosophical discourse, politics is more than welcome in the new
journal. In fact, the philosopher and the poet alike – both of them embodiments of the
“philosophischen Geist” – are not really at home in the current, spatiotemporally particular
circumstances anyway. In order to realize their innermost potential, both of them should, “dem
Geiste nach,” extract themselves into the atemporal realm – an elevated form of exile, a kind of
inner emigration avant la lettre.66
Notably, Die Horen – an “allgemeinbildende Zeitschrift”67 – was initially planned
concurrently with a politically oriented periodical, to be titled Europäische Annalen. Later
published as the Allgemeine Zeitung, the latter would go on to become one of the most significant
political newspapers in the German-speaking territory. Both Die Horen and the Europäische
Annalen were initially going to be published concurrently by Johann Friedrich Cotta, with Schiller
at the editorial helm. Agreeing to edit the political journal only as a favor to Cotta, Schiller, soon
after taking the initial steps of acquainting himself with the basics of political writing, withdrew
from what he claimed to be too demanding a task.68 The poet and philosopher was now determined
to focus entirely on his metapolitical project in Die Horen instead.
To be sure, the journal’s specific apolitical course was conditioned in part by circumstantial
reasons. Originating around 1770, political journalism in the German-speaking territories was
considerably impeded by the Religionsedikt of 1788 and the subsequent intensification of
censorship.69 In this light, Schiller’s editorial decision to abstain from political statements may
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have had a purely pragmatic motivation. Moreover, with the revolutionary and post-revolutionary
events in France polarizing public opinion, the non-partisan, überpartheilich, course favoring
neither the republicans nor the royalists also seemed to be the most sensible route so as not to
alienate too many readers.70
More fundamentally, however, Schiller’s own political views were not unequivocal.
Starting from 1792, he followed the revolutionary developments in France with keen interest,
hoping that they could lead to a reform of monarchical rule away from absolutism and towards a
more participatory system of government.71 Presented with an honorary French citizenship for his
poetic accomplishments,72 the German poet even entertained the idea of traveling to France in
order to try his hand at influencing the neighboring country’s political course.73 Certain authorities
at home were not exactly supportive of these musings, and, by 1793, too, the situation in France
had turned to terror, and so Schiller saw himself compelled to part with his ideals in the political
realm.74 “Ja, ich bin so weit entfernt, an den Anfang einer Regeneration im Politischen zu
glauben,” he wrote to his patron, Herzog von Augustenburg, “daß mir die Ereignisse der Zeit
vielmehr alle Hoffnungen dazu auf Jahrhunderte benehmen.”75 Operating with the epistemic
stances of faith and hope, the poet and philosopher thinks centuries ahead. Fencing off the
problematic realm by nominalizing a broad adjective – “im Politischen” – Schiller gives up on this
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region of human existence because of its apparent incapacity for regeneration. Used here in
passing, this organic metaphor of rebirth, regeneration, and renewal in the realm of “das Politische”
will, indeed, figure prominently in a future century’s fateful theorizations of political change.
Schiller’s verdict upon retiring from the realm of political affect, if not necessarily
engagement, was that, given an opportune historical moment for political reform, humanity simply
proved unprepared for it, which ultimately doomed the budding change to failure. 76 The poet
reoriented his focus accordingly: Rather than investing his intellectual efforts into a particular
political course, he would devote them to the betterment of humanity. Significantly, however,
Schiller’s was not simply an Enlightenment project in the sense of gradual improvement of human
beings’ reason and morality. Rather, the poet and philosopher aimed at a more thorough education
of the humankind: one that would reconcile rationality with nature. Disenchanted with political
passion in the present moment, Schiller would now devote himself to “menschlich-ästhetische
Wirksamkiet,”77 turning toward an indeterminate future that, in fact, would transcend the
constraints of time and space: “[...] sonst aber und dem Geiste nach ist es das Vorrecht und die
Pflicht des Philosophen wie des Dichters, zu keinem Volk und zu keiner Zeit zu gehören, sondern
im eigentlichen Sinne des Wortes der Zeitgenosse aller Zeiten zu seyn.”78 In this manner, Schiller
arrived at his theory of aesthetic education as a metapolitical project – one that, bypassing political
strife and struggle, nonetheless aimed to exert an influence on politics by reforming human beings
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towards their capacity for freedom and thus political maturity in the first place. 79 In this manner,
Schiller’s Announcement was a kind of annunciation: at stake was not merely another journal,
however loftily conceived. At stake was a fundamental reform of humanity.
The central editorial premise of Die Horen, its abstention from political topics, is of
particular significance for my investigation. In order to examine the motivations, assumptions, and
implications of this proscription, I will look more closely at the two documents delineating the
journal’s program: Einladung zur Mitarbeit, sent out to the invited contributors on June 13, 1794,
and the Ankündigung of the journal, disseminated to the public six months later, on December 10,
1794 – both of these short texts “Reklameleistungen ersten Ranges.”80 The Ankündigung, in
particular, can be read as a concise articulation of Schiller’s aesthetic theory, a theory to which I
will refer in broad strokes, without, however, investigating it in detail.81 Of particular interest to
me are not just the implications of Schiller’s aesthetics of autonomy but, more narrowly, the
specific and explicit presentation of this aesthetics as a rejection of politics. As I focus on this
narrow – merely annunciatory – moment in the history of the German letters, I contend that the
following question posed by the literary scholar Günter Schulz in 1960, in the wake of an
unprecedented political cataclysm, remains relevant today: “Ob diese einseitige Ausschließung
des Politischen [...] nicht schwere Folgen für die inhaltliche Gestaltung der Horen und das
Schicksal der deutschen Geistesgeschichte, ja der deutschen Geschichte gehabt hat, müssen wir
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heute fragen.”82 In this light, Schiller’s Ankündigung may have proved programmatic not just for
one specific journal but, more broadly, for the subsequent development of German literature. To
be sure, given the particular inextricability of this literature from precisely the political trajectory
of the relevant geographical territories,83 Schiller’s Ankündigung can be seen as an epochal
statement with even broader implications. Before taking a closer look at the specific wording of
Schiller’s apolitical aesthetic program for Die Horen, I would like to provide an overview of the
journal’s brief career.

An Overview of Die Horen: Expectations, Results, Implications
The project of associating education in taste with moral betterment had its roots in the
ideals of Enlightenment, and the notion of ästhetische Erziehung had circulated since around
1750.84 Moreover, the intellectual idea behind Die Horen of uniting reason and beauty had been
contemplated by Schiller for some time and represented a culmination of his ventures in periodical
publication. Since 1787, too, the poet had entertained the idea of a “herrschenden NationalJournal”85 – a symbiosis of political and aesthetic ambitions. By the time he signed the contract
for Die Horen in June 1794, Schiller had already edited and published several periodicals, all of
them quite short-lived: Wirtembergisches Repertorium der Litteratur (1782-1783), Rheinische
Thalia (1785), Thalia (1785-1791), and Neue Thalia (1792-1795). Already in 1792, Schiller had
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expressed his “alte Idee” of a collective and intellectually authoritative effort in the shape of an
“allgemeine Zeitschrift” – which, as such, would suppress ideological bias.86 With Die Horen,
then, Schiller finally had an opportunity not only to realize this creative idea but also to supersede
the Enlightenment’s paradigm of gradual improvement of reason and morality through merely
conceptual clarification. Schiller’s new project would accomplish a leap forward by bringing about
a union between “gelehrte Welt” and “schöne Welt,” “sowohl spielend als ernsthaft” (A, 871).87
Just like its predecessors, the ambitiously conceived Die Horen made a rather brief
appearance on the German-speaking cultural arena – but a noteworthy one nonetheless. In a letter
from June 1794 to his friend Christian Gottfried Körner, Schiller assigned a truly grand task to his
publishing undertaking: “Unser Journal soll ein Epoche machendes Werk seyn, und alles, was
Geschmack haben will, muß uns kaufen und lesen.”88 Not only, then, did Schiller envision his
journal as an influential authority in the present, but he also endowed it with a future-molding
function. For, in Schiller’s vision, Die Horen would inaugurate nothing less than a new epoch – a
break with the received past and an introduction of a novel, albeit unspecified, future. The novelty
of this future would be closely regulated by the authority of taste, Geschmack: “[...] alles, was
Geschmack haben will” would have to flock to the prophetically conceived journal in order to
fulfill its aesthetic ambition or claim. In its wide field, the new journal would tolerate no
competition. Its imperial goal was to conquer the space of periodical literature in Germany, forcing
out any journals that had “das Unglück” to offer similar content.89
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To this end, Schiller was determined to bring together the most famous and influential
German-speaking authors, an aspiration that can likely be linked to a general “Auratisierung der
Dichterpersönlichkeit” in the last decade of the eighteenth-century German letters.90 To be sure,
this emphasis on fame was motivated not least by the financial incentive to impress potential
readers with the announced contributors’ established authority91 – this, too, indicative of what
Christa Bürger has diagnosed as a contemporaneous capitalization of the literary market: “Die
Tatsache [...], daß literarische Produkte wie andere Waren zu einem bestimmten Preis gehandelt
werden, der sich nicht nach dem Wahrheitsgehalt der Aussage, sondern nach dem Tauschwert
bekannter Namen richtet [...].”92 This was not a particularly difficult task in the 1794 Weimar – a
small town that, through a chain of circumstances, had become a cultural center of the Germanspeaking territories. With Goethe employed as a privy councilor in the Duchy of Saxe-Weimar,
the neighboring cities of Weimar and Jena had attracted a number of influential intellectuals.93
Presented in the journal’s announcement as an “achtungswürdige Gesellschaft” and studiously
listed in alphabetical order, the resulting roster of names had their fame in common but diverged
greatly in terms of their intellectual provenance, which would ultimately detract from the journal’s
long-term cohesion.94 Curiously, the offerings of the announced “achtungswürdige Gesellschaft”
were to be published anonymously in the journal’s individual issues, the names of the contributors
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not to be revealed until the end of each Jahrgang.95 It is as though the journal’s offerings,
comprising pieces by several illustrious contributors at a time, were nonetheless meant to be
presented as a kind of universal achievement of the human spirit in line with the journal’s
underlying premise of “veredelt[e] Menschheit” (A, 870). The creators of the individual texts might
be different, but their ultimate origin and intention was presented as unified under a single editorial
and authorial premise.
Also worthy of attention is the announced journal’s title, the “ehrenvoll[e] Nam[e], den sie
an ihrer Stirne führt” (A, 872). In a departure from Schiller’s invocation of the single mythological
figure of Thalia, the muse of comedy, in his publishing undertakings prior to Die Horen, his new
journal was given a plural name. Echoing the editor’s determination to bring together “die besten
Köpfe der Nation” in a collective effort of intellectual exertion, this newly plural title
communicates a sense of harmonious unity of several faculties and authorities. A classical Greek
reference, “Die Horen” implicitly located the origin of autonomously defined aesthetics in an
unreachably distant yet consonant mythological past. The announced, and thereby also summoned,
patron muses of the journal, the mythological figures of the Horae themselves – the deities of the
recurring seasons Eunomia (“order”), Dike (“justice”), Irene (“peace”) – were expected to endow
the ambitious undertaking with lawfulness and order: “In diesen Göttergestalten verehrte der
Grieche die welterhaltende Ordnung, aus dem alles Gute fließt, und die in dem gleichförmigen
Rhythmus des Sonnenlaufs ihr treffendstes Sinnbild findet” (A, 871.) Already the name of the
announced journal carried programmatic implications, heralding a harmonious union of the
rational, the moral, and the beautiful. The harmony envisioned in and through “Die Horen” was
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that of a transcendent union about to descend onto the conflict-ridden Babylonic human world.96
In this manner, commensurate with the journal’s prophesied epoch-making significance – “Unser
Journal soll ein Epoche machendes Werk seyn” – was its retrospective legitimation through a
“welterhaltende Ordnung.” And precisely this mythological reference allows Schiller to articulate
the novel project at the core of his journal’s program. Suddenly turning to the past tense, the poet
briefly recites the origin myth of the Horae, to which he appends a philosophical lesson: “[...] eine
reizende Dichtung, durch welche angedeutet wird, daß das Schöne schon in seiner Geburt sich
unter Regeln fügen muß und nur durch Gesetzmäßigkeit würdig werden kann, einen Platz im
Olymp, Unsterblichkeit und einen moralischen Wert zu erhalten” (A, 872). By thus reciting a
mythical past, Schiller performs a key historiographic gesture: “an attempt to recover an imagined
past so it can interact with the present needs.”97
Schiller’s fixation on harmony went beyond the thematic content of Die Horen.
Apparently, the claim promulgated in the Ankündigung that Die Horen would strictly avoid the
noise of politically provoked polemics also extended to the journal itself. Efforts were made to
stifle criticism of the publication – arguably, so as to prevent it from becoming an object of
polemic, debate, and contestation, and thus an object generative of politics. In order to steer the
path of his journal’s popular resonance, Schiller arranged for those affiliated with it to publish
positive reviews of individual issues,98 not an uncommon strategy “einer gezielten
Rezensionspraxis” at that time.99 It seems that, having been announced as a visionary source of
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wisdom in matters of intellectuality and taste, the journal had to preserve that same appearance of
undisputed authority upon its actual release into the plural, and potentially dissenting, hands of the
reading public.
Ultimately, however, the arranged positive reviews did little to ensure impeccably
enthusiastic reception. Negative criticism prevailed. Notably, already the title of the journal
provoked disapproval. One prominent critic argued that its title’s obscure classical reference was
incomprehensible for most readers: The lofty name, “die an den Geist des Volks gerichtet seyn
soll” was actually “ein unverständliches, fremdes, Ehrerbietung heischendes Wort,” in which “ein
Ungelehrter durchaus nichts versteht”100 – an accusation that indirectly referenced the journal’s
own contractually codified promise of broad comprehensibility.101 Furthermore, it was argued, Die
Horen lacked editorial and thematic unity, combining demanding theoretical discourse with lighter
material – in private correspondence, Goethe characterized the issue containing his Römische
Elegien and Schiller’s Ästhetische Briefe as a “Centaur.”102 The journal’s theoretical difficulty,
too, was decried as an overwrought effort – one critic went so far as to demand that Schiller’s
Briefe, the journal’s centerpiece and its program’s theoretical foundation, be translated into
German.103 Still others criticized what they perceived as the journal’s politically conservative tone,
arguing that Die Horen, despite its purportedly apolitical program, in reality promoted a counterrevolutionary agenda.104 Ultimately, too, Schiller’s magnanimous gesture of aesthetically
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educating the German public had its limits. Once the complaints from the unruly readership started
coming in, the poet-editor declared himself pedagogically at a loss: “Wenn es Leser giebt, die
lieber die Wassersuppen in anderen Journalen kosten als eine kräftige Speise in den Horen
geniessen wollen [...] so ist dieses freylich sehr übel, aber zu helfen weiß ich nicht.”105 Beyond a
somewhat humorously irascible capitulation by the poet vis a vis his discontented readers,
Schiller’s dismissive statement also conveys an implicit prioritization of the author’s genius over
the lowly demands of the reading public. This posture of prideful autonomy impervious to
uneducated contestation certainly has implications quite a bit broader than Schiller’s particular
character traits. Indeed, it is consonant with the very premise of the announced journal and the
specific innovation accomplished by it: the articulation of literary autonomy.106
Schiller’s highly idealized presentation of his project as a peace-bringing authority stands
in stark contrast with the various mundane conflicts that accompanied it behind the scenes.107 Soon
after the project’s start, the ambitious editor did not see eye to eye with his collaborators – those
“besten Köpfe der Nation” – and conflicts ensued. Prominent figures departed the
“achtungswürdige Gesellschaft.”108 Pretty soon, the subscription numbers of Die Horen sank from
the impressive initial 2,000 to about 1,000 pieces. Contrary to the bold expectations placed on it
at the outset, the journal proved a “spektakulär[er] Mißerfolg.”109 By January 1796, only a year
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after the journal’s start, Schiller had distanced himself from the project, having, as he claimed,
“von der Theorie Abschied genommen.”110 In contrast to its inauguration with an ambitious and
far-reaching announcement, Die Horen ultimately disappeared from the publishing market without
so much as a public notification.111 Discontinued in January 1798 – with its last issue belatedly
released in June 1798112 – this journal marked the end of Friedrich Schiller’s fourteen-year career
in the field of periodical publication and thus also in the field of formation and reformation of the
reading public’s intellectual and aesthetic foundations.
Despite its programmatic promise of harmony, the journal nevertheless ended up igniting
an open conflict on the stage of literary politics in the German-speaking world.113 Schiller and
Goethe fired back at the critics of their aesthetic crusade, publishing in Schiller’s Musenalmanach
auf das Jahr 1797 a collection of satirical epigrams titled Xenien – here, as with Die Horen, a
reference to the Greeks, albeit now with a sarcastic rather than noble inflection. Even if Schiller
and Goethe themselves soon retreated, this “fürchterliche Affäre”114 had long-lasting
consequences, hardening the positions of the various warring camps. 115 Engendered by the
programmatically nonpartisan Die Horen, Die Xenien gave an outlet to extreme partisanship,
arguably helping to extinguish “allgemeine Bestrebungen der literarischen Welt in
Deutschland.”116
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Retrospectively, Die Horen have been canonized as the central publishing organ of Weimar
Classicism – indeed, as “das imponierende Dokument klassischen Denkens.”117 By initiating the
consequential collaboration between Schiller and Goethe in the first place, Die Horen gave rise to
much more than a temporary collaboration between two mortals: Brought together in creative
alliance were two figures that, through a certain process of transmission and tradition, would
morph into cultural symbols with wide-ranging, not least political, significance.118 The related
gesture of canonizing this historical collaboration as a “Classicism” has created an image of an
established cultural status quo advantageously propped up by a forum for propagating its wellestablished ideas. In reality, however, the situation was likely much less defined and more
precarious.119 The very period – or “local cultural phenomenon”120 – that has, post factum,
circulated under the contested title of “Weimar Classicism”121 saw itself constituted, in part,
around the program announced with Die Horen – but also around the wide-ranging polemics
engendered by it. Indeed, even as he praises its formulation of aesthetic autonomy as a
groundbreaking cultural achievement, T.J. Reed reconstructs the brief project of Weimar
Classicism as one of intense opposition, arguing against the “Zerrbild der Klassik als einer
mühelosen gesellschaftlichen Institution.”122As Steffan Davies underscores, Weimar Classicism,
despite its canonical image of harmony, was “born out of crisis” – a time of massive sociopolitical
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upheaval and displacement in the wake of the French Revolution.123 Consonant with these
reconstructions is Hans-Dietrich Dahnke and Bernd Leistner’s general overview of the 1780s and
1790s as a period replete with intellectual polemics and generative of something like a
Disassoziationsvorgang in the German-speaking literary and intellectual field.124 As Christa
Bürger argues, the Xenien controversy, and by extension the project of Die Horen, was a significant
event in what she diagnoses as a “Zerfall der Einheit der literarischen Öffentlichkeit” – a process
that was felt to result not least from political polarization in the wake of the French Revolution,
i.e., precisely the kind of politically induced polarization Schiller’s apolitical program in Die
Horen had intended to forestall. 125

Aesthetics of Autonomy
I would now like to take a closer look at the journal’s announcement, Ankündigung, in
which Schiller’s editorial ambition found a worthy expression. Despite its merely annunciatory
status, this missive lavishly deployed brilliant rhetoric and has been distinguished not only in the
context of its author’s oeuvre as a “Kabinettstück Schillerscher Prosa”126 but also as a “herrliches
Stück Prosa” more generally.127 Already at the time of its publication, the Ankündigung was
praised for its own artistic worth: “vielleicht eines der ersten Avertissements, die einen Kunstwerth
haben.”128 Indeed, beyond its immediate task of announcing future writing, this preliminary prose
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anticipated Schiller’s poetological ideal of “schöne Diktion” – namely, diction that is not merely
mechanical but “ein organisches Produkt” – an idea that the poet would develop in his 1795 essay
“Über die notwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch schöner Formen.”129 Already the new journal’s
announcement, then, foreshadowed its aesthetically programmatic ambition of ennobling intellect
through beauty. With its program of political abstinence and concomitant claim to aesthetic
autonomy, Schiller’s announcement of Die Horen was received as a “kulturpolitisches Manifest”
already by its contemporaries.130
As mentioned above, the incomprehensibility of the journal’s “‘philosophisch seyn
sollender Abhandlungen’” was a frequent theme in the contemporary criticism.131 This
circumstance may seem trivial, but it actually touches on a more fundamental point, namely, the
conflict between the Enlightenment’s instrumental idea of art and the ideal of autonomous art
developed by Schiller prior to and concurrently with Die Horen.132 Implied by the allegation of
incomprehensibility was the sin of non-utility:133 If, that is, readers had difficulty accessing the
lofty texts offered by Die Horen, how was the latter supposed to serve as an instrument of
edification for the former? Prominent among the critics of Die Horen, the old guard of the
Enlightenment lamented the journal’s inability to publish intellectual and literary discourse that
would propel its audience to independent thought and moral betterment.134 For Schiller, however,
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precisely the Enlightenment’s emphasis on reason was too short-sighted. The poet was interested,
rather, in mediating between reason and sensuousness by way of art. By 1794, too, Schiller had
come to see art as a sui generis realm that, as he thought, nonetheless had profound sociopolitical
implications.
As several scholars have argued, it is precisely in its departure from the Enlightenment
ideal that the journal’s epochal significance resided. Steffan Davies, for instance, has called into
question the frequent reference to this project’s famous failure, arguing that Schiller’s Weimar
journal embarked, rather, on “the most important question put to culture by the age”: “how could
the artist respond as artist – how might art respond as art – to the challenges of the day?”135 Indeed,
Davies and others argue,136 Schiller was able to overcome the Enlightenment’s instrumental
conception of art in favor of a more advanced stance: that of aesthetic autonomy. Since Schiller’s
aesthetic program for Die Horen was no creation ex nihilo, I would now like to sketch out a brief
overview of this idea’s background in Schiller’s intellectual biography.
The development of Schiller’s aesthetics did not follow a smooth path. Preoccupied with
the question of art’s legitimation early on,137 the poet started out by polemizing against the
Enlightenment’s instrumental conception of art as a means to human betterment,138 yet he soon
shifted his outlook, defending the idea of a national theater on the basis of its indirect civic
significance.139 Not yet in possession of a theory that could justify art without at the same time
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instrumentalizing it, Schiller would reach the next stage of his aesthetic preoccupations in 1788,
when his poem “Die Götter Griechenlands” incited an intense polemic, having been accused of
supplanting Christianity with pagan deities from Greek mythology and thereby failing to dutifully
affirm Christian revelation as the true basis for all poetry. Polemically provoked in this manner,
Schiller began to articulate a theory of autonomy as essential to all art and poetry.140 Subsequently
envisioning art, as opposed to Lessing’s religion, as the path to humanity’s education in his poem
“Die Künstler,”141 Schiller eventually crystallized his nascent hypothesis that the lyric poet’s task
consisted in unifying what had been fragmented: “ ‘den ganzen Menschen in uns.’”142 That is, it
was the poet’s duty to make man as such the subject matter of his poetizing. For Schiller, then, the
specific value of art consisted in its unique ability to access human beings in their essential,
universal integrity, as human beings. Famously influenced by Kant’s 1791 Kritik der Urteilskraft
and its emancipation of aesthetic judgment from externally imposed regulations, Schiller
nonetheless intended to revise Kant’s explicit separation between art and morality143 by searching
for art’s moral and thus civic significance: Avoiding a mere instrumentalization of art for moral
ends, Schiller sought a more organic connection.144
Schiller’s mature theory of aesthetic autonomy was, in practice, not quite autonomous,
made possible as it was by a stipend from his patron, the liberally minded Prince Friedrich
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Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Augustenburg.145 In a 1793 series of letters to the
Danish prince, Schiller formulated what would, a year later, be revised into his central contribution
to Die Horen: the epistolary treatise titled Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer
Reihe von Briefen. It was now precisely the principle of aesthetic autonomy that was envisioned
to have a crucial political effect: It would illuminate the human being’s capacity for freedom as
such. It is important to highlight the specific concept of aesthetics at the core of Schiller’s 1794
epochal project. No merely local matter of improving his compatriots’ sense of taste, aesthetics,
for Schiller, is a realm privileged with an enviable access to the very essence of humanity. Through
his theory of aesthetic education, Schiller has in mind the formation, Erziehung, of the human
being as human being. In other words, in his project of aesthetic education, Schiller is concerned
with the human being as a speculative ideal of humanity or humankind. Taking its point of
departure from the universal concept of Menschheit, Schiller’s aesthetic-theoretical undertaking is
emphatically not concerned with particular human beings in their plural existence.
While the concept of “autonomy” is not explicitly implemented by Schiller in his
Ästhetische Briefe,146 it is generally utilized in the Schiller scholarship to refer to the novel project
of Schiller’s aesthetics. The thesis that Schiller accomplished an epochal rethinking of art on its
own terms and for its own sake is consistent across interpretations. Its apparent familiarity
notwithstanding, “Autonomie” is a term with its own history and presuppositions, emerging in
German literature in the second half of the eighteenth century – particularly, as Katrin Kohl has
argued, in the wake of Kant’s conceptualization of Dichtung as art in his Kritik der Urteilskraft
and his assignment of schöne Kunst to the purview of genius as opposed to externally imposed
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rules. Kohl emphasizes the metaphorical character of the term “autonomy,” highlighting its various
connotations of liberation: among them, geopolitical liberation from other national traditions as
well as disciplinary liberation from theology, rhetoric, and eventually philosophy.147 With the
discovery of something like artistic and literary autonomy, then, a lot was at stake. According to
some, the program of aesthetic autonomy in Die Horen offers a “radical” alternative to the
destruction perpetrated by political discourse.148 Some have even highlighted this episode in the
German tradition as a kind of civilizing moment in the midst of intellectual backwardness: “als
epochemachendes Geschenk an die europäische Kultur und als Fortführung des aufklärerischen
Prinzips der freien Meinungsäußerung.”149 Others, however, insist that this novel program of
autonomous art was indicative of a broad and, ultimately, destructive shift: “von einer bürgerlichaufklärerischen zu einer bürgerlich-autonomen Institutionalisierung der Literatur” and thus
indicative of broader tendencies of socio-political atomization.150
“Displacement of Politics”: Goethe’s Unterhaltungen and Schiller’s Ankündigung
In light of the Schillerian program outlined above, the status of Goethe’s Unterhaltungen
deutscher Ausgewanderten is anything but uncontroversial. Already at the time of its publication
in partial installments in Die Horen, the text was hardly met with enthusiasm. Charlotte von Stein,
a sophisticated reader and member of Weimar’s conservative cultural elite, lamented, “Dem
Goethe scheint's gar nicht mehr Ernst um's Schreiben zu sein [...].”151 Wilhelm von Humboldt, one
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of Schiller’s original collaborators on Die Horen, summarized, “Die Unterhaltungen misfallen
durchaus und total.”152 Most importantly, Schiller, too, registered his disappointment in a
December 5, 1794 letter to Körner: “Von ihm [Goethe] findest Du in dem ersten Stück noch den
Anfang einer Reyhe von Erzählungen, aber dieser Anfang, der zur Einleitung dienen soll, hat
meine Erwartung keinswegs befriedigt. Leider trifft dieses Unglück schon das erste Stück, aber es
war nicht mehr zu ändern.”153 As Schiller indicates here, Goethe’s Unterhaltungen are perceived
as unsatisfactory specifically in their introductory or inaugural function. With Goethe himself
admitting to the contingent status of this piece of writing,154 its initial dismissal and minimization
likely influenced subsequent reception.
Overlooked for a long time as a subpar product by the canonized maestro, Unterhaltungen
deutscher Ausgewanderten has been rediscovered with great interpretive vigor. The text has given
rise to various, often mutually exclusive readings. Of course, precisely this interpretive crossroads
is predicted by the text’s own poetological premises discussed at the beginning of this chapter:
After all, the character of the Old Man does warn the emigrants, “alles was ich vorzubringen habe,
hat keinen Wert an sich” (UdA, 1016). In this light, Michael Saman convincingly emphasizes the
epistemological significance of Goethe’s text, suggesting that “Whether we choose to view the
Unterhaltungen [...] as a messy textual inkblot or as a pristine poetic unity – what comes to the
foreground either way is the process of judgment by which the reader goes about determining
meaning or unity in them.”155 That is, Goethe’s text – at least in the way in which it confronts its
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readers, if not necessarily in the way it may have been conceived or expected within broader
theoretical frameworks – confronts these readers first and foremost with the problem of its own
interpretation. Similarly, Kirk Wetters has highlighted the text’s specifically “literary
circumvention” of the “egocentric political exchange” and its gradual transformation from a
“community of belief” into a “community of interpretation.”156
This insight into the specific sui generis character of Goethe’s puzzling text has not always
been acknowledged by the scholarly consensus. Rather, the interpretability of the Unterhaltungen
has mostly been discussed in conjunction with Schiller’s editorial program in Die Horen. To be
sure, the exact logic of the relationship between Goethe’s and Schiller’s respective contributions
to Die Horen is a contentious matter. Some claim, “Der ästhetische Theoretiker führte, und der
Erzähler folgte ihm nach, indem er seine Sache nach und nach entwickelte.”157 Others argue,
“Goethe’s emigrants were not just a response to Schiller’s programme, but formed it.”158 Thus,
Goethe’s contribution has been variously declared an outright subversion of that program, an
unconditional fulfillment of it, or an inextricable part of its very formation.159 Common to all of
these strains of interpretation, however, is the assumption that Goethe’s text is largely exhausted
when accommodated within the aesthetic vision and program underlying Schiller’s theoretical and
editorial project.
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The confusion likely stems not least from the close collaboration and exchange between
Schiller and Goethe during the planning stages of Die Horen in the autumn and winter of 1794,
which Goethe authorized with the following verdict: “Wir wissen nun [...] daß wir in Prinzipien
einig sind und daß die Kreise unseres Empfindens, Denkens und Wirkens teils koinzidieren, teils
sich berühren.”160 Yet, from a purely chronological lens, the two authors’ collaboration was
preceded by Schiller’s Einladung zur Mitarbeit, in which he had already formulated some of the
main principles of his nascent project. This means that Goethe, before agreeing to contribute to
Die Horen or writing any part of the Unterhaltungen, had to have acquainted himself with the
project’s direction and, specifically, its programmatic abstention from political discourse. Having
received the first nine of Schiller’s Ästhetische Briefe on the 20th of October and communicated
his enthusiastic approval, Goethe sent Schiller the first installment of his Unterhaltungen on the
27th of November. Schiller, in turn, responded on the 29th of November, noting his intention to
write an Ankündigung for the journal, in which he would apprise the reading public of the journal’s
apolitical program. The promised Ankündigung was sent to Goethe on the 6th of December. As this
chronological outline suggests, Goethe’s framing narrative for the Unterhaltungen, while aware
of Schiller’s editorial intention, nonetheless preceded Schiller’s composition of the Ankündigung,
this “herrliches Stück Prosa.” In order to trace Schiller’s rendition of a theme articulated by
Goethe, it would be instructive to juxtapose their respective texts.
Schiller’s Ankündigung opens with the vocabulary of imminent war and its negative effects
on society’s intellectual development. In response, he proposes a preemptively censored discourse
that would avoid polarizing topics – i.e., topics that trigger disagreement by inviting a variety of
interpretations in accordance with the interpreters’ particular personal interests and corresponding
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political affiliations. He forestalls this unavoidable perspectival variety with a preemptively
speculative gesture, counteracting the conflict-inducing minutia of material circumstances with a
universal, and thus conciliatory, viewpoint:
Zu einer Zeit, wo das nahe Geräusch des Krieges das Vaterland ängstiget, wo der Kampf
politischer Meinungen und Interessen diesen Krieg beinahe in jedem Zirkel erneuert und
nur allzuoft Musen und Grazien daraus verscheucht, wo weder in den Gesprächen noch in
den Schriften des Tages vor diesem allverfolgenden Dämon der Staatskritik Rettung ist,
möchte es ebenso gewagt als verdienstlich sein, den so sehr zerstreuten Leser zu einer
Unterhaltung von ganz entgegengesetzter Art einzuladen. In der Tat scheinen die
Zeitumstände einer Schrift wenig Glück zu versprechen, die sich über das Lieblingsthema
des Tages ein strenges Stillschweigen auferlegen und ihren Ruhm darin suchen wird, durch
etwas anderes zu gefallen, als wodurch jetzt alles gefällt. Aber je mehr das beschränkte
Interesse der Gegenwart die Gemüter in Spannung setzt, einengt und unterjocht, desto
dringender wird das Bedürfnis, durch ein allgemeines und höheres Interesse an dem, was
rein menschlich und über allen Einfluß der Zeiten erhaben ist, sie wieder in Freiheit zu
setzen und die politisch geteilte Welt unter der Fahne der Wahrheit und Schönheit wieder
zu vereinigen. (A, 870, Schiller’s emphasis)
Without defining what exactly “politisch” might mean, Schiller envisions it as a phenomenon of
division – the world is divided insofar as it is politically divided (“politisch geteilte Welt”) – and
one rooted in the temporally determined strife (“das beschränkte Interesse der Gegenwart”). In
response to this division, Schiller seeks unity predicated upon speculative, universal, and
atemporal principles, “über allen Einfluss der Zeiten erhaben.” Striving to supersede the
multifaceted constraints of time, Schiller plans to distil the atemporal human (“rein menschlich”)
essence. In this memorable opening paragraph of Schiller’s Ankündigung, a number of
formulations will ring familiar to the reader of Goethe’s Unterhaltungen. By imposing silence,
Stillschweigen, on the favorite topic of the day, Schiller foreshadows the vision of conversation im
Stillen as proposed by Goethe’s Baroness: “Aber das kann ich von dem Zirkel erwarten, in dem
ich lebe, daß Gleichgesinnte sich im Stillen zu einander fügen und sich angenehm unterhalten,
indem der eine dasjenige sagt, was der andere schon denkt” (UdA, 1007, my emphasis).
Furthermore, reminiscent of the despotic de-escalation enforced by the Baroness through her
54

Gesetz of pleasant Unterhaltung, Schiller promises that his journal – an “Unterhaltung von ganz
entgegengesetzter Art” – is going to set free (“in Freiheit zu setzen”) the socio-intellectually
distracted reading public (A, 870, my emphasis). Announced as a remedy for “den so sehr
zerstreuten Leser,” this Unterhaltung is nonetheless also figured in terms of distraction:
Dies ist der Gesichtspunkt, aus welchem die Verfasser dieser Zeitschrift dieselbe betrachtet
wissen möchten. Einer heitern und leidenschaftfreien Unterhaltung soll sie gewidmet sein,
und dem Geist und Herzen des Lesers, den der Anblick der Zeitbegebenheiten bald
entrüstet, bald niederschlägt, eine fröhliche Zerstreuung gewähren. (A, 870, my emphasis)
In a subtle play on the two possible senses of the same word, Schiller heralds his journal as that
correctively edifying mechanism through which the reader will find her way to the distraction of
the proper kind. By curtailing the potentially uncontrollable polysemy of his words, the editor
preemptively authorizes the correct usage by censoring the excessive kind of distraction (“so sehr
zerstreuten”) and specifying what kind of “Zerstreuung” is allowed (“fröhliche Zerstreuung”). In
this manner, the noise of war is corrected by the harmony of the editor’s prescription.161
Reminiscent of the Baroness’s prescriptive language, this externally imposed semantic purification
– by way of censoring one kind of Unterhaltung and authorizing another – nonetheless stands in
stark contrast with the reverberation in the word Unterhaltung as it is announced by Goethe’s Old
Man:
Diese Unterhaltung wird für die versammelte Gesellschaft aufgespart. Wir dürfen ihr
nichts entziehen, und ich sage voraus: alles was ich vorzubringen habe, hat keinen Wert an
sich. Wenn aber die Gesellschaft, nach einer ernsthaften Unterhaltung, auf eine kurze Zeit
ausruhen, wenn sie sich, von manchem Guten schon gesättigt, nach einem leichten
Nachtische umsieht, alsdann werd ich bereit sein, und wünsche daß das, was ich vorsetze,
nicht unschmackhaft befunden werde. (UdA, 1016, emphasis mine).

Here, I am partially drawing upon Bonnie Honig’s discussion of Jacques Derrida’s critique of John Austin’s
theoretical move to preemptively make sure that there is “no dissemination escaping the horizon of the unity of
meaning” and that the performatives he theorizes “are reined in by an ‘exhaustively determinable context [that] implies
teleologically that no remainder escapes the present totalization’” (Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the
Displacement of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2016), 90).
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Here, the Old Man uses the crucial word Unterhaltung twice, yet in two incompatible senses.
Whereas the first instance of this word (“Diese Unterhaltung wird fur die versammelte Gesellschaft
aufgespart [...]”) is used to refer to the stories that are about to be shared, the second one refers to
the serious conversation (“ernsthafte Unterhaltung”), which should precede that other – possible
but not necessary – Unterhaltung. Sandwiched between these two incompatible senses of the word
Unterhaltung is the Old Man’s relativizing warning against seeking a value unto itself in any one
of his utterances: “[...] und ich sage voraus: alles was ich vorzubringen habe, hat keinen Wert an
sich” (UdA, 1016). Differently from Schiller’s proposal to purify “Zerstreuung” through an
“Unterhaltung von ganz entgegengesetzer Art,” Goethe’s Old Man moves from “Unterhaltung” to
“Unterhaltung” with no advance notice. Similarly, whereas Schiller on behalf of his fellow
Verfasser, prescribes the light in which their journal is to be read – “Dies ist der Gesichtspunkt,
aus welchem die Verfasser dieser Zeitschrift dieselbe betrachtet wissen möchten” – Goethe’s Old
Man leaves the question of interpretive lighting open: “[...] es kommt freilich vieles auf den
Beobachter an und was für eine Seite man den Sachen abzugewinnen weiß [...]” (A, 870; UdA,
1015).
The poetological tonality – prescribed in Schiller and left open in Goethe – has important
implications for the two texts’ respective conceptions of community as a fundamentally ambiguous
mechanism of inclusion and exclusion. Reminiscent of the law proposed by Goethe’s Baroness –
“Aber das kann ich von dem Zirkel erwarten, in dem ich lebe, daß Gleichgesinnte sich im Stillen
zu einander fügen und sich angenehm unterhalten, indem der eine dasjenige sagt, was der andere
schon denkt” – Schiller’s vision of his project hinges on the transformation of the community into
a prescribed circle (“Zirkel”). Hitherto pluralized by conflict – “Zu einer Zeit [...] wo der Kampf
politischer Meinungen und Interessen diesen Krieg beinahe in jedem Zirkel erneuert [...]” – this
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circle is to be supplanted “mitten in diesem politischen Tumult” by “einen engen vertraulichen
Zirkel” by way of prescriptively abstinent Unterhaltung (UdA, 1007, my emphasis; A, 870, my
emphasis). However, whereas this circular togetherness represents the ultimate aim of Schiller’s
vision, it is revised and displaced in Goethe’s text. There, precisely the pivotal figure of the
Verfasser, on whose – collective – behalf Schiller speaks about future speech, is pluralized in a
dissonant manner, split into the Baroness and the Old man, no longer able to prescribe univocally:
The complex interaction between their respective Ankündigungen in Goethe’s text calls the very
potential of program fulfillment into question. The Old Man’s theorization emerges as a kind of
remainder that escapes the totalization of the Baroness’s foundational gesture.
Regardless of the exact lineage of the apolitical program of Die Horen, is it fair to argue,
as Hartmut Reinhardt does, that Goethe’s Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten is a
“Begleitwerk zu Schillers Ästhetik und nichts anderes”?162 I do not wish either to affirm or dispute
that Goethe may have been in agreement with Schiller’s apolitically formulated aesthetic project.
Rather, I am interested in highlighting the specific difference between the manner in which Goethe
ended up framing his Unterhaltungen and Schiller’s articulation of his own program. To this end,
I have tried to shed light on what I see as an irreducible undecidability within Goethe’s text –
specifically, in contrast to the rhetorical brilliance of Schiller’s Ankündigung.163
Another source of controversy surrounding Goethe’s Unterhaltungen has to do with the
political stance translated through it. Didn’t it communicate an indisputably conservative rejection
of the revolutionary developments in France – and thus tacit support for the system of the ancien
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régime? This was already the dominant reception at the time of the text’s first publication in Die
Horen. Not only, it was argued, did the Unterhaltungen, at first anonymously authored, support
the politically illiberal status quo but also did so under the guise of apoliticism, thereby naturalizing
that which surely had its specific spatiotemporal prerequisites and was thus reformable. As the
historical record shows, Goethe’s political affinities certainly did not reside with the revolution,
although his specific rejection of the revolutionary events in France are anything but simple.
Moreover, the poet’s own political activity in his role as Privy Councilor to the Duke of SaxeWeimar often proved suppressive of sociopolitical reform.164 As W. Daniel Wilson argues, “In the
end, of course, he worked both as a writer and as a privy councilor against stirrings of resistance
to absolutism in Germany. In doing so, he gave the lie to the notion – persistent even to this day –
that Weimar Classicism represents a ‘disengagement’ from politics. Goethe and Schiller both
mobilized literature against the forces of revolution.”165
In this light, the issue I take with the dominant tenor of the secondary literature on Goethe’s
Unterhaltungen is the ease with which this scholarship often packages the text under various
labels, deploying it as a programmatic foundation for, or illustration of, other theories or motives.
This theoretical stance on my part may appear to appeal to precisely the ideal of autonomous art –
and perhaps something like an autonomous criticism, blind to the text’s specific historical context.
That is not my intention, however. Instead, I propose to look in a slightly different direction. I am
less interested in what Goethe really meant to say based on his actual convictions: which political
side – the revolutionaries or the royalists – he supported personally and for which party he offered
support in his Unterhaltungen. As I have indicated above, the difficulty with his text – as perhaps,
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more generally, with those literary texts whose complexity of articulation somehow overshadows
their presumed message – is that it contains plenty of quotes that, if extracted on their own, would
serve to corroborate the claim of political partisanship, perhaps “a common phenomenon for a
writer who seldom conveyed an unalloyed political message in his complex works.”166 Without
overlooking Goethe’s own illiberal politics, one can nonetheless look at his Unterhaltungen and
find oneself puzzled by its specifically textual complexity. Whatever its program might have been,
Goethe’s text does not easily lend itself to a univocal, autonomous message. Its multiple voices
are, as I have tried to show, not always consonant. Significantly, this non-consonance goes beyond
the level of narrated opinions – of the royalists and or of the republicans. Rather, it also affects
their narration as well. I have attempted to demonstrate this by illuminating the tension between
the Baroness’s and the Old Man’s respective prescriptions for future Unterhaltung. Perhaps against
Goethe’s personal political convictions, the text he ends up putting to paper is at least not quite
controllable in a programmatic manner.
Finally, of particular interest for my investigation more broadly is the inextricable
connection of Schiller’s theory of aesthetic autonomy to his banishment of political topics
prefacing this theory as it was formulated and published in Die Horen. To be sure, as many scholars
have convincingly argued, Schiller’s Ästhetische Briefe – contrary to the appearance created by
their ostensible flight from the realm of politics into that of aesthetics – belong to political
philosophy.167 Indeed, Schiller himself seems to have implied as much in a letter to Goethe: “Ich
habe den politischen Jammer noch nie einer Feder angesetzt, und was ich in [den Ästhetischen
Briefen] davon sagte, geschah bloß, um in alle Ewigkeit nichts mehr davon zu sagen; aber ich
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glaube, daß das Bekenntnis, das ich darin ablege, nicht ganz überflüssig ist.”168 Crucially,
Schiller’s admission of having spoken on a political topic is succeeded by a decisive refusal to
utter another word on the matter. It is not my intention to dispute the political relevance of
Schiller’s aesthetic theory in its mature version articulated in 1794 and 1795. Indeed, this chapter
has largely avoided an explicit engagement with that theory. Rather, I have tried to call attention
to the gesture of banishing political discourse as an inextricably concomitant phenomenon of this
theory and its articulation. For, in the end, Schiller’s political – or perhaps metapolitical –
engagement is accompanied by an explicit rejection of “politics.” In calling into question Schiller’s
metapolitical project of political abstinence, I have drawn upon Bonnie Honig’s discernment of a
“mysterious phenomenon”: “the displacement of politics in political theory” – an aspiration within
the field of political theory and philosophy to makes politics (ostensibly, the field’s very subject
matter) superfluous.169 Envisioning themselves as solutions to problems, these theories envision
“politics” as that which needs to be regulated and ultimately reformed out of the equation.
The situation that outlines itself in Schiller’s Die Horen program is that “politics” is
banished from a discourse whose ultimate aim is, in fact, to educate the human being – den
Menschen – to a capacity for politics in the first place. Schiller’s propaedeutic is such that it instates
a positive thematic ban at the outset in order to enhance the human being’s – des Menschen –
broadly cognitive apparatus for a future receptivity to the propaedeutically banned realm.170 The
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In this light, Schiller’s pedagogical project may appear somewhat akin to Kant’s critical-philosophical one in the
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key point, of course, is that this very realm – “politics” – would acquire a reformed shape in organic
tandem with the aesthetically reformed human being, den Menschen, himself. As so many
individual instantiations of the universal and universally reformed Mensch, human beings would
be attuned to a coexistence and cooperation to which discord and contestation would be
definitionally foreign. With his editorial program for Die Horen, Schiller inaugurates his aesthetics
through a performative gesture of hereby declaring politics banned.

some future point. The question, for Kant, is, rather, how much one can say, i.e., know, about certain topics, given the
innate and irreducible constraints of human reason.
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Chapter 2
Artistic Autonomy: Gottfried Benn’s Poetological Polemics

Ich las kürzlich in einer Zeitung, im Besuchszimmer eines der neuen preußischen
Ministerien sei ein Schild folgenden Inhalts angeschlagen: “Man kommt nicht in eigener
Sache dorthin, wo ein neuer Staat aufgebaut wird.” Ausgezeichnet! Das soll heißen, wo die
Geschichte spricht, haben die Personen zu schweigen. Es ist die konkrete Formel der neuen
Staatsidee.171
Durch Zeitungsnotizen müßten Sie erfahren, daß ich mich dem neuen Staat zur Verfügung
hielte, öffentlich für ihn eintrete. [...] Ich muß Ihnen zunächst sagen, daß ich auf Grund
vieler Erfahrungen in den letzten Wochen die Überzeugung gewonnen habe, daß man über
die deutschen Vorgänge nur mit denen sprechen kann, die sie auch innerhalb Deutschlands
selbst erlebten. Nur die, die durch die Spannungen der letzten Monate hindurchgegangen
sind, die von Stunde zu Stunde, von Zeitung zu Zeitung, von Umzug zu Umzug, von
Rundfunkübertragung zu Rundfunkübertragung alles dies fortlaufend aus unmittelbarer
Nähe miterlebten, Tag und Nacht mit ihm rangen, selbst die, die das alles nicht jubelnd
begrüßten, sondern es mehr erlitten, mit diesen allen kann man reden, aber mit den
Flüchtlingen, die ins Ausland reisten, kann man es nicht.172
Inhibition of speech is at the forefront of both of these excerpts and is central to their source texts,
two radio broadcasts composed by the German poet Gottfried Benn in the wake of the National
Socialists’ accession to power: “Der neue Staat und die Intellektuellen” (April 1933) and “Antwort
an die literarischen Emigranten” (May 1933). With these two public statements, the venerated poet
“rocked the foundations of an entire intellectual class in Germany” by declaring allegiance to the
Nazi regime.173 In doing so, Benn appeared to renege on his long-held conviction of artistic
autonomy, which he had defended in his essayistic output in the late twenties and early thirties.
Both of Benn’s statements from the spring of 1933 posit borders – around the ideal of the
state and of the homeland – and thereby delimit the realm of transmissibility. Both of them, too,
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emphasize the medial aspect. Thus, while the April speech opens with a matter-of-fact reference
to something read in a newspaper (“Ich las kürzlich in einer Zeitung [...]”), the May statement not
only expects a similarly fluent referencing of the media from its addressees – “Durch
Zeitungsnotizen müßten Sie erfahren, daß ich mich dem neuen Staat zur Verfügung hielte,
öffentlich für ihn eintrete” – but also elevates it into a prerequisite for speaking in the first place:
“Nur die, die [...] von Zeitung zu Zeitung [...] alles dies fortlaufend aus unmittelbarer Nähe
miterlebten [...] mit diesen allen kann man reden [...].” Crucially, broadcast on the radio as well as
circulated in newspapers, Benn’s fateful 1933 speeches are inextricably bound up with the role of
mass media. Significant is thus not merely their particular content but also the mode of their
transmission as well as the question of transmissibility in general.
In both of these radio speeches, Benn does not simply offer a positive enunciation of his
newfound political allegiance. Rather, he frames it as a negation of someone else’s language. This
someone else is identified as the “intellectuals” in the first radio speech and is further othered into
“literary emigrants” in the second one. If Benn opens his April 1933 statement by quoting a statesanctioned prohibition – “‘Man kommt nicht in eigener Sache dorthin, wo ein neuer Staat
aufgebaut wird’” – by the time of his May 1933 speech, he has internalized this official formula
and translated it into a personal conviction: “[...] daß ich [...] die Überzeugung gewonnen habe,
daß man über die deutschen Vorgänge nur mit denen sprechen kann, die sie auch innerhalb
Deutschlands selbst erlebten.” Significantly, both of the poet’s pivotal radio addresses from the
spring of 1933 carry an undeniable programmatic weight. It is in this feature of a programmatic
ban on dissenting – political – speech that a notable affinity between Gottfried Benn and Friedrich
Schiller resides.
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Schiller and Benn are two literary figures whose commonalities have been extensively
explored.174 Both of them physicians by profession, they find fame in the literary field. Both start
out as poets and go on to develop ardent aesthetic theories – all the more ardent because of their
sweeping anthropological dimension – that, as Antje Büssgen demonstrates, are crucially
conditioned by a crisis of faith.175 It is then also not so much Benn’s poetry as, rather, his essayistic
writing, concerned mainly with questions of aesthetics, that illuminates his similarity with
Schiller.176 What I would specifically like to focus on in my reading is the striking echo between
the two poets’ respective gestures of speech censorship, which, to be sure, are closely connected
to their notions of aesthetic or artistic autonomy respectively. In 1794, Schiller bans political
speech in a programmatic announcement of his new publishing project with the pre-political goal
of aesthetically educating the humankind – or at least its German-speaking segment – to a capacity
for politics in the first place. In 1933, Benn bans political speech from all discourse about
Germany, envisioning the contemporaneous political moment in his home country as a pinnacle
of historical creativeness, immune to mere speech about it. It is noteworthy that both Schiller and
Benn promulgate their rejection of the public’s language in a public, circulated manner: via an
announcement in Schiller’s case and via radio broadcasts in Benn’s. In this way, both poets cast
an exclusionary circle around acceptable speech and acceptable speakers. In Schiller and Benn
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alike, this regulatory gesture vis a vis language revolves around the hardly self-evident notion of
“politics,” which, for both of them, has to do with the realm of current affairs. Whereas Schiller
dismisses this transient realm as a distraction from questions of eternal significance, Benn
monumentalizes it as an expression of metaphysical concerns. Ultimately, however, Schiller’s
depoliticization of aesthetics reemerges in a slightly different guise in Benn’s extreme, even if
brief, repoliticization of it.177

Biographical Overview: From Poet to Essayist
Surely, thoughts about poetry’s impact on the world must preoccupy any poet interested in
attaining more than locally generic significance. This question is particularly pronounced in the
case of Gottfried Benn, a practicing medical doctor and ambitious writer. Pivotal moments in
Benn’s literary career emerge from controversies around the question of literature’s social role.
Even as Benn’s conviction changes from adamant insistence on the artist’s autonomy to fervent
subordination of art to sociopolitical ends, his preoccupation with poetological apologetics remains
constant throughout his literary career.
Born in 1886 into the family of a Protestant pastor, Benn highlighted the significance of
his upbringing and its influence on his worldview. In a “Selbstdarstellung” from 1934, Benn
praises the households of German pastors for their historical achievement of producing “ein[en]
enorm[en] Teil der gesamten geistig produktiven, kulturschaffenden Macht des deutschen
Volkes.” 178 Going to great genealogical lengths to disprove allegations of Jewish heritage in his
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pedigree, Benn locates his origins not simply in the German “Volk” but, more specifically, in its
allegedly distinctive prerogative: that of creating culture, “Kultur.” Only after studying evangelical
theology and German philology at his father’s behest did the young Benn follow his own calling
with a study of medicine at the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Akademie für das militärärztliche
Bildungswesen.179 In 1912, Benn received his medical degree and permission to practice as a
physician, a life-long profession he performed mostly from a private practice for skin and venereal
diseases with intermittent appointments in the military as recompense for his state-sponsored
medical schooling. Retrospectively, Benn would judge his training in medicine and biology as
decisive elements of his intellectual development, which he credited with instilling in him a “Kälte
des Denkens, Nüchternheit, letzte Schärfe des Begriffs.”180 Admittedly, to what extent the
discipline of sober thinking can be traced in Benn’s prose is debatable.
In 1912, the publication of Benn’s debut volume of expressionistic poetry titled Morgue
und andere Gedichte brought him his first literary recognition – albeit from a narrow circle of
readers already predisposed to appreciate the Expressionist break with artistic norms.181 Surely not
without influence from his medical and anatomical studies,182 the young poet was able to fascinate
with an unperturbed handling of tabooed topics, such as bodily functions and ailments – a
confrontation with regions of reality hitherto discarded by literature and thus a radicalization of

179

Benn, “Lebensweg eines Intellektualisten,” 27.

“Rückblickend scheint mir meine Existenz ohne diese Wendung zur Medizin und Biologie völlig undenkbar. Es
sammelte sich noch einmal in diesen Jahren die ganze Summe der induktiven Epoche, ihre Methoden, Gesinnungen,
ihr Jargon, alles stand in vollster Blüte, es waren die Jahre ihres höchsten Triumphes [...] ihrer wahrhaft olympischen
Größe. Und eines lehrte sie die Jugend [...]: Kälte des Denkens, Nüchternheit, letzte Schärfe des Begriffs [...]
unerbittliche Kritik, Selbstkritik [...]” (“Lebensweg eines Intellektualisten,” 28).
180

181

Peter Uwe Hohendahl, Benn – Wirkung wider Willen (Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum Verlag, 1971), 25.

Klaus Theweleit, “The Politics of Orpheus between Women, Hades, Political Power and the Media: Some Thoughts
on the Configuration of the European Artist, Starting with the Figure of Gottfried Benn or: What Happens to
Eurydice?,” New German Critique 36 (1985): 133-156, here: 154.
182

66

the longstanding debate about literature’s realist potential.183 In the following years, Benn
published several more books of poems as well as experimental prose. After the appearance of his
Gesammelte Gedichte in 1927, the poet definitively entered Berlin’s literary scene and began to
expand his readership, although no longer via lyric poetry, which he would not write again until
1933.
Late 1920s and early 1930s saw a proliferation of poetological essays in Benn’s output.
“Poetological,” however, is perhaps too narrow a term to characterize the specific niche of this
self-consciously idiosyncratic prose. An avid reader of scientific and medical literature, Benn did
not so much treat these topics thematically in his essays as assimilated them in a process of extreme
“Verdichtung.”184 And yet, for all of their manifest idiosyncrasy, Benn’s essays were also quite
representative of certain prominent cultural currents of the time. Informed by genealogical
constructions of the Western civilization and its gradual cultural decline, Benn’s interpretation of
history rejected the notions of progress and rationality, situating him among the representatives of
the so-called Conservative Revolution. Composed of diverse reactionary responses to the troubles
of modernity, this multifaceted cultural phenomenon was characterized by a longing for the mythic
ideals of totality and unity – of the specifically nationalist variety – as well as an appeal to such
transpersonal values as Volk, ritual, and overcoming of utilitarian and materialist reality.185 In line
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with the Conservative Revolution’s apolitical and vatic conception of the poet’s role in the
world,186 art, for Benn, belonged to the realm of the irrational and was thus to be sharply
distinguished from the goal-oriented rationality and functionality of the sociopolitical sphere.
Benn’s efforts to gain socio-literary influence paid off. In April of 1932, at the height of
his professional recognition, he was elected to the Prussian Academy of Arts, the Weimar
Republic’s highest literary honor, one that Benn would not tire of highlighting.187 Less than a year
later, after the National Socialists had come to power in the March 1933 elections, Benn was
temporarily promoted as a head of the Academy’s Dichtersektion – following Heinrich Mann’s
resignation in protest188 – and proved instrumental to this institution’s political reconfiguration.
With a member of the NSDAP now presiding over the Academy and with half of the academy’s
members having been expelled, Benn was tasked with drafting the declaration of loyalty to the
new regime, which led to further departures from the academy and concurrent acceptance of
conservative and regime-friendly writers.189
In this socially distinguished position of writing the law for poets and poetry – and not just
any law, but a performative oath of allegiance – Benn found himself compromising the artistic
autonomy he had so vehemently advocated for in his theoretical – but also, crucially,
performatively charged – writings of the late 1920s and early 1930s. The change in the artist’s
personal stance – from non-involvement to enthusiasm with respect to political matters – came to
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the fore in April and May of 1933, when Benn intensified his hitherto merely pro forma statement
of institutional loyalty into an ardent declaration of personal and artistic allegiance to the new
regime with two consecutive speeches, both of them broadcast on national radio and circulated in
national newspapers: “Der neue Staat und die Intellektuellen” in April and “Die Antwort an die
literarischen Emigranten” in May of 1933. In both of these politico-artistic decrees, Benn
articulated a policy of exclusion, positing a rigid border around the realm of possible speech and
possible speakers. Specifically, the poet banned the so-called “intellectuals” and then, more
narrowly, the “literary emigrants” from participating in the discourse about Germany’s
sociopolitical affairs. With this fateful turn in his thinking, Benn undoubtedly contributed to the
legitimization of the Nazi regime and its ideology190 – a brief contribution with a long-term effect.
In addition, however, Benn’s short-term support for the Nazi regime also brought to a head some
of the key questions at the core of his previous preoccupation with the status and mission of art
and artist, which I will discuss in this chapter.
As early as 1934, Benn, too, would become a victim of censorship and exclusion. The
reality of the National Socialist regime failed to correspond to Benn’s idealized vision of it.
Promptly defamed as a former Expressionist and therefore harmful to the integrity of the new
state’s Weltanschauung, Benn was forced to recede, by the end of 1936, from the propagandistic
spotlight into so-called inner emigration,191 deciding to remain in Germany while withdrawing
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from its public life and abstaining from either explicitly affirming or rebuking its political
developments.192 Finally, in 1938, the Nazi regime definitively banned his books and forbade him
to publish any further. In this manner, the poet, too, was met with a prohibition on speech – not
unlike those intellectuals and literary emigrants whose right to speak he had resolutely denied just
a few years earlier in his two pivotal public addresses.

A Voice from the Ether: The Radio in Benn’s Career
Although Benn had made his name as a lyric poet, his essayistic output was not simply
ancillary to his lyric production, propelled as it was by his desire to propagate his views on art and
poetry.193 Indeed, the poet wrote many of his essays specifically with a view to their capacity for
mass reception and transmission. Significantly, Benn’s venture into the essay genre was bound up
with his strategic use of the radio: His first radio-broadcast poetry reading took place on June 7,
1927, which coincidentally marked a temporary end to his lyric production.194 Starting from the
early days of the radio as a new mass medium in the Weimar Republic, Benn availed himself of
opportunities to disseminate his views to a spatially scattered yet temporally gathered audience of
his contemporaries. The poet cultivated a special posture and tone for these occasions – not
surprisingly, quite in line with the contemporary mystification around the novel medium and its
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invisible, ethereal workings.195 In fact, the specific kind of speech produced by the radio196
afforded Benn the ability to intervene in the contemporary discourse in such a way as to propagate
his wisdom while at the same time holding on to his privileged and self-stylized position as an
outsider aesthete.197 From this lens, it becomes harder to separate Benn the poet from Benn the
litigator of poets’ and poetry’s role in the world. Bertolt Brecht, a critic of a traditionally rhetorical
and oratorical use of the radio, made the following remark about the poet Gottfried Benn’s radiobroadcast appearances: “When radio was invented and lectures on rabbit-breeding or marine-life
research soon proved to be well paid, our poet was taken over by a strong urge to teach. He
produced some dark theories for the radio about humanity, about the fall of tradition, etc. that one
best reads in the old, beautiful fashion.”198 With these witty words, Brecht nonetheless pinpointed
an inextricable connection between the content and performance of Benn’s essayistic prose.
As Anke Gilleir and Sascha Bru have highlighted, modernist authors’ practice of public
address has largely been overlooked in the scholarship.199 While many of these authors thematized
self-consciously avantgarde poetics, they often resorted to traditional rhetorical and oratorical
conventions when making use of public speaking. One notable exception to this practice was the
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playwright Bertolt Brecht, who considered the effect of estrangement, Verfremdungseffekt, to be a
necessary intervention not only between the theater stage and its gathered spectators but also
between the radio studio and its scattered listeners.200 Recognizing the irresistible power of
effective public speaking and presciently attributing to it the success of the Nazi Party201 – this
“Rednerpartei”202 – Brecht advocated for non-totalizing forms of public address. Rather than
appealing to the listeners’ empathic and syllogistic sensibility, the orator would have to decouple
himself from his message,203 illuminating the context of the speaking occasion instead – “attention
had to be drawn to the artifice of the public address itself.”204 Insisting on the novelty of the radio
as a medium, Brecht did not only speak through it but also reflected about it.205
In his 1932 address “Der Rundfunk als Kommunikationsapparat. Rede über die Funktion
des Rundfunks,” Brecht gives a speech about giving speeches, challenging the hitherto uncritically
accepted univocity and unidirectionality of the radio: “Aber ganz abgesehen von seiner
zweifelhaften Funktion [...] hat der Rundfunk eine Seite, wo er zwei haben müßte. Er ist ein reiner
Distributionsapparat, er teilt lediglich zu.”206 Recognizing the multiplicative novelty of the radio
– “Man hatte plötzlich die Möglichkeit, allen alles zu sagen” – Brecht takes the extra step to
interrogate this specific multiplicity accessible to the radio: “Und wer waren alle?” (RKA, 129,
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emphasis in the original). In thus bringing the revolution full circle, as it were, Brecht asks about
the novelty, if any, of the new medium’s recipients, thereby following up on his provocative
opening claim that “[n]icht die Öffentlichkeit hatte auf den Rundfunk gewartet, sondern der
Rundfunk wartete auf die Öffentlichkeit [...]” (RKA, 128). In this manner, Brecht illuminates a
peculiarly paradoxical character of the radio: on the one hand, its sheer untimeliness, perceptible
in its non-synchronicity with the public’s unawareness of its specific novelty; on the other hand,
however, its malleability to the kind of reception it experiences from the outdated public. In other
words, Brecht seems to suggest, the radio is no self-evidently enlightening phenomenon, lending
itself just as well to uncritical use qua instrument of mystification. Admittedly, given a nonobsolete use on the part of the public, Brecht argues, the radio could become a medium of public
communication, “ein ungeheures Kanalsystem” – “das heißt,” Brecht interrupts, “er wäre es, wenn
er es verstünde, nicht nur auszusenden, sondern auch zu empfangen, also den Zuhörer nicht nur
hören, sondern auch sprechen zu machen und ihn nicht zu isolieren, sondern ihn in Beziehung zu
setzen” (RKA, 130). Crucially, arguing against the atomizing effect of the radio implemented as a
mystifying ether-voice, Brecht underscores its relational, pluralizing capacity, thereby illuminating
the radio’s ability not only to impart information to a community of listeners but also, significantly,
to affect the very constitution of that community. In short, then, the genuinely novel potential of
the radio will remain unlocked if no corresponding critical innovation of its users – specifically,
of their capacity for relating to one another – were to occur. This finding, of course, has political
implications, and Brecht spells them out: “[Der Rundfunk] hat überdies hinaus [...] die Berichte
der Regierenden in Antworten auf die Fragen der Regierten zu verwandeln. Der Rundfunk muß
den Austausch ermöglichen. Er allein kann die großen Gespräche [...] veranstalten, die Debatten
[...], die Dispute [...]” (RKA, 130). Highlighting the various kinds of participatory and contestatory
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speech of which radio is capable, Brecht decries a certain “Folgenlosigkeit” of current public
institutions, among which, as he sees it, is “eine folgenlose Literatur”: a literature that, intent “ihre
Leser zu neutralisieren, indem sie alle Dinge und Zustände ohne ihre Folgen darstellt,” partakes of
the general tendency of “alle unsere ideologiebildenden Institutionen” to essentialize the content
of specific ideologies as naturally given truths (RKA, 130). With this, Brecht offers a decisive
critique of “Kultur,” critiquing not merely any particular cultural phenomena but rather a specific
concept of culture: a concept “nach dem due Bildung der Kultur bereits abgeschlossen ist und
Kultur keiner fortgesetzten Bemühung bedarf” (RKA, 130). Against the prevailing conception of
the radio as a didactically centralizing medium of mass control,207 Brecht cautions that “das
Publikum nicht nur belehrt werden, sondern auch belehren muß” (RKA, 131, emphasis in the
original). Contrary to Friedrich Schiller’s project of human education, then, the one proposed by
Brecht is characterized by a peculiar reciprocity. Running through Brecht’s address, too, is an
emphasis on the urgency of change. Notably, however, this insistence on rethinking and revising
is distinct from the contemporary and often radio-propagated calls for regeneration of all kinds: to
use Brecht’s formulation, “Also für Neuerungen, gegen Erneuerung!” (RKA, 133).
With this speech, Brecht critiques the practice of oratorical, declamatory speaking on the
radio, of which Gottfried Benn made ample use from the outset. For precisely the urgent need to
recognize the radio’s specific, novel capacity for non-unidirectionality and non-univocity was
something that Benn acknowledged neither in the 1920s and early 1930s nor in 1933. Instead, the
poet resorted to the radio’s oracular potential, positioning himself as a mouthpiece of profound

On early German radio’s political function of centralization, see Solveig Ottmann, Im Anfang war das Experiment.
Das Weimarer Radio bei Hans Flesch und Ernst Schoen (Berlin: Kulturverlag Kadmos, 2013), 156-163.
207

74

insight, be it of poetological or historiographical nature – an invisible yet overpowering,
unidirectional voice that could conceive of no interruption or response.208

Artistic Autonomy through Poetological Polemics
Its scandalous effect notwithstanding, Benn’s rebuke, in the spring of 1933, of intellectuals
and literary emigrants is hardly an isolated incident of poetological polemics in this author’s
literary career, which he nonetheless stylized around a consciously constructed self-image as a
fierce advocate of autonomous authorship.209 Significantly, however, this stance was not exactly
timely and provoked controversy as the issue of literature’s social responsibility gained in
relevance during the socioeconomically turbulent post-war years in Germany under the
parliamentary government of the Weimar Republic.210
Among the drastic social changes brought about by Germany’s accelerated
industrialization were rapid urbanization and ensuing displacement of large masses of people. The
resulting socioeconomic uncertainty created a fertile ground for the propagation of so-called
völkisch theories and fantasies of national community crucially based on scapegoating and
othering. The devastating consequences of World War I, a cataclysm that would prove decisive
for the disintegration of the Weimar Republic,211 only exacerbated this situation, further propelling
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the emergence of various neoconservative networks throughout Germany.212 A crucial feature of
German civil society since the 1850s, energetic associational activity attained heightened levels of
proliferation during the Weimar Republic.213 Yet, this active civil engagement and association on
the part of the populace did not find a sufficiently energetic match in the post-war political
institutions.214 The self-determination theoretically made possible by the Weimar experiment of
parliamentary democracy was not sufficiently undergirded by material improvements for the
electorate. Further fragmentation emerged on the economic front, as Germany’s working class saw
itself systematically undermined by widespread managerial practices of economic rationalization:
Profoundly undermining workers’ power to negotiate favorable working conditions, these policies
ousted the nascent practice of electoral democracy from the workplace.215 The democratically
elected and representative parliamentary government proved unable to provide an adequate
response to the economic crises of the 1920s, which resulted in an increasing fragmentation of the
German civil society. With large numbers of people disillusioned by democratic institutions of the
Weimar Republic, nostalgic visions of authoritarian rule gained prominence and support.216
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Under these turbulent circumstances, artistically motivated sociopolitical neutrality was
not an easily excused luxury.217 Starting from the 1920s, a new creative and literary style, Neue
Sachlichkeit, called for a different vision of the relationship between literature and its subject
matter. Even if it shared some of the key features with pre-war literary theories, this selfconsciously novel methodology emphatically claimed to break with all tradition.218 As its thingor matter-oriented name might suggest, Neue Sachlichkeit was characterized by decentralization
and de-essentialization on several levels. To begin with, it lacked a systematic theorization, its
principles articulated largely in numerous and diverse occasional texts. Secondly, hard to classify
as a strictly intra-literary phenomenon, Neue Sachlichkeit aimed to engage with discourses outside
of literature, among its main features being an emphasis on documentary practices. Finally, in
contrast to the ideals of nationalism and heroism propagated by the contemporaneous
neoconservative currents, this new creative approach not only declined a self-definition based on
an idealized notion of Germanness, indeed welcoming foreign influences, but also crucially
deemphasized the role of the author as a unique creative genius in the first place.219
Against this particular wind of the times, Gottfried Benn felt compelled to defend the
autonomy of art and artist. Expressly antagonistic toward the democratizing tendencies of the
Weimar Republic and thereby quite aligned with the times’ other winds, Benn nonetheless
appeared to have no clear political allegiance.220 While not of the nationalist völkisch ilk, he was
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also neither in the camp of the uncompromising leftists nor in that of more “moderate” social
democrats. Yet contrary to his carefully cultivated self-presentation as an outsider in the
institutionalized literary scene, the poet’s unpopular and untimely insistence on artistic autonomy
often emerged in a not quite autonomous manner: as polemical responses to socially entangled
situations.221 Indeed, Benn’s reactive-polemic posture and underlying aspiration to intervene into
the literary scene and its politics has been productively traced through

Benn’s essayistic

writings,222 and I would like to offer a brief overview and commentary of it.
Even if one can speak of no direct causal link, the poet’s early reflections on the
sociopolitical status of art at least coincided with an experience of being rejected by the Weimar
state: his application, in 1927, for the position of a salaried physician was turned down. De facto,
however, the object of rejection was Benn’s artistic aspirations, since a guaranteed source of
income would have afforded him the free time for regular literary production. Plausibly motivated
by personal ressentiment,223 Benn offered a rebuke of the state, titled “Kunst und Staat,” in which
he distinguished between such sociologically rooted phenomena as culture and civilization and the
“isolated” and “monomaniacal” phenomenon of art.224 It is in the nature of the state as such, Benn
argued, to ignore the latter: “[...] der Staat hat nie etwas für die Kunst getan. Kein Staat.”225
The next episode of Benn’s outspoken insistence on artistic autonomy was centered around
a polarizing review of his Gesammelte Prosa and would prove crucial in the trajectory of the
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author’s stance on this topic, conceptually as well as performatively. Authored by writer Max
Hermann-Neiße, the review appeared in a July 1929 edition of Neue Bücherschau, a generally leftleaning publication that focused on material of documentary and political nature.226 Neiße’s
portrayal of Benn as a “überlegenen und unabhängigen Welt-Dichters”227 superior to politically
engaged, mostly leftist writers provoked two of the latter – Johannes R. Becher and Egon Erwin
Kisch – to resign from the editorial board of Neue Bücherschau. The ensuing polemic around
Neiße’s review, which quickly moved away from the particular “Welt-Dichter” Benn to the
concept of authorship as such,228 was exemplary of the contemporary reckoning with a neu
sachliche instrumental approach to literary language.229 By elevating Benn as an independent and
superior “Dichter” above the “Lieferanten politischen Propagandamaterials,”230 Hermann-Neiße
explicitly challenged the neu sachliche demystification of the authorial function from a creative
genius to an objective reporter of quotidian realities.
Incited by this controversy, Benn, too, contributed his reflections on the poet’s vocation in
an essay titled “Über die Rolle des Schriftstellers in dieser Zeit,” which appeared in the October
1929 issue of the Neue Bücherschau. Even if its title promises to offer what sounds like general
reflections on the role of the writer (“Schriftsteller”), this essay is polemically and situationally
entangled through and through. Indeed, Benn frames it as an intervention into a correspondence
between two others: as an open letter to the editor of the Neue Bücherschau Gerhart Pohl but one
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that, in fact, responds to and attacks Kisch’s own earlier open letter to Pohl. Anxious to correct the
record on his sociopolitical and poetological position, Benn distinguishes between Stellungnahme
and Schilderung. All he does in his writing, Benn argues, is offer a clear-eyed depiction
(Schilderung) of the times; taking sides (Stellungnahme) would be futile and therefore dishonest.
Against Kisch’s accusations of aristocracy, Benn cites from his own work to show that, while his
politics lean “antizivilisatorisch, antikapitalistisch,” his poetics oppose “Verschleuderer des
Worts.”231 With this, Benn posits an image of the writer as a sober truthteller who candidly
communicates his recognition of the senselessness of history – which Benn dubs as “der Schulfall
des Fragmentarischen” – and therefore its impermeability to ameliorative or progress-oriented
actions or words:
Wer Geld hat, wird gesund, wer Macht hat, schwört richtig, wer Gewalt hat, schafft das
Recht. Die Geschichte ist ohne Sinn, keine Aufwärtsbewegung, keine
Menschheitsdämmerung; keine Illusionen mehr darüber, kein Bluff. [...] Diese Lehre
scheint mir weit radikaler, weit erkenntnistiefer und seelisch folgenreicher zu sein als die
Glücksverheißungen der politischen Parteien.232
In the socioeconomically pivotal year of 1929, Benn’s expectedly pointed reference to “this time”
– the writer’s role in which he appears to negotiate – amounts rather to a turning away from time
as “this” time. For Benn, the writer’s uniquely vatic function consists not in any sociopolitical
clairvoyance but rather in an ability to see through and beyond the minutia of contemporary worldhistorical developments. In addition to propelling Benn to the center of the contemporary public
discourse on the writer’s role in society, this episode of provoked poetics proved decisive for his
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own aesthetic theory, motivating him to begin work on an essay titled “Zur Problematik des
Dichterischen,”233 in which he would formulate his definitive formulation of artistic autonomy.
Published in April 1930, Benn’s “Zur Problematik des Dichterischen” occupies a key
position in his essayistic output and poetics more generally. The opening statement of Benn’s essay
declares the distinction between “Schriftsteller” and “Dichter” to be the central problem of
contemporary poetics: “Das Thema vom Dichter und Schriftsteller, ihrem Wesen, ihrer Lage und
ihren Beziehungen zueinander, ist in letzter Zeit wiederholt Gegenstand literarischer Unterhaltung
gewesen, und zwar immer in dem Sinne, daß die Zeit für den Dichter vorüber sei, an seinen Platz
sei eine andere Erscheinung getreten.”234 As Wolf Lepenies argues, the gesture of distinguishing
Dichtung not only from Wissenschaft but also from Literatur was characteristic of the Germanspeaking realm at the time.235 Underlying this seemingly local distinction was a corresponding
distinction between language as a social phenomenon and language as a natural phenomenon:
While the former was allegedly used instrumentally in Literatur, the latter had an originary outlet
in Dichtung. According to this vision, Dichtung was thus endowed with an eminent
anthropological dimension: The human being, prior to being socialized, was distinguished with a
primary capacity for Dichtung – “Kennzeichen und Auszeichnung des Menschengeschlechts” –
which then presumably was gradually erased in the process of daily survival in society.236 No
merely secondary phenomenon, Dichtung was envisioned, rather, as a primordial, natural force
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with regenerative potential.237 Notably, Lepenies underscores the political implications of the
Dichtung-Literatur dichotomy, arguing that it was coextensive with the polarized attitude toward
the very project of the Weimar Republic.238
Already its weighty title – “Zur Problematik des Dichterischen” – signals the essay’s
ambition: namely, to intervene – supposedly with a solution – in a problem or a set of problems
(Problematik) and one, moreover, designated with the nebulously overarching notion (das
Dichterische).239 However, instead of merely contributing to an established topic of this so-called
“poetic,” Benn’s essay frames itself as a polemical response to the contemporary literary debates,
which he cites explicitly and rejects as sociological in nature: concerned primarily with something
as pedestrian as literature’s capacity for adequate representation and advancement of sociopolitical and thus extra-literary issues.240 Benn, for his part, is set on salvaging the poetic. A
tempting syntactic possibility of the German language, the nominalized adjective das Dichterische
simultaneously narrows down (by creating a noun and thus a concept) but also widens the range
of the subject matter it includes into its borders (by collecting under one abstract notion the diverse
inflections and connotations a given adjectival modifier might carry in different contexts vis a vis
different nouns). Precisely this uneasy combination of conceptual ambition and vagueness is at the
core of Benn’s aim. The aim is to carry out an archeological revaluation.
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Instead of countering the purportedly impure – sociological – approach with a reflection
on narrowly literary questions (e.g., form or prosody), Benn frames das Dichterische – and art
more generally – as a biological phenomenon241 with primordial roots in the human psyche and
decidedly independent from the leveling tendencies of rationalization and conceptualization.
Citing the French sociologist Levy-Bruhl, Benn relativizes such rationalization as only a slim layer
of human history, waging an anaphoric attack on the word “Aufklärung” through a series of
syntactically dense paragraphs that are characterized by a baffling mixture of extreme hypotaxis
and fragmentation. Uncoupling thinking, das Denken, from its superficial association with logic
and rationality, Benn locates it, rather, in the “dunklen Kreis organischer Belange [...] der
Herkunftseinäugigkeiten, der Schöpfungspolyphemien.”242 He then goes on to supersede atomized
rationality with a more profound cognitive register: that of dreaming and hallucination. This, in
turn, leads him to perform an archeology of the I, through which he arrives at das Dichterische –
“Das archaisch erweiterte, hyperämisch sich entladende Ich, dem scheint das Dichterische ganz
verbunden”243 – which he ultimately explicates as a “Theorie von reinem Nihilismus” and
“hyperämische Theorie des Dichterischen.”244 Benn’s aim is to isolate the figure of der Einsame,
the poet – conceived more ambitiously than in the local sense of “lyric poet” – as profoundly
incompatible with humans qua beings capable of plurality and co-existence: “Es gibt nur den
Einsamen und seine Bilder [...] Seine sozialen Voraussetzungen kümmern ihn nicht [...] Eine
dunkle, eine unverbrüchliche Gestalt [...].”245 In this way, presenting the poetic as a profoundly
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biological phenomenon, Benn absolves it of historical efficacy. For Benn, das Dichterische is
definitionally autonomous from social or political affairs.246
It is at this juncture that the specific significance of Benn’s intervention in the “Problematik
des Dichterischen” emerges. More than the thematic argument of Benn’s essay, it is rather its
language and rhetorical mode that aspires to intervene in “the poetic.” “Zur Problematik des
Dichterischen” aptly exemplifies Benn’s highly idiosyncratic essayistic – albeit hardly
traditionally theoretical – prose. For an author whose early fiction thematized variations of
language crisis,247 the essay’s unabashed eloquence may take one aback. Replete with premises
and conclusions that are far from self-evident, it does less to elucidate them than to overwhelm the
reader through rhetorical means. What it neglects in terms of clarity, the essay compensates
performatively. Rhythmically impactful and syntactically striking sequences of anaphoric,
hyperbolic, highly hypotactic formulations abound.248 Benn offers here a kind of Dionysian vision
that, in its very articulation, is no less characteristic of their author as a “Magier des Wortes”249
than his 1912 debut poems on scandalously non-poetic topics. In this essay, then, Benn’s approach
to “the poetic” does not simply revise it as a concept; rather, it performs a thorough revaluation of
“the poetic” by revamping the cognitive and linguistic path to it. In describing the specificity of

In this essay, Benn still entertains a pejorative view of history as a process, “unmotiviert und sinnlos” (Benn,
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Benn’s essayistic style and use of the essay form, Christian Schärf highlights its performative
character: “Das ‘faszinierende’ Montieren von sprachlichen Versatzstücken, von dem Benn
verschiedentlich spricht, ist kein postmodernes Spiel, sondern schamanische Beschwörung.”250 At
stake, that is, is not “the poetic” as a delimited conceptual realm but rather the manner of
approaching it in the first place. In an emphatically contrarian manner, Benn vigorously takes on
“the poetic” while sidestepping the contemporary poetological discourse.
Two years later, another notable episode of Benn’s not quite autonomous poetics emerged
around his “Rede auf Heinrich Mann,” delivered on the occasion of the latter’s sixtieth birthday in
March of 1931. With quasi-Nietzschean pathos, Benn presents Mann as a pioneer on the German
literary scene, who has liberated art – Kunst, but Benn also uses the word “das Dichterische”251 –
from its secondary role of a mere means (to the socially venerable end of Bildung) to an
autonomous status of “absolute Kunst”: “Da kamen um 1900 die Brüder Mann und
phosphoreszierten. Lehrten einer literarischen Generation das Gefährliche, das Rauschnahe, den
Verfall, der notorisch zu den Dingen der Kunst gehört [...].”252 For Benn, this “Kunst an sich,”
attributed by him to the artistic credo of sociopolitical autonomy or “Artistik,” which he in turn
traces back to Nietzsche, is organized by an intrinsic principle that, regardless of its conceptual
content, would allow this Kunst to be great.253 A page-long question constructed through a toppling
series of if-clauses culminates in a call for a revaluation of positivism among the Volk:
Könnte sich nicht vielleicht an ihnen ein Volk zur Klarheit erziehen, an dem Goldenen und
Kalten, das um die Dinge liegt, die sich vollendet haben, könnte nicht ein Volk beginnen,
zu diesem Positivismus der erarbeiteten, harten und absoluten Dinge aufzublicken mehr
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als zu jenem Positivismus der anonymen Wahrheit, des amorphen Wissens, der
fluktuierenden Formeln der wissenschaftlichen Relativität? Könnte dann nicht ein
perspektivistisch so verändertes Volk, dachte wohl Nietzsche, auch die Kunst anders sehn,
die Kunst, die eigentliche Aufgabe des Lebens, die letzte Transzendenz innerhalb des
großen europäischen Nichts [...]254
The question continues in this manner for quite a while. Easily carried away by the essay’s oracular
pathos, one almost forgets that it is actually meant to fulfill a quite mundane function of honoring
a mere mortal. What’s more, the mortal in question is the famously socially and politically engaged
honoree Heinrich Mann, to whom Benn controversially attributes the fundamentally asocial
attitude of Artistik.255 Benn’s enthusiastic portrait of Mann did not go unnoticed, provoking an
extended polemic.256 In his provocative essay “Heinrich Mann? Hitler? Gottfried Benn? Goethe?,”
the architect Werner Hegemann rebuked Benn’s misplaced representation of the older Mann
brother, sharply criticizing his own conception of socio-politically inefficacious and autonomous
art. Deriding Benn’s “verwirrende Begeisterung,” Hegemann alleged the poet’s affinity with the
fascists through a series of alternating quotes from Benn and Hitler, hardly distinguishable in their
consonance.257 With these two controversies – the one around the left-leaning Neue Rundschau
and the other around the venerable liberal figure of Heinrich Mann – Benn thoroughly antagonized
both of Weimar Republic’s anti-fascist circles.258 Quite contrary, then, to his self-stylization as a
loner superior to the mundane concerns of socially engaged writers and rejected by the
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contemporary literary enterprise, Benn was, rather, one of its active participants.259 As this brief
overview has suggested, he was no stranger to taking up unpopular positions at the center of
contentious cultural debates. It should thus come as no surprise that, with the National Socialists’
rise to power in March of 1933, Benn would not shy away from a public statement about literary
policy.
Shortly before the Nazis’ seizure of power, Benn’s stance underwent a notable shift.
Written at the height of Benn’s literary recognition in October 1932, Benn’s essay “Nach dem
Nihilismus” marks an important turning point in his poetics. Here, just as in “Zur Problematik des
Dichterischen,” Benn identifies deep-seated ills in humanity’s cultural development, once again
distinguishing art as a privileged realm. However, as the 1932 essay’s future-pointing title
suggests,260 Benn is no longer interested in simply diagnosing; he now proposes a remedy.261
Moving beyond his firmly held belief in the autonomy of art, Benn begins to subordinate it to a
larger socio-political framework. The essay concludes with the poet declaring his readiness to
work – as an artist – on the overcoming not only of the contemporary crises but also the apathy
about them. “Nach dem Nihilismus” is thus doubly programmatic: both in the sense that it
prescribes a certain program for poetry as well as in the sense, novel for Benn, that this program
is supposed to serve extra-poetic ends. This crucial step in Benn’s poetological thinking paves the
way for his spring 1933 statements of allegiance to the Nazi regime.
Right at the outset, the essay, and the essay collection introduced by it, poses a grand
question:
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Haben wir noch die Kraft, so fragt der Verfasser, dem wissenschaftlich determinierenden
Weltbild gegenüber ein Ich schöpferischer Freiheit zu behaupten, haben wir noch die Kraft,
nicht aus ökonomischen Chiliasmen und politischen Mythologemen, sondern aus der
Macht des alten abendländischen Denkens heraus die materialistisch-mechanische
Formwelt zu durchstoßen und aus sich selbst setzenden Idealität und in einem sich selbst
zügelnden Maß die Bilder tieferer Welten zu entwerfen? (NdN 394)
With a characteristically anaphoric maneuver, Benn lends a performative quality to his question,
forcing the readers to mine for its gist just as deeply as they presumably would for the object in
question.262 To be noted right away is the foregrounding of the I – the autonomous “Ich
schöpferischer Freiheit” – where Benn locates the answer to the evils of modernity: progressive
“cerebration” and nihilism. Notably, he elevates this creative autonomy above the realm of politics,
glossed as “politische Mythologemen” and thus exposed as superficial – presumably, because of
its “logos” character, whereas Benn’s own essay strives for a more primordial layer of the mythic:
“die Bilder tieferer Welten.” At stake for Benn is not simply the alleged mechanization of the
world but also a concomitant anthropological crisis: from the mechanization of the world there
emerged a new type of the human being, which Benn calls “materialistisch organisierte[r]
Gebrauschstyp” (NdN 397). It is this pernicious development that Benn now prepares to combat
with artistic means.263
In his two fateful speeches from the spring of 1933 – “Der neue Staat und die
Intellektuellen” and “Die Antwort an die literarischen Emigranten” – Gottfried Benn’s concerted
effort to let his peculiar brand of conservative cultural critique reach a broader audience attained a
high point, transitioning from essay to speech: from an ambivalent and yet suggestive stance of an

On the inseparability of Benn’s “sprachliche Gestaltung” from the thematic content of his essays, see Schärf,
Geschichte des Essays, 250.
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“Es bekäme dann für den Deutschen den Charakter eines ganz ungeheuren Ernstes, als Hinweis auf einen letzten
Ausweg aus seinen Wertverlusten, seinen Süchten, Räuschen, wüsten Rätseln [...] Es bekäme dann für ihn den
Charakter einer volkhaften Verpflichtung, kämpfend, den Kampf seines Lebens kämpfend, sich an die eigentlich
unerkämpfbaren Dinge heranzuarbeiten [...]” (NdN 403).
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outsider to a frontally oriented posture of a populace-addressing orator. Both of the 1933 speeches
revolve around the right to speak. The juxtaposition dramatized by each of these two public
statements – the new state versus the intellectuals, literary emigrants versus their responder –
carries out no dialogue but performs, rather, an othering. Insofar as both speeches are transmitted
to the German people through the national radio, they stage a peculiarly triangular drama –
someone speaking to someone about someone else – whereby the coordinates of the direct and
indirect objects of this speech are somewhat fluid: the “someone else” spoken about is also
inadvertently among those being addressed.

From Theory to Practice: Preparing to Speak
Whereas in his 1932 essay “Nach dem Nihilismus” Benn had still only hinted at an
imminent implementation of art as a means to socio-political ends, his radio speech “Der neue
Staat und die Intellektuellen” followed through on that promise. Yet, if this speech marked a
reversal in Benn’s thinking – from insistence on literary autonomy to insistence on literary
purposiveness – the nature of that purposiveness was more complex and troubled than might
appear at first sight. In this speech, Benn not only promulgated his praise of the new political
regime but also attributed to it an elemental creative potential, thereby forging a link between the
artistic realm and the contemporaneous political moment. Broadcast in the “Berliner Funk-Stunde”
on the evening of April 24, 1933 under the title “Welt in der Wende. Gottfried Benn spricht über
‘Der neue Staat und die Intellektuellen’” and circulated the following day in the Berliner BörsenZeitung,264 this speech contained Benn’s first public statement about the new political regime in
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Germany, recited only a month after the emergence of the “new state” through the Enabling Act
of 1933.
Benn’s declaration of allegiance was quite timely and was not overlooked. Provoking
expected condemnation from many of Benn’s former fellow Dichter and Schriftsteller, it was also
acclaimed by the German press and several conservative writers in Germany. Especially praised
was Benn’s intuitive sense for the eruption of a novel epoch and a correspondingly originary,
regenerative idiom presented as a synaesthetic union between pain, effort, and thought: “Hier ist
die Wandlung des Zeitalters unter Schmerz und Mühe erlebt, gedacht und errungen an jenem
innersten Ort, wo die Begriffe und Werte geschmiedet werden, mit denen eine Zeit dem Leben
gegenübertritt, wo sie ausgewechselt werden, wo sie aufblühen, verblassen und vergehen.”265
Moreover, the significance of this speech was not exhausted by its performative weight as a
declaration of political allegiance. It also fulfilled the retrospectively programmatic function of
prefacing Benn’s eponymously titled essay collection, which was published in July and October
of 1933 and collected some of Benn’s most prominent essays from 1930 to 1933. In his prologue,
Benn highlighted the continuity between his April 1933 speech and his earlier writings:266 the
implausible continuity, that is, between the poet’s novel insistence on the political role of artistic
creativity and his earlier exclusion of politics from artistic pursuits. For even if the reversal in
Benn’s stance was not straightforward, it was nevertheless an undeniable shift: The self-stylized
pariah of the late 1920s would have hardly mounted a podium to address the masses about the
cultural glory of the state.
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This reversal in Benn’s stance was quite sudden. As late as February 20, 1933, Benn
continued to press for a separation between literature and politics.267 At a meeting of the Prussian
Academy of Arts, he condemned Heinrich Mann, who had recently resigned from his position as
the head of the Academy’s Dichtersektion, for his repeated and, according to Benn, counterconstitutional attempts to bring about a political union of various left-oriented groups against the
imminent danger of the Nazi victory in the March 5 elections.268 Conceiving of the Academy as
“die einzige Stätte zur literarischen Traditionsbildung und zur künstlerischen Repräsentation,”
Benn adamantly called for its strict nonpartisanship in political matters.269
In a letter from the 27th of February – incidentally, the date of the Reichstag fire, which
would set off a chain of events transforming the new regime from apprehension-inspiring to
totalitarian – Benn derides the general mood of anxiety in the literary circles. In his view, the very
facticity of the novel historical circumstances renders any attempt to criticize them superfluous:
“Die Revolution ist da und die Geschichte spricht. Wer das nicht sieht, ist schwachsinnig [...] Dies
ist die neue Epoche des geschichtlichen Seins, über ihren Wert oder Unwert zu reden ist läppisch,
sie ist da [...].”270 Declaring the primacy of datum over verbum, Benn reduces language (“reden”)
to evaluative commentary a posteriori (“über ihren Wert oder Unwert zu reden”). A similarly
phrased idea of historical givenness reappears in one of Benn’s unpublished theses on history from
March 5, 1933: “[...] Geschichtliche Bewegungen,” he notes, “sind nie erlernbar u. ableitbar. Sie
sind da.”271 With this pronouncement, Benn insists on the elemental character of history and,
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consequently, its impermeability to intellectual comprehension and rationalization. As he
privileges the sheer facticity of historical circumstances – presumably motivated by some force
insofar as movements, Bewegungen – Benn denies the human being any historical efficacy. Of
course, this position had already been formulated by Benn as early as his October 1929 reflections
on the role of the writer in this time: the role of not only wisely recognizing the futility of trying
to influence the course of history but also of mustering the courage to do so precisely in this sociopolitically senseless time.
And then, at the end of April 1933, after several months of silence – Benn’s last publication,
the anthology Nach dem Nihilismus, had appeared in October 1932 – the poet finally made a public
statement. Prompted by no external request to do so,272 the April 1933 radio talk “Der neue Staat
und die Intellektuellen” extolled the state – in stark contrast to the poet’s 1927 indictment of the
state with a similarly contrastive title, “Kunst und Staat.” 273 This effusive event of public and
politically partisan speech, however, did not originate ex nihilo, having been gestated privately in
the course of several months.274 It would then also initiate a publication phase that, lasting until
October 1933 and including essays on such topical questions as breeding and hereditary
transmission, attested to Benn’s desire to assert himself on the newly reconfigured literary scene.275
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To be sure, Benn’s new stance may have been at least partly prompted by his heightened
institutional standing and ambition.276 After all, as the temporary head of the poetry section for the
Prussian Academy of Arts, he no longer spoke merely for himself when he decided to step forward
as an ardent supporter of the new state.277 On March 13, 1933, Benn proposed and drafted a
declaration of loyalty to be signed by his fellow members of the Dichtersektion. The question he
posed was unequivocal:
Sind Sie bereit, unter Anerkennung der veränderten geschichtlichen Lage weiter Ihre
Person der Preußischen Akademie der Künste zur Verfügung zu stellen? Eine Bejahung
dieser Frage schließt die öffentliche politische Betätigung gegen die Regierung aus und
verpflichtet Sie zu einer loyalen Mitarbeit an den satzungsgemäß der Akademie
zufallenden Aufgaben der Nation. 278
Formulated as an ultimatum, Benn’s inquiry presented the alternatives as mutually exclusive.
Having hitherto only privately scoffed at Heinrich Mann’s activist efforts against the Nazi party,
Benn now publicly expelled such efforts from the Academy and did so on behalf of the Nazi state.
Since an affirmative answer to the poet’s question was not forthcoming from most of his
Dichtersektion colleagues, drastic changes in the Academy’s make-up ensued. At the same time,
Benn’s cooperative teamwork in the academy inadvertently contributed to his own eventual
expulsion. The influx of regime-friendly and völkisch writers did not bode well for Benn’s own
standing in the Academy in the long run. The self-appointed warrior and guardian of the poetic
word would ultimately be forced out after the Academy’s official reconfiguration in June of
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1933.279 However, in the spring of 1933, Benn apparently still entertained hopes of exercising
influence over the new state’s literary institutions.
In excess of merely institutional duty, Benn penned and disseminated an effusive personal
commendation of the Nazi state. This transformation of his pre-1933 unwavering non-partisanship
into enthusiastic support for “die neue Epoche des geschichtlichen Seins” – i.e., the Nazi rule in
Germany – did not stem from the poet’s sudden reneging on his conviction that “über ihren Wert
oder Unwert zu reden” is pointless. For, just as Benn had previously derided disapproval of the
new regime, his own support also did not consist in a mere positive value judgment about it. Not
only did Benn’s statement forgo anything as facile as positive evaluation, it also framed itself
precisely as a rebuke of petty intellectual judgment.
This anti-intellectual stance is predicated on Benn’s aforementioned conception of history
as an elemental, non-rationalizable force. Indeed, the notion of history emerges as a central
category in the poet’s April 1933 statement of allegiance to the new political regime. There, Benn
pits the mere intellectuals (Intellektuelle), whom he locates in the Schillerian privileging of
universal reason over the fatherland, against authentic thinkers (Denkende), i.e., those who follow
the presumably Nietzschean privileging of typological novelty:
[...] [wir stehen] heute vor der Tatsache eines vollkommenen, geschichtlich logischen, von
echten menschlichen Substanzen ernährten Sieges der nationalen Idee [...] Für den
Denkenden gibt es seit Nietzsche nur einen Maßstab für das geschichtlich Echte: sein
Erscheinen als die neue typologische Variante, als die reale konstitutionelle Novität, also
kurz gesagt als der neue Typ, und der, muß man sagen, ist da. Die typologische Majorität
– wer könnte bezweifeln, daß sie vorhanden, auf seiten des neuen Staates vorhanden ist?”
(NSI, 15).
Insistently appealing to a positivist vocabulary of substance, fact, and presence – “vor der
Tatsache,” “Substanzen,” “Erscheinen,” “real,” “ist da,” “vorhanden” – Benn casts all intellectual
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doubt aside and posits the new state as indisputable in its thereness and visibility. As I will discuss
below, this “new state” itself acquires creative potential in Benn’s 1933 vision, emerging as an
iteration of Benn’s pre-1933 visions of creativeness.

Silence: History Is Speaking Through the Poet
About a month after the National Socialist regime’s accession to power in Germany, this
“new state” enters the stage in Benn’s radio talk “Der neue Staat und die Intellektuellen” not
through any solemn formalities but rather via the mundane act of reading a newspaper:
Ich las kürzlich in einer Zeitung, im Besuchszimmer eines der neuen preußischen
Ministerien sei ein Schild folgenden Inhalts angeschlagen: “Man kommt nicht in eigener
Sache dorthin, wo ein neuer Staat aufgebaut wird.” Das soll heißen, wo die Geschichte
spricht, haben die Personen zu schweigen. Es ist die konkrete Formel der neuen Staatsidee.
(NSI, 12)
This matter-of-fact introduction of the “new state” foreshadows the poet’s introduction of Lyrik –
a matter quite a bit less consequential – in yet another public address (his 1951 lecture Probleme
der Lyrik), several years after the “new state’s” collapse:
Meine Damen und Herren, wenn Sie am Sonntag morgen Ihre Zeitung aufschlagen, und
manchmal sogar auch mitten in der Woche, finden Sie in einer Beilage meistens rechts
oder links unten etwas, das durch gesperrten Druck und besondere Umrahmung auffällt, es
ist ein Gedicht.”280
The offhand reference to the quotidian habit of skimming through daily news thus emerges as a
frame repeatedly used by Benn to approach matters of drastically disparate thematic content. State
and poem alike, the object of Benn’s interest is legibly formatted and enclosed for ready access
and easy communication – in “einem Schild folgenden Inhalts” or “durch gesperrten Druck und
besondere Umrahmung.” In both instances, Benn bases his address to his respective audience on
a fundamental appeal to a transpersonal reality of commonly shared gestures and habits.
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Undoubtedly, each of the subject matters in question – whether state or poetry – is of great
significance to Benn. However, it is precisely by framing them as barely noticeable, and thus
ingrained, facts of daily life that he underscores their significance: the significance of something
that is already there, ist da – as indisputable as the perfunctory motion of flipping through the
pages of a newspaper.
As he translates the quoted slogan – “‘Man kommt nicht in eigener Sache dorthin, wo ein
neuer Staat aufgebaut wird’” – into his own words, Benn locates the novelty of the new state in its
inextricable connection with history: “Das soll heißen, wo die Geschichte spricht, haben die
Personen zu schweigen. Es ist die konkrete Formel der neuen Staatsidee.” According to Benn, this
“konkrete Formel” reveals the conflict at the heart of his dramatic address.281 “History,” emerging
as a key dramatis persona in Benn’s radio talk, dictates the terms of interaction between the two
figures announced in the talk’s title – the “new state” and the “intellectuals.” Speaking through
vast upheavals, history renders mere human speech irrelevant. In a gesture reminiscent of
Schiller’s censorious editorial program in Die Horen, Benn inaugurates a new “epoch” by
imposing a silence. Admittedly, with this categorical distinction between speaking “history” and
speechless “persons,” the status of Benn’s own perspective and voice in this radio talk is far from
self-evident. Namely, what is the role of the voice behind the loudspeaker of the radio studio?
What relationship does it entertain to history? And how does it relate to the presumably mute
Personen at whom it is directed?
Some light is shed on these questions towards the end of Benn’s radio talk. If the “concrete
formula” of the new state – “Das soll heißen, wo die Geschichte spricht, haben die Personen zu
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schweigen” – is posited by Benn at the beginning of his speech in a somewhat obscure manner, it
ultimately culminates into a clear-cut series of questions:
Gedankenfreiheit, Pressefreiheit, Lehrfreiheit in einem Sechzigmillionenvolk, von dem
jeder einzelne den Staat für seine Unbeschädigtheit verantwortlich macht, – ist da der Staat
nicht aus Rechtsbewußtsein verpflichtet, diese Freiheit aufs Speziellste zu überwachen?
Das Wort ist aber der stärkste physiologische Reiz, sagt Pawlow, den das Organische
kennt, auch der unabsehbarste, muß man hinzufügen. Läßt sich da überhaupt ein Argument
gegen einen Staat finden, der erklärt, die öffentliche Meinungsäußerung nur denen zu
gestatten, die auch die öffentliche Staatsverantwortung tragen? (NSI, 18)
In this passage, Benn – the voice carried by radio waves to reach millions of ears and to merge
them in this moment of communal listening – attacks a key intellectual capacity: the freedom to
articulate independent thoughts and to make them public. Benn traces his argument against these
speech-related freedoms to the theory, extracted from behavioral sciences, of the physiological
efficacy – and, notably, unpredictability – of language. If, Benn argues, the state is responsible for
each of its constituents’ safety, and if speech is a direct cause of potentially dangerous action, then
the state is of necessity responsible for surveilling and limiting its constituents’ speech – for their
own protection. Crucially, too, when Benn speaks of the unpredictability of language, he means
not merely the possible effect of language on someone else (as a matter of persuasion or influence)
but, more importantly, the organic nature of language, language as the speaker’s biological
function.282 In a display of rhetorical prowess, the orator puts forth a decisive anaphoric attack on,
and through, the word “Geistesfreiheit”:
Geistesfreiheit –: weil 1841 die Massenherstellung von Druckerschwärze begann und im
Laufe des Jahrhunderts die Rotations- und Setzmaschinen hinzukamen, das wäre bei 3812
Tageszeitungen in Deutschland und 4309 Wochenschriften zuviel historischer Sinn.
Geistesfreiheit –: daß an sie überhaupt die Entstehung der Kultur gebunden sei, ist eine
gänzlich erkenntnislose Betrachtung: alles, was das Abendland berühmt gemacht hat [...]
entstand, um es einmal ganz klar auszudrücken, in Sklavenstaaten [...] die Geschichte ist
reich an Kombinationen von pharaonischer Machtausübung und Kultur; das Lied darüber
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ist drehend wie das Sterngewölbe; der Vers von heute lautet: Geistesfreiheit, um sie für
wen aufzugeben? Antwort: für den Staat! (NSI, 18, my emphasis)
In this sweeping historical retrospective, Benn methodically delegitimizes the idea of intellectual
freedom in order to subordinate it to the concept of the state. As though to demonstrate the
Pavlovian theory he has just cited, Benn invokes the word Geistesfreiheit several times in an almost
incantatory manner. This compulsive repetition belies the semantic content of the word at stake:
There is nothing “free,” Benn seems to suggest, about an intellectual freedom that can be reduced
to a refrain that is then also immediately cut short. Refusing to incorporate the word
“Geistesfreiheit” into his main train of thought, the orator punctuates off each of its three iterations
away from the respective denunciative clause that follows. In this manner, the ear is bombarded
with a montage-like sequence of images that gradually reduce the opening caesura “Geistesfreiheit
–: [...]” to the closing teleological exclamation “[...] für den Staat!” In this almost parodical
performance, Benn denounces the concept by foregrounding the word and reducing it to a mere
echo. For, if the word has material efficacy, Benn seems to suggest, then it can be combatted with
similarly efficacious methods.
Benn begins his attack on “Geistesfreiheit” by summarily locating its origins in an
accidental byproduct of technological innovation and thus far away from the necessity of anything
as elevated as “Geist.” Then, correcting a purportedly misguided intellectual legacy, the militant
historiographer proceeds to relieve intellectual freedom of any significance for the West,
“Abendland,” whose origins, in turn, he locates in the very opposite of free thought or action: in
slave labor, labor coerced to realize the projects thought up not by some idealized and abstract
notion of human Geist but specifically by the concrete Geister in power. Proceeding in this manner,
Benn swiftly closes his seemingly open question – “[...] ist da der Staat nicht aus Rechtsbewußtsein
verpflichtet, diese Freiheit aufs Speziellste zu überwachen?” – with a definitive answer:
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“Geistesfreiheit, um sie für wen aufzugeben? Antwort: für den Staat!” With this decisive
performative triumph over the word “Geistesfreiheit,” Benn crystallizes the central purpose of his
radio talk: the discreditation not simply of certain subversive thinkers or specific subversive
thoughts, but of thinking as a fundamentally subversive and therefore condemnable practice in the
first place.
In lieu of the feeble, because plurally distributed, “Gedankenfreiheit,” Benn posits the
cryptically nominalized and collectivized figure of “der Gedanke” as the basis for his speech in
this address:
Von diesen Intellektuellen und in ihrem Namen spreche ich nicht. / Ich spreche im Namen
des Gedankens und derer, die sich ihm beugen. Wie sieht der Gedanke die heutige Lage
an? Nicht der klägliche Gedanke, der lange genug im geschichtlichen Erbe als dem Nährgut
der Nation herumschnüffelte, wo er einen Helden schwach und ein Opfer niedrig zeichnen
könnte, sondern der notwendige Gedanke, diese überirdischste Macht der Welt, mächtiger
als das Eisen, mächtiger als das Licht, immer in der Rufweite der Größe und im
Flügelschlagen einer transzendenten Tat, wie sieht er die heutige Geschichte an? (NSI, 13).
By distancing himself from the intellectuals, Benn rejects thinking conceived verbally: thinking as
a practice, carried out individually, incompletely, and thus imperfectly. Rejected here is the kind
of intellectuality that, with its propensity for critique and analysis, breaks down and apart, calls
into question, doubts.283 Benn’s antidote to this destabilizing enterprise is a heroically hypostatized
conception of thinking through the figure of “the thought,” Gedanke. Two months before his radio
talk, in a January 27 letter to his epistolary friend Friedrich Wilhelm Oelze, Benn invokes this
“Gedanke,” contrasting its virility with the fearful “Wissenschaft [...] staatsgeschützt,
pensionsberechtigt”:
Das wahre Denken aber ist immer gefährdet u gefährlich. Der Gedanke u das Wort kam ja
nicht in die Welt, um die Wissenschaft u. den Sozialismus u. die Krankenkassen zu
rechtfertigen, sondern als die furchtbarste Waffe, die grausamste Schneide, der blutigste
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Morgenstern dem waffenlosen Menschen in der grausamsten aller Welten zu helfen. Davon
ein Rest blieb dem Gedanken, der wirklich denkt, der nicht wissenschaftlich denkt, sondern
visionär, zwanghaft unter eingeborenen Ideen. Davon ein Rest blieb in der Kunst, im
halluzinatorischen Denken, im Ausdrucksdenken. Das ist tiefes, von weither
zwangsmässiges Denken.284
Scientific reason is here rejected in favor of real – visionary and forceful – thinking that is not
superficially produced through individual thinkers’ socially constrained interpretation of empirical
data, but emanates rather from the depths of (physiologically) inherited, transpersonal ideas. In
lieu of flawed thinking by imperfect thinkers, Benn posits an idealized heroic image of a necessary,
transcendent thought, presenting himself as its mouthpiece. In a matter of two months, Benn’s tone
has left behind nostalgic longing and assumed the posture of future-oriented declamation.
While certainly in line with the National Socialists’ homegrown campaign against
“intellectualism,”285 Benn’s denigration of intellectuals in his declaration of allegiance to the Nazi
regime has extensive precedent in the author’s work. A critique of intellectuality, dubbed by Benn
as “progressive Zerebration,”286 runs through much of his writing, fictional and essayistic alike.287
As for many Expressionist writers, Nietzsche serves as a major influence – specifically, his critique
of the dominant philosophical tradition, its privileging of abstract reason, and ultimately the
instrumentalization of reason in the natural sciences.288 In his early fictional prose centered around

284

Gottfried Benn, Briefe an F.W. Oelze 1932-1945, eds. Harald Steinhagen and Jürgen Schröder (Wiesbaden: Limes
Verlag, 1977), 28.
Ansel, “Zwischen Anpassung und künstlerischer Selbstbehauptung,” 46. On the primacy, in the thought of the
Conservative Revolution from Nietzsche to Goebbels, of will and spirit over intellectuality as well as the
aestheticization of the former, see Herf, Reactionary Modernism, 12ff.
285

286

See, for instance, Benn’s “Nach dem Nihilismus.”

On the central role of Erkenntniskritik in Benn’s writing, see Silvio Vietta, “Gottfried Benns Subjektkritik und sein
politischer Fehlschritt,” in Referate des Essener Colloquiums, ed. Horst Albert Glaser (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang,
1989), 222-234.
287

288

Alter, Gottfried Benn. The Artist and Politics, 89

100

the protagonist Rönne, Benn explores the dissociative dynamic at the core of human perception
and consciousness. In a similar vein, in his essays from the late 1920s and early 1930s – most
characteristically, in the pivotal “Zur Problematik des Dichterischen” and “Nach dem Nihilismus”
discussed above – Benn often constructs the genealogy of the modern human subject as a trajectory
of spiritual decline and gradual instrumentalization – in order to then accentuate the liberating
potential of art and poetry as realms fundamentally autonomous from the merely rational logic.
In this context, then, Benn’s choice of the “intellectuals” as the figure of the other in April
1933 is no random casting decision, as it were. Still, Benn does transmute some of his longstanding convictions into an unexpected potion. Holding on to his denunciation of positivist and
instrumental intellectuality, Benn nonetheless reverses course on his previous rejection of the
political realm as a similarly positivist phenomenon, incompatible with artistic creativity.
Misguidedly enough, he envisions the political moment of April 1933 not as just another
bureaucratically sustained hierarchical construct but rather as a creative phenomenon transcending
quotidian reality and rationalist thinking.289 It is precisely as an exemplification of such positivistmechanistic thinking that Benn conceives of the German political system preceding the advent of
the Nazi regime. And, just as he previously advocated for a rejection of the positivist intellectual
heritage in the spiritual and artistic realm, he now, in April 1933, envisions the Nazi regime as
capable of discarding the feeble sociopolitical legacy of the Weimar Republic.290
Yet, against the backdrop of the 1933 transformation in Benn’s conception of history, a
crucial aspect does remain constant. The verbosity of Benn’s radio talk – belying its manifest
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emphasis on speech limitation – characterizes Benn’s essayistic prose well before 1933.
Unabashedly supplanting measured argumentation, Benn’s verbal outbursts in the form of myriad
rhetorical devices unmistakably aspire to evoke a strong reaction in the reader and, given Benn’s
proclivity for radio transmission, listener.291 The Pavlovian theory of linguistic efficacy cited by
Benn as a justification for state censorship of speech is at play in his own language. Indeed, this
compositional strategy corresponds to Benn’s conception of the word as a channel to primordial
psychic resources and thus creatively productive. The consistently unbridled eloquence of his
prose stands out as a unifying factor between his seemingly diametrically opposed stances before
and in 1933: between his pre-1933 strict artistic autonomy from the sociopolitical sphere versus
the 1933 conception of art in the service of the state.
Having been introduced in the very opening of Benn’s radio talk, the notion of “history”
assumes a central place in its argumentation, with some variation of the word Geschichte appearing
with remarkable frequency in the course of the text.292 This emphasis on “history” in the 1933
speech marks a significant turn in Benn’s understanding of this concept: from its dismissal as
irrelevant to the artist’s historically inefficacious existence to its lionization as a locus of eminent
creativeness.293 When declaring allegiance to the Nazi state in April 1933, Benn sees this state not
merely as a political successor to the Weimar Republic on a neutral historical timeline but rather
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as a qualitatively different phenomenon: in lieu of a chronological succession, “unabsehbare
geschichtliche Verwandlung.”294
Benn’s emphasis on history goes hand in hand with an erasure of the speaking subject.295
Commencing from the first-person point of view, the radio talk quickly claims to speak on behalf
of someone or something else – “Ich spreche im Namen des Gedankens und derer, die sich ihm
beugen” – after which the first-person singular pronoun disappears from Benn’s address to the
German nation (NSI, 12). This disappearance of the singular voice aptly illustrates the distinctive
quality of the new community as it is envisioned by Benn – namely, "[...] ih[r] große[s] Gefühl für
Opferbereitschaft und Verlust des Ich an das Totale, den Staat, die Rasse, das Immanente” (NSI,
12). Likewise, in a peculiar oscillation between active and passive voice, Benn attributes agency
not to human subjects, thoroughly limited as they are, but to inanimate and trans-generational
categories such as “history” and “century”:
Im Grunde hat immer nur die Geschichte gedacht. Gedacht wurde auf dem Sinai [...];
gedacht haben die Meilensteine [...]; gedacht hat das jetzige neue Jahrhundert, als es das
werdende Gesetz formte: der totale Staat. Immer prägte die Geschichte den Stil, immer war
dieser Stil die Verwirklichung eines neuen historischen Seins. (NSI, 17)
By resorting to the narrative simple past, Benn casts his musings on the contemporary and
contingent moment into a timeless guise of transcendent necessity. His historiographic voiceover
renders the singular human voice entirely irrelevant to the course of history. The act of thinking –
i.e., the central concern of Benn’s reflection on the contemporary historical moment – is taken
away from the individual subject and attributed to the historical process. No longer a passive object
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of intellectual cognition, history turns into a thinking agent and, crucially, a creative phenomenon
itself.296
In a disavowal of merely conceptual language, Benn depicts the emergence of this new
historical movement – neither bad nor good, as he stresses, but rather undeniable in its thereness
– as besieged by a feeble polyphony of echoes: “die Kultur ist bedroht, die Ideale sind bedroht,
das Recht, die Menschheit ist bedroht” (NSI, 15). Whereas the “national idea” is, for Benn,
nourished by “echten menschlichen Substanzen,” the “international idea” subsists on nothing but
echo – i.e., not living substances, but mere shells of past ideals and institutions. Audible in the
nominalizing repetition of the definite article – “die Kultur ... die Ideale ... das Recht... die
Menschheit” – this linguistic echo performs the echo-like character of language and ultimately
abandons it for a dazzling performance of rhythm and rhyme: “[...] es klingt wie Echo: aus der
Lombardei, aus Ungarn, aus Versailles, als die Gallier kamen, die Goten, die Sansculotten, klang
es schon so” (NSI, 15). The rhyming union of disparate terms – “Lombardei” and “Versailles” as
well as “Goten” and “Sansculotten” – is exposed as futile in a yet another rhyme: “[...] es klingt
wie Echo” is echoed in “[...] klang es schon so” (NSI, 15). With this definitive performance, Benn
indicts the emptiness of language. Given its potential for such frivolity, language, Benn seems to
suggest, must be rejected and, with it, a certain politics which takes place through it: a polyvocal
politics – a politics of multiple speakers.
Indeed, Benn positions “history” against “democracy.” Whereas democracy allows for
participatory speech, “history” has no place for it:
Eine echte neue geschichtliche Bewegung ist vorhanden, ihr Ausdruck, ihre Sprache, ihr
Recht beginnst sich zu entfalten, sie ist typologisch weder gut noch böse, sie beginnt ihr
Sein. Sie beginnt ihr Sein, und alles Feine, Abgestimmte, zu was Gelangte wirft sich ihr
entgegen; aber es ist die Geschichte selber, die diese Angriffe entkräftet, ihr Wesen, das
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nicht abgestimmt und demokratisch verfährt. Die Geschichte verfährt nicht demokratisch,
sondern elementar, an ihren Wendepunkten immer elementar. (NSI, 16)
In Benn’s mythologizing vision, history represents a peculiar amalgam of creative agency and
elementary material of formation and creation. With this idealization of “history,” Benn moves
away from the individual subject and toward the mythical and the collective:
Welch sonderbarer Sinn und welche sonderbare Geschichte, Lohnfragen als den Inhalt aller
menschlichen Kämpfe anzusehen. Welch intellektueller Defekt, welch moralisches Manko
[...] nicht in dem Blick der Gegenseite über die kulturelle Leistung hinaus, nicht in ihrem
großen Gefühl für Opferbereitschaft und Verlust des Ich an das Totale, den Staat, die Rasse,
das Immanente, nicht in ihrer Wendung vom ökonomischen zum Kollektiv, in diesem
allem nicht das anthropologisch Tiefere zu sehen! (NSI, 12)
Benn’s vision of community is one of totality; its unifying principle is grounded not in economics
(i.e., the quotidian and mechanical wage-based separation) but in myth (i.e., a non-verifiable prehistoric origin).297 Ultimately, Benn’s own “Über Rolle des Schriftstellers in dieser Zeit” discerns
in the historical moment of the year 1933 an actualization of his mythogenic musings during the
final years of the Weimar Republic.298
Benn’s lionization of history and a concurrent move away from the individual subject
culminates in a series of imperatives:
[Die Geschichte] läßt nicht abstimmen, sondern sie schickt den neuen biologischen Typ
vor, sie hat keine andere Methode, hier ist er, nun handele und leide, baue die Idee deiner
Generation und deiner Art in den Stoff der Zeit, weiche nicht, handele und leide, wie das
Gesetz des Lebens es befiehlt. (NSI, 16)
Fittingly, too, the closing line of Benn’ s manifesto of political creativity is an imperative – i.e.,
language as a transition to action and away from its merely representational function. Addressing
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the new youth, whose emergence Benn has just depicted in the narrative past tense, the poet
commands, “Halte dich nicht auf mit Widerlegungen und Worten, habe Mangel an Versöhnung,
schließe die Tore, baue den Staat!” (NSI, 20). To the poet-commander, words represent a delay. In
fact, the voice issuing this command to assume the decisive, non-compromising, closed-off stance
of heroic self-sacrifice for the sake of state-building is styled as itself the voice of history: “wo die
Geschichte spricht, haben die Personen zu schweigen. Es ist die konkrete Formel der neuen
Staatsidee” (NSI, 12). Through this transition to the imperative capacity of language, Benn
performs his coveted transition of das Dichterische and its primordial potential into the present
moment.
Writing Back: Benn’s Crusade against the Literary Emigrants
Benn’s first foray into politically engaged speech was not an isolated occurrence. Prompted
by no apparent outside pressure, he decided to double down on his excommunication of the
intellectuals from the new state, and did so with a public response to a private letter. On May 9,
1933, Klaus Mann – a fellow writer, admirer of Benn’s work, and now an emigrant in France –
writes to Benn in order to express his own and his fellow German emigrants’ consternation at the
poet’s decision to support the Nazi state, most evident in his active role in purging the Prussian
Academy’s section for poetry. For his part, Benn declines to answer in a reciprocally private
manner and opts instead for another public address. With a Chandos Letter of his own, Benn
reckons with his illustrious past, flaunting his newly acquired fluency of the present.
Just two weeks after the momentous event of cleansing that was the Nazi book burning on
the 10th of May, Benn’s response, “Die Antwort an die literarischen Emigranten,” is broadcast on
the Berlin radio on May 24, 1933 – albeit on such a short notice that it leaves no trace in the records
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for that day’s program – and is circulated in the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung the following day.299
The newspaper publication of the address is prefaced by an editorial note that is simultaneously
incorrect and yet overly precise: Even as it misleadingly introduces Benn’s Antwort as a response
to letters from multiple – as opposed to one – former literary colleagues, it also specifies that the
concerned parties are not of Jewish heritage, presumably to indicate that the conflict in question is
not contaminated by any dubious outside influences.300 Perhaps in order to stoke patriotic
indignation in the Volksgemeinschaft of the newspaper’s readers, its editors identify Benn’s
allegiance to the new state as the cause for the emigrants’ resentment.301 In this manner, the state
– an invisible and yet all-seeing principle of all relation and communication – emerges as a central,
albeit unspoken, participant in this epistolary drama.
In contrast to the incensed tone of Benn’s “Answer,” the message it answers does not
exactly invade its recipient’s private space. Indeed, Klaus Mann prefaces his letter with duly
apologetic rhetoric, acknowledging the impropriety of reaching out to his addressee with no
apparent right and putting himself at an emphatically respectful remove from Benn:
Lieber und verehrter Herr Doktor Benn, erlauben Sie einem leidenschaftlichen und treuen
Bewunderer Ihrer Schriften mit einer Frage zu Ihnen zu kommen, zu der ihn an sich nichts
berechtigt, als eben seine starke Anteilnahme an Ihrer geistigen Existenz? Ich schreibe
diese Zeilen nur in der Hoffnung, dass Sie mich als verständnisvollen Leser Ihrer Arbeiten
etwas legitimiert finden eine offene Frage an Sie zu richten.302
Mann’s pronounced rhetorical caution highlights the incommensurability of Benn’s response –
one that, as an open letter, not only refuses to accord its correspondent reciprocal discretion but
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also overlooks Mann as a singular addressee in the first place. In lieu of a private, handwritten
response, Benn forwards Mann a newspaper copy of his speech, thus rendering him one of the
many anonymous literary emigrants to whom it is addressed. In this mediated manner, Mann
receives an answer not so much from Benn as from the media-controlling state, to which Benn has
declared unconditional allegiance and he, Mann, has turned away from and exited.
In this manner, the state has intervened into the relationship between Benn and Mann, a
relationship hitherto consciously oblivious of state matters. In his post-war memoirs, Klaus Mann
remembers his acquaintance with Benn in the following manner: “Dann wurde über Literatur
gesprochen. Wir verstanden uns, in literarischen Fragen.”303 No idle mark, the comma following
the statement of mutual understanding emphasizes the unbridgeable limits of its scope; beyond
questions of literature, this social harmony lapsed, “[...] sowie es um politische Probleme ging, die
wir allerdings nur selten in unserer Unterhaltung berührten.” Politics emerges here as a topic
prohibitive of conversation conceived as Unterhaltung: non-committal social relation
characterized by lightness and non-partisanship. Ironically, then, even as they avoid the heavy,
partisan matter of politics in their Weimar-period interactions, Benn and Mann find themselves
irreversibly on the opposite sides of the central geo-political divide with the National Socialists’
ascent to power in the spring of 1933.
As its title conveys, Benn’s “Antwort an die literarischen Emigranten” is a response, yet
one that flouts the rules of responding. Having been privately addressed by Mann as a specific –
indeed, singularly important – author (“[...] der uns der Inbegriff des höchsten Niveaus und einer
geradezu fanatischen Reinheit gewesen ist [...]”),304 Benn replies with an anonymization and
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totalization of his interlocutor. Opening his Antwort with the ambiguous pronoun Sie – “Sie
schreiben mir einen Brief aus der Nähe von Marseille [...]” – Benn never unveils the referent
behind this pronoun (ALE, 24). The formally neutral pronoun Sie renders undecidable so much as
the grammatical number of the noun substituted by it.
With Benn’s inaugurally political radio speech “Der neue Staat und die Intellektuellen” in
the recent background, the open letter’s author – an erstwhile proponent of literature’s
unconditional right to autonomy – now positions himself as a mouthpiece of the state, greatly
amplified by being broadcast on the national radio and circulated in the national press. As though
having relinquished his willingness or even ability to speak for himself and to a singular other,
Benn endows his response with paradigmatic dimensions. In this similarly juxtaposing set-up,
Benn now metonymically assumes the role of the “new state,” to which he has declared
unconditional loyalty, his language now state property, as it were. Likewise, the “intellectuals”
from the previous speech are now made to assume the role of “literary emigrants.”
It is certainly noteworthy that Benn chooses the geopolitical characteristic of the emigrant
status – of being outside of one’s homeland’s borders – as definitive of his addressees. Indeed,
with hardly veiled contempt, Benn presents them as Flüchtlinge, a highly ambiguous
characterization: “[...] mit diesen allen kann man reden, aber mit den Flüchtlingen, die ins Ausland
reisten, kann man es nicht” (ALE, 24). While, at the most superficial level, Flüchtlinge are those
who – in contrast to the more neutral “emigrants” – have not had the privilege of leaving their
native country with deliberation, this word can also connote “deserters” or “fugitives,” thereby
casting Benn’s titular addressees in a morally inferior light. If “Der neue Staat und die
Intellektuellen” still only stated the undesirability of the addressed other, the second installment of
Benn’s homage to the new state has, already in its title, completed the ejection of this other: the
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intellectuals have turned into emigrants, refugees, deserters, and fugitives. Unsurprisingly, too,
Benn seems to retain this censorious attitude to the emigrant status well into the post-war years.
While he ultimately does recant his ill-advised declaration of allegiance to the Nazi state, Benn
unapologetically stands by his conviction that the decision to remain in Germany was a necessary
condition for obtaining the right to judge and speak about Germany and its affairs: “Wer über
Deutschland reden u. richten will, muss hier geblieben sein.”305 Unrepentant for his dubious
vocabulary of Flüchtlinge from 1933, Benn continues to avail himself of it as late as 1950, in his
autobiographical and thus retrospective text Doppelleben, endowing it with biblical legitimacy:
“‘Wer glaubt, der flieht nicht.’”306
Furthermore, Benn’s characterization of his addressees as “literary” emigrants underlines
the significance of language – and, specifically, literary language – in this conflict. The temporary
head of the Prussian Academy’s poetry section may use the same German idiom to reach those
outside of Germany’s borders as he uses to reach those within its borders. However, they are not
uniformly reachable. Whatever mutual understanding between Benn and the emigrants this
communication is still able to accomplish is minimal. Already in the second paragraph of his
response, Benn refuses his addressees the right to speak with him: “Ich muß Ihnen zunächst sagen,
dass ich auf Grund vieler Erfahrungen in den letzten Wochen die Überzeugung gewonnen habe,
daß man über die deutschen Vorgänge nur mit denen sprechen kann, die sie auch innerhalb
Deutschlands erlebten” (ALE, 24). From the outset, too, Benn bars the possibility of mutual
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comprehension (“Schon aus diesem Grunde werden wir uns kaum verstehen [...]”) and underscores
his own inability to understand his interlocutors (“[...] ich weiß zwar gar nicht, was Sie mit diesen
Ausdrücken eigentlich sagen wollen”) (ALE, 25, 29). This inaugural rejection of the other’s speech
renders Benn’s “answer” monologic from the outset: a final verdict that bars the possibility of a
response or appeal. Just about sufficient as a means of mere notification, the German language no
longer guarantees the full transmission of the substance being communicated. Language has been
externalized as a mere shell of full-fledged interaction. And yet, Benn’s letter demonstrates an
unapologetic effusion of words.
Promoted to the status of explicit addressees in the radio talk’s title (“Antwort an die
literarischen Emigranten”), the former German-speaking “intellectuals” are simultaneously
expelled from the realm of addressability. A peculiar dynamic emerges: Even as the immediate
addressees of this letter are barred from understanding it, the letter is an open one and therefore
meant to be received and understood – if only by the bystanders. Even more than “Der neue Staat
und die Intellektuellen,” Benn’s “Antwort an die literarischen Emigranten” is bifurcated in its
direction. The text’s dissemination through the German state media belies its title’s apparent
intention of being directed at those outside of Germany. Broadcast on the German national radio
and printed in a national newspaper, Benn’s message is meant to be heard by the Germans in
Germany just as much, if not more, as the German-speaking emigrants outside of Germany’s
borders. Because effortless reception is granted to those who are precisely not emigrants and whose
access to the message – both its literal content as well as metaphysical significance – is guaranteed
simply by virtue of their immediate location on the German soil, the explicitly mentioned emigrant
addressees emerge as those meant merely to overhear its contents.
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Similarly, the epithet “literary,” used by Benn to demarcate his absent addressees, signals
that “literature” has been ejected from the realm of loyalty as something foreign and undesirable:
What remains within German borders is not mere “literature” but an idyllic union between
language and Volk, language and state. Marked in Benn’s title as a non-assimilable other (literary
emigrants), literature has been excised from the formerly contentious question about the
relationship between literature and politics. The momentous conflict hitherto preoccupying Benn
as a poet and custodian of poetry’s place in the world has been resolved.
In Edward Said’s terms, when Benn pronounces the emigrants to be “literary” emigrants,
he is committing a tautology, for the very notion of “literary,” in Said’s view, already presupposes
a certain exile, being-outside, dissent.307 For Benn’s rhetorical purposes, however, the peculiarly
pleonastic structure of his address “an die literarischen Emigranten” is of course the point, even if
not deliberately so. The point is to purify – language, literature, culture, state. Benn, the selfdeclared poet of the German Volk, deploys his native tongue with unparalleled virtuosity to
exorcise it of the other: to render the other an emigrant, a foreigner, and thus rightless in the poet’s
and his compatriots’ rightful home that is the German language, literature, state, fatherland. One
can thus read Benn’s 1933 diatribes as literature’s attempt at self-mastery: an attempt at
appropriating its own, proper, language.
In both of his 1933 statements, Benn does not merely refute the accuracy or even legitimacy
of the other’s views. Rather, he refuses this other the right to speak in the first place. In fact, by
positioning the “new state” against the “intellectuals” in his April 1933 speech, Benn expels not
so much an undesirable thought content as rather the very act or practice of thinking. A similarly
fundamental expulsion takes place in his May 1933 speech. There, by essentializing the
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contemporary sociopolitical developments in Germany with the characteristic of nationality (“die
deutschen Vorgänge”), Benn implicitly defines spatiotemporal contemporaneity with these
“German” events as a kind of native tongue. That is, the area delimited by Germany’s geopolitical
borders has turned into a unique medium that alone can transmit – meaningful – speech. Language,
as grammatically and semantically German as it may be, has been demoted from its traditional role
of transmission or communication: it no longer grants access to communicable speech. Enunciated
outside of the borders of transmissibility, it loses its functionality, becomes mere noise. The critical
distance afforded by language – the ability to reflectively process the immediacy of experience –
has been annulled. Instead, unmediated and continuous presence – finding oneself on Germany’s
grounds – has become a guarantor of intelligibility and communicability and a prerequisite for the
right to speak. Having transgressed Germany’s borders, the intellectuals turned emigrants have
been rendered mute; they have lost their ability to speak or be spoken to, to hear or be heard, to
understand or be understood.
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Chapter 3
Hannah Arendt: Rethinking Humanity Politically

Gottfried Benn’s April 1933 radio-broadcast admonition to German intellectuals about the
unprecedented novelty of their political situation was directly relevant for an intellectual who will
be discussed in this chapter: Hannah Arendt. The 1920s, when the staunchly apolitical Benn began
to emerge as an author of psycho-archaeological essayistic visions, was also the time when Arendt,
one of the twentieth century’s most prominent political theorists, received her intellectual training
at German universities. Overshadowed by Arendt’s post-war recognition outside of Germany for
her unprecedented engagement with post-1933 political phenomena are her intellectual roots in
the Weimar Republic. In this period of scholarly no less then sociopolitical upheaval, a variety of
paths emerged. Although deliberately idiosyncratic in its articulation, Benn’s apolitical stance was
certainly not unique. Indeed, the Weimar Republic witnessed many variations of this turn away
from public affairs. In addition to Thomas Mann’s 1918 programmatic Betrachtungen eines
Unpolitischen, one could recall the aestheticism of the George Circle or the rejection of worldly
affairs in Franz Rosenzweig’s articulation of the “theologico-political predicament.”308 Although
educated in this intellectual climate,309 Arendt took a slightly different path. Thus, for instance,
Arendt’s signature notion of the in-between as the political space par excellence – crucial to her
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post-war theory of the human condition – can be traced back to the thinker’s pre-war, Weimar-era
interest in the figure of the neighbor, which she first explored in her 1928 doctoral dissertation on
the concept of love in Saint Augustine. Already at the beginning of her intellectual career, then,
Arendt reflected on the phenomena of relationality and plurality. Whereas Gottfried Benn’s theory
of artistic autonomy could be said to conform to a long-standing distinction between culture and
politics – between illumination and obscurity, interior and exterior, essence and accident – Arendt
would offer a challenge to this marginalization of politics by insisting rather on its inextricability
from human life insofar as human.
Born into an assimilated Jewish family in Hannover – where, incidentally, Benn would be
stationed, in what he called an “aristokratische Form der Emigration,” in 1935 as an Oberstabsarzt
for the Wehrmacht310 – Hannah Arendt, according to her own self-understanding, came from
philosophy’s particularly illustrious abode in the German tradition: “Wenn ich überhaupt aus etwas
‘hervorgegangen’ bin, so aus der deutschen Philosophie.”311 Philosophy, however, would not
remain her life-long habitat. A self-described “political theorist,”312 Arendt did not simply theorize
about this or that aspect of politics as something unquestionably given. Rather, the notion of
politics was, for Arendt, a question worthy of exploration and interrogation in the first place. Her
approach to her eventual subject matter emerged through multifaceted investigations into that
which is given – or, perhaps more accurately, has been given – and experienced. A glimpse into
Arendt’s thinking about politics emerges when, in her 1954 lecture “Philosophy and Politics,” she
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articulates the following prerequisite for the oxymoron that would be a political philosopher: “If
philosophers, despite their necessary estrangement from the everyday life of human affairs, were
ever to arrive at a true political philosophy they would have to make the plurality of man, out of
which arises the whole realm of human affairs – in its grandeur and misery – the object of their
thaumadzein.”313 Canonically, the properly philosophical disposition originates from the affect of
wonder, thaumadzein. However, since philosophers have canonically been concerned with the
human being as such, in the singular, Arendt transports the traditionally philosophical wonder onto
the contingent and irreducibly plural realm of human affairs or politics. Through this
preoccupation with the public realm, Arendt’s work indirectly calls into question Benn’s, but also
Schiller’s, credo of artistic or aesthetic autonomy. By insisting on the irreducibly political character
of human existence, too, Arendt also indirectly challenges Schiller’s project of educating the
human being as human being via a preliminary expulsion of politics from his pedagogy. Moreover,
in contrast to Benn’s sovereign dismissal of the literary emigrants, Arendt personally experienced
flight and statelessness, an experience that proved pivotal for her not just on a personal level but
also as a key intellectual impetus. Indeed, this experience – no experience among others – emerged
as a circumstantial limit to the intellectual content of her thought.

Introduction: The Beginnings of an Intellectual
Arendt had considered emigration as early as in 1932, having presciently discerned Hitler’s
future rise in German politics already in 1929 – the year, incidentally, that she published her
doctoral dissertation and thus acquired official credentials for entry into the realm of
scholarship.314 The philosopher Karl Jaspers, Arendt’s intellectual mentor, whose most cherished
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value was allegedly clarity,315 could not – even after Hitler’s ascension to power in January 1933
– clearly see the necessity for Arendt’s, a Jew’s, possible need to leave Germany and thus “separate
herself from the Germans.”316 In her 1964 interview with the journalist Günter Gaus, Arendt
discussed her break with Germany’s intellectual milieu in 1933, and specifically with the
intellectuals of Benn’s ilk, “denen zu Hitler ‘was eingefallen war’” – those, that is, who, perhaps
not especially malicious, were nonetheless perspicacious enough to discern a creative potential in
the brute event of the Nazis’ Machtergreifung.317 Much like Benn in 1933, although for entirely
different reasons, Arendt was apprehensive of intellectuals who failed to recognize the novel
political circumstances after January 1933. Indeed, Arendt experienced this recognition in the form
of a shock: the Reichstag Fire on that year’s 27th of February.
While this immediately consequential event of ignition was met by Benn with a calm
historiographical note about the unassailable thereness of history (“Dies ist die neue Epoche des
geschichtlichen Seins, über ihren Wert oder Unwert zu reden ist läppisch, sie ist da [...]”),318 it
elicited a much more frantic reaction from many other Berliners. With her husband, leftist author
Günther Stern, compelled to flee immediately,319 Arendt found herself preoccupied with efforts to
secretly shelter those fearing imminent persecution by the new regime. 320 If Benn could afford to
wait out for the opportune moment to step out into the public realm and broadcast his autonomous
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position on the Nazis’ recent ascension to power, Arendt had to go underground, taking on the
illicit task of helping the German Zionist Organization with research on antisemitism. The angle
from which antisemitism was to be researched was not that of neutral sociological inquiry: rather,
quotidian factual evidence had to be gathered – evidence of specific anti-Semitic remarks made in
non-governmental, inconspicuous circles, under daily circumstances.321 This research of the
inconspicuous was also performed quite inconspicuously: within the institutional walls of the
Prussian State Library, under the guise of scholarly research. Ultimately leading to the researcher’s
eight-day arrest and subsequent flight from Germany, this peculiar experience of keeping the
appearance but not the essence of scholarship would coincide with Arendt’s turn to the burning
question that was politics – a turn that, ironically, would also pave the way for her ultimately
productive dissociation from the calmer field of philosophy and self-identification as a political
theorist.322
Indeed, the Reichstag Fire would later be recalled by Arendt as the moment in which she
realized the impossibility of occupying the position of a passive observer any longer and was
confronted with a sense of responsibility – the moment, that is, in which her “turn to the political”
could be said to have taken place.323 In this way, Arendt’s self-reported politicization was not a
result of some patriotically solemn sentiment; on the contrary, it coincided with the moment of
imposed expulsion from her patria. Ambivalent about the pathos of patriotism early on,324 Arendt
identified her Jewish heritage – the circumstance due to which she was forced to flee Germany in
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the first place – as the deciding factor in her turn away from an academically nurtured apolitical
intellectuality to a politicized stance.325 If, as Steffan Davies argues, Schiller and Goethe were
exiles in their own time, fleeing from the political tumult into a radically novel aesthetic program,
Arendt, too, could be viewed as a kind of deserter and exile from the contemporary intellectual
realm as it had been crystalized in its traditional academic and academy-adjacent contours – a
tradition whose trajectory had been determined not least by that arguable flight of Weimar
Classicism.326 Be that as it may, in summer of 1933,327 Arendt secretly crossed the German-French
border, eventually having to give up her German citizenship in exchange for the precarious,
eighteen-year-long status of an emigrant and refugee. Once again, then, she became Gottfried
Benn’s inadvertent addressee: this time, addressed by his May 1933 “Die Antwort an die
literarischen Emigranten.” After spending seven years in Paris, Arendt, together with her second
husband, Heinrich Blücher, was interned in a camp for enemy aliens after the fall of France in
1940. Arendt and Blücher were among the last 238 refugees to gain life-saving entry visas to the
United States.328
On March 7, 1933, prior to leaving Germany, Arendt had publicly articulated her own
stance on the country’s ominous political developments in an article titled “Original Assimilation:
An Epilogue to the One Hundredth Anniversary of Rahel Varnhagen’s Death.” Considering the
unease of assimilation – and its roots in the Enlightenment’s promise of emancipation – in light of
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the “general social antisemitism” “today in Germany,” this essay was based on Arendt’s recently
finished biography of the German-Jewish salonnière, and thus a certain guardian of intellectuality,
Rahel Levin Varnhagen von Ense.329 The status of this manuscript was particularly telling: in lieu
of traditional transmission through publication and subsequent entrance into the intellectual
tradition, it found itself transported in Arendt’s suitcase, on the move, away from the place where
the language in which it had been written and thought was spoken. With the manuscript of this
intended Habilitationsschrift detained in a bag, the fact that two fragments from it saw the light of
day in 1933 and 1934 is significant, as Haun Saussy has underscored. After all, given Arendt’s
highly precarious existence as a stateless person who had not yet established herself in her field –
a field whose intellectual coordinates were precisely in flux for her at that time – these two
fragments could have remained among the few traces of her thought to be preserved for
posterity.330 In light of the perennial question of national culture and literature, particularly in its
German-language iteration, these contingencies of transmission are significant.
As it turned out, the smuggled Habilitationsschrift would not have a chance to experience
the realization of its consequential professional function of confirming its author’s university-level
intellectuality.331 By the time it was finally published – in a 1958 American-English translation as
Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess – its implicit promise of an academic career in Germany
had lost its relevance for Arendt, now a US-American citizen with no plans to repatriate to
Germany. Yet in 1959, the year that this book was finally published in Germany and in its original
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German, Arendt would make a temporary return to her country of origin, in order to receive a prize
for her intellectual achievements.

“We Refugees”
The mass emergence of refugees and stateless persons arose as a colossal international
crisis in the wake of World War I, “als zum erstenmal große Gruppen von Menschen auftauchten,
die in eklatanter Weise aller Rechte beraubt waren.”332 This appalling new reality of multitudes of
human beings suddenly having no citizenship rights anywhere in the world seems to have had little
impact on Gottfried Benn’s imagination. The rhetorical levity with which Benn allowed himself
to deploy the trope of the emigrant as fugitive and defector (Flüchtlinge) stands in stark contrast
with the indelible trace that the experience of having to flee, shared by her with millions of others,
appears to have left in Hannah Arendt’s thinking. Whereas the phenomenon of emigration
provoked an intransigent recourse to spatial as well as intellectual stasis in Benn, it initiated a
fundamental upheaval of thinking in Arendt. Yet, rather than merely amending the thinker’s
already developed political theory, the condition of being stateless and thus legally suspended –
“die unendlich komplizierte Papierexistenz von Staatenlosen”333 – fundamentally informed
Arendt’s understanding of politics, “der lebendigen Politik”: “Erst die Hunderttausende von
staatenlosen Flüchtlingen in den zwanziger und dreißiger Jahren unseres Jahrhunderts, denen
Millionen von displaced persons in den vierziger Jahren auf dem Fuße gefolgt sind, haben die
Frage der Menschenrechte wieder auf die Tagesordnung der lebendigen Politik gebracht.”334
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Ten years after its memorable broadcast to the German public, Benn’s answer to the literary
emigrants received an inadvertent response in Arendt’s short piece “We Refugees” from 1943.
Here, in a quite peculiar manner, Arendt gave a voice to the strawman figure invoked in Benn’s
speech. Admittedly, this voice-giving hardly resulted in unmediated testimony. The essay’s
matter-of-fact, almost comical tone barely concealed the enormity of its topic. Its main conceit –
namely, the exasperating speechlessness of the refugees – served as the background for Arendt’s
aim: to call this silence and dismissal into question.335 While Benn’s speech had been broadcast
centrifugally, from Berlin (the place Arendt would have to flee) to the rest of Germany, Arendt’s
text appeared in an exceedingly local manner: in a small New-York-based Jewish publication, The
Menorah Journal.336 Benn had composed his address in early 1933 and thus still with a seemingly
unimpeachable nationalist pathos of a poet whose language and thought had magically aligned
with those of his Volk and state; Arendt, on the other hand, wrote her article in 1943, talking about,
and on behalf of, Jews – that is, those who in 1943 were met with the most dire forms of expulsion.
Benn’s intensification of “Emigranten” into “Flüchtlinge” had undeniably conveyed the implicit
sense of their illegality. Independently picking up on precisely this connotation, Arendt also
commented on the novelty of this refugee status in her essay: The denotation of someone “driven
to seek refuge” had remained intact, but the connoted causation of this necessitation by some
extraordinary, illicit activity was no longer valid.337 As Arendt assured her readers, the refugees in
question were extremely ordinary, guilty of neither wrongdoing nor wrong thinking.
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Both texts exhibit a troubling rhetorical character, albeit in very different ways. The thirdperson, collectively plural anonymity of Benn’s address – “Antwort an die [...] Emigranten” –
finds an echo in Arendt’s text, but this time from the first-person point of view – although here,
too, marked by a collectively plural anonymity of the “We Refugees.” The apparent first-person
immediacy of her report turns out to be a rhetorical illusion. The incongruity between the text’s
tone and topic – and, of course, this incongruity is itself the topic – comes through most tellingly
in Arendt’s mention of the rampant suicides committed by the still non-interned Jews who,
convinced until the last moment that no harm would come from the external enemy, were
confronted with the fact that their own neighbors, those spatially nearest to them, had turned
against them.338 The unspeakable horror of these daily suicides is augmented by the fact that no
posthumous response accompanies them. As Arendt writes, “Unlike other suicides, our friends
leave no explanation of their deed, no indictment, no charge against a world that had forced a
desperate man to talk and to behave cheerfully to his very last day. Letters left by them are
conventional, meaningless documents.”339 In this early piece, then, Arendt urgently calls attention
to a certain lack of response, calling on the exiled Jews, one of whom she herself is, to stop hiding
their Jewish identity and refugee status, to stop retreating into the walls of their private existence.
To be sure, Arendt recognizes the extreme existential precarity experienced by those she calls upon
in her article:
But before you cast the first stone at us, remember that being a Jew does not give any legal
status in this world. If we should start telling the truth that we are nothing but Jews, it would
mean that we expose ourselves to the fate of human beings who, unprotected, by any
specific law or political convention, are nothing but human beings. I can hardly imagine
an attitude more dangerous, since we actually live in a world in which human beings as
such have ceased to exist for quite a while; since society has discovered discrimination as
338
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the great social weapon by which one may kill men without any bloodshed [...] Those few
refugees who insist upon telling the truth, even to the point of ‘indecency,’ get in exchange
for their unpopularity one priceless advantage: history is no longer a closed book to them
and politics is no longer the privilege of Gentiles.340
In this early article, inextricably informed by its author’s particular personal experience of
displacement and discrimination, Arendt begins to articulate crucial aspects of her political theory:
a realization of the negative condition of politics – i.e., merely human existence, devoid of the
fundamental “right to have rights” – and the concomitant existential dead-end of apolitical
detachment. The question of historical and political consciousness had already been the object of
Arendt’s reflection in her 1932 essay “Aufklärung und die Judenfrage.” There, similarly to her
essay on “Original Assimilation,” she criticized the Enlightenment’s emancipatory project for its
universalizing gesture of considering human beings in terms of their universally essential
rationality. In doing so, Arendt argued, the Enlightenment failed to consider their irreducible
historical plurality.341 For Arendt, the Enlightenment’s seemingly emancipatory proposition
actually had a pernicious effect for the German Jews, fatefully diminishing their future capacity
for political participation in the German society.
Having been deprived of her German citizenship in 1937, Arendt made several visits to the
country of her birth after the war. Two of them will form the main coordinates of this chapter:
Arendt’s first postwar visit, in 1949; and her first invited visit, in 1959. Here, one of the literary
emigrants whom Benn had expelled from Germany’s affairs in 1933 was now returning to
Germany, even if only temporarily. In her reflections that accompanied these two visits – “The
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Aftermath of Nazi Rule” in 1949 and “Von der Menschlichkeit in finsteren Zeiten” in 1959 –
Arendt offered a critical revision of some of the questions at the core of Benn’s censorious
addresses: questions of speech and silence, reality and myth, world and worldlessness.
Significantly, in the course of her reflections, Arendt articulated a revision of what human
existence might presuppose, thereby articulating her unique vision of politics.

Reporting from Germany
In 1949, Hannah Arendt traveled to Germany on a restorative mission. Through her work
as executive director for the Commission on European Jewish Cultural Reconstruction, she was to
oversee the recovery of Jewish cultural objects expropriated by the Nazis so that they might be
reinstated to their rightful owners – in many cases, no longer directly possible.342 After several
postponements, Arendt’s trip ultimately lasted from August 1949 until March 1950, thus
incidentally coinciding with the new founding of Germany, or part of it, as the Federal Republic
of Germany on September 15, 1949. Arendt’s first return to her country of origin was certainly no
easy homecoming.343 After sixteen years and a devastating sociopolitical cataclysm of
unprecedented proportions, recognition was surely difficult, and impressions must have been
overwhelming. In a letter to a friend and fellow emigrant in New York, Arendt noted, “Über
Deutschland könnte man Bände schreiben, ich aber werde nur einen Artikel schreiben.” 344 The
promised article took the shape of a report: “The Aftermath of Nazi Rule. A Report from
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Germany,” published in the October 1950 issue of Commentary, an American monthly founded in
1945 with the aim of exploring contemporary Jewish-American issues from, at that time, a leftliberal and anti-Communist perspective.345 Yet this report was not, as its genre designation might
suggest, merely a recording or inventory of the present – as though performed by an alien from a
different planet, capable exclusively of concurrent observation and no retrospective reflection.
Anything but terse, Arendt’s article offered not only quotidian details about post-war Germany but
also far-reaching sociopolitical analysis. Similar to the retroactive nature of her trip’s official
purpose, the title – “Aftermath” – of her accompanying reflections points to the visiting author’s
concern with the past, even if, analogously to Benn’s 1933 “Der neue Staat und die
Intellektuellen,” Arendt’s article could have adopted a novelty-highlighting title. The enthused
delusions of revival, renewal, and regeneration, persistently intoned in 1933 by such poets and
thinkers as Gottfried Benn and Martin Heidegger, stand in stark contrast with this statement of an
“aftermath.”
“The Aftermath of Nazi Rule. A Report from Germany” deals as much with the physical
destruction of that which is being reported on, Germany, as with its specific and unprecedented
social disintegration through the “horrible originality” of totalitarian rule.346 Having just completed
her pioneering study Origins of Totalitarianism, which would be published in English in 1951,
Arendt was no stranger to these considerations. In this way, Arendt’s reflections about the
structural premises of totalitarian rule decisively informed her approach to the object of her
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observation and report, in which she concisely touched on many of the questions discussed in her
book. Just like the book, the report had the task of studying the present as a diagnosis of the past.347
The aftermath of totalitarian rule laid bare the sociopolitical premises that had allowed it to
originate in the first place. Introducing her former home country as the “nightmare of Germany in
its physical, moral, and political ruin,” Arendt – “mehr traurig als erbittert”348 – hardly intended
simply to denounce (ANR 342, Arendt’s emphasis)349. Rather, the aim was likely to understand.
Mere denunciation would have represented an idle stance from a superior vantage point, implying
a prior division of the world into good and evil. Such a statically moralizing partition would likely
have been foreign to Arendt’s search for structural and systemic understanding irreducibly
informed by the actual experiences of actual human beings.350 “If I moralized or became
sentimental,” Arendt wrote, looking back at her Origins of Totalitarianism, “I simply did not do
well what I was supposed to do, namely, to describe the totalitarian phenomenon as occurring, not
on the moon, but in the midst of human society.”351
In a 1954 essay titled “Understanding and Politics,” Arendt rejects the claim that any
cognitive act short of condemnation would be tantamount to exoneration, even in the case of
something as horrific as totalitarian rule – even in its National Socialist manifestation: “To the
extent that the rise of totalitarian governments is the central event of our world, to understand
totalitarianism is not to condone anything, but to reconcile ourselves to a world in which such
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things are possible at all.”352 Significantly, then, Arendt’s effort to investigate totalitarianism is
neither merely an academic pursuit nor an exercise in moral judgment. Rather, it stems from an
existential commitment to the world in its indisputable, albeit more often than not indisputably
horrific, reality. In the same essay, Arendt writes, “If we want to be at home on this earth, even at
the price of being at home in this century, we must try to take part in the interminable dialogue
with the essence of totalitarianism.”353 “Being at home on this earth” is an enigmatic, almost
pleonastic formulation: Where else would one be at home but on this earth, and in what manner
could one be on this earth but at home? As a refugee and thus a legally “homeless” person, Arendt
does not romanticize “home” as a site of familiarity or national pride. Rather, “home,” understood
as terrestrial existence, can only be constituted through a practice of understanding, even if through
confrontation. In her report from Germany, Arendt confronts an utterly dismal situation: physical
destruction, utter bankruptcy of former myths, inability to confront the recent past, failures of
reconstruction policies – a situation of sheer worldlessness. Such a despondent state of affairs
might inspire one to escape, if not physically, then at least mentally. Arendt, however, chooses to
make an effort to understand: to observe, respond, and report.
In a more than inadvertently curious manner, Arendt’s 1950 “report” from and about
Germany could be read as a retort to Benn’s 1933 “Antwort an die literarischen Emigranten” – it,
too, a kind of denunciatory report from Germany: a report on the “emigrants,” as it were, delivered
to the popular judgment of the Volksgemeinschaft. Having, on Benn’s pre- and post-war account,
relinquished her right to talk about Germany by virtue of her decision to emigrate from it,354 Arendt
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nonetheless not only had the audacity to talk about Germany but did so in an emphatically
relentless manner in her 1950 Commentary article.355 Also noteworthy is the staging of Arendt’s
“Report” vis a vis Benn’s “Antwort.” Just as the latter had been addressed to the emigrants in
appearance only – intended, in actuality, for the supposedly loyal listeners in Germany – Arendt’s
article, published only in English, in a Jewish-American magazine and thus addressed, to a large
extent, to emigrants and refugees,356 was directed away from the Germans in Germany while
talking about them.
Admittedly, had Arendt’s report been addressed to the Germans in Germany, it is not clear
that the transmission of its message would have succeeded. For even as the reporter imagines
writing volumes about Germany, the subject matter itself is marked by glaring gaps and absences:
not simply of objects of cognition but also, and more significantly, of this cognition itself.
Germany – the place most visibly destroyed – also turns out to be the place where this destruction
is least brought up in thinking or speaking. Whereas Benn prescribed silence to those who had left
or were yet to leave Germany, the silence that Arendt found upon her return to Germany emanated
from those who had remained there. As Arendt reports, “A lack of response is evident everywhere”
(ANR 342). Reminiscent of the lacking response on the part of those on whose behalf Arendt wrote
in 1943, this lacking response, noted by a returning emigrant shortly after 1945, simultaneously
stands in stark contrast with the thunderous answer hurled at the departed emigrants in 1933 by a
German poet on behalf of his fellow Germans.
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If the subject matter of Benn’s “Antwort an die literarischen Emigranten” were emigrants
as Flüchtlinge, escapees from History’s inevitable stride, Arendt, too, talks of a certain flight. In
her depiction, it is, however, the Germans who emerge as the escapees: in this case, from visible
reality. Indeed, whereas “Geschichte” was the leitmotif of Benn’s April 1933 “Der neue Staat und
die Intellektuellen,” it is “reality” that occurs again and again in Arendt’s report seventeen years
later. History, which was made to speak with an overriding voice in Benn’s speech (“[...] wo die
Geschichte spricht, haben die Personen zu schweigen”), is represented by a glaring absence in
Arendt’s report. In this account, the only fact, Tatsache,357 that, in Benn’s terminology, could be
said to be there, da,358 is the destruction of “the visible marks of more than a thousand years of
German history” (ANR 342). Having silenced himself as a Person and assumed the role of
History’s mouthpiece, the German poet was among those whose mind had, to use Arendt’s
expression, succumbed to the idea of an “irresistible stream of history” (ANR 347). Precisely this
history has collapsed, is now a site of utter destruction in the visiting emigrant’s report. Once
addressed by their poet with a victorious laudation of their shared past, present, and future – united
in a supratemporal wave of poetic and mythogenic inspiration – Germans now
[...] busily stumble through the ruins of a thousand years of their own history, shrugging
their shoulders at the destroyed landmarks or resentful when reminded of the deeds of
horror that haunt the whole surrounding world, one comes to realize that busyness has
become their chief defense against reality. And one wants to cry out: But this is not real –
real are the ruins, real are the past horrors, real are the dead whom you have forgotten. But
they are living ghosts, whom speech and argument, the glance of human eyes and the
mourning of human hearts, no longer touch. (ANR 345)
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The rare moment of oblique but poignant self-reference – “And one wants to cry out” – in Arendt’s
otherwise object-oriented account is provoked not by the fact of ubiquitous material devastation
(“ruin,” “destroyed landmarks,” “deeds of horror”) but rather by the ubiquitous lack of response
to it. It is significant that Arendt formulates the sentiment of wanting to cry out in the anonymous
third person (“one”) and only potential modality (“wants to”). At stake in this despaired and
somehow aborted utterance is something like the very possibility of reaching out to another. That
is, Arendt’s concern does not reside merely with “reality” but, more importantly, its capacity for
transmission and reception: an in-between space that might be able to transmit this commonly
shared “reality” in the first place. In this pivotal passage, the repetition of the word “real” is
inextricably connected to the word “world.” For Arendt, the specifically outrageous aspect of the
indifference to the “real” is the fact that what is thus being dismissed otherwise “haunts the whole
surrounding world.” That is, the observer’s outrage is provoked by the act of abstracting oneself
from the commonly shared, irrevocable givenness of one’s surroundings as well as from the
specific past that precedes them. In their myopic effort to shield their sight from the present’s roots
in the past, Arendt’s former compatriots, as she reports, cling onto the immediate present through
peculiarly reflex-like “busyness.” The reality with which this busyness is preoccupied is truncated
of its history. Cropped out is any reflection beyond the present moment framed by immediate needs
and their clearance. In contesting the reality of this ultra-magnified here and now, Arendt argues
against an understanding of time as a neutral succession of points on a timeline. She insists on the
inextricable connection of this here and now to its specific past: “real are the ruins, real are the
past horrors, real are the dead whom you have forgotten.” In a profoundly unsettling way, Arendt’s
use of such vocabulary as “ghost-like” and “haunt” is perhaps not entirely figurative, possibly
carrying with it a chilling echo of self-referentiality. After all, her own temporary return to
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Germany in 1949-1950 has an undeniable symbolic significance: the return of the emigrant, of the
ejected, of the other who, at the level of state policy, was supposed to have been eliminated, of
whom the state and the home was supposed to have been rid. In this light, it is Arendt who, in the
very act of returning and introducing herself as a Jew and doing so, moreover, in the German
language, must have appeared ghost-like to her interlocutors, intent as they were on keeping
cognitive doors firmly shut for any recollections of the recent past.
Sent from the ruins of a shipwreck – a shipwreck not only of gigantic degree but also of an
entirely unprecedented kind – Arendt’s “Report from Germany” can perhaps be regarded as a kind
of postcard, albeit an unusual one at that time. In her general critique of Germany’s effort “to
restore a facsimile of pre-war [...] conditions,” Arendt mentions the Germans’ frequent practice of
sending each other postcards that display their country’s landmarks, which, having been destroyed,
no longer demarcate any national borders, be it spatially or symbolically (ANR 345). This postcardsending gesture is quite telling. Beyond registering an unwillingness to face the ruins, it also points
to a prioritization of the image, endowed with preservative power, over that which it is supposed
to represent. Notably, this phenomenon of (self)-deception and dissemblance of reality was not, in
Arendt’s mind, limited to the Germans in postwar Germany. In her later reflections on politics, the
theme of deception through image-making would crucially resurface in the context of USAmerican politics, the polar opposite of a totalitarian society, as programmatically prescribed
ideological splits would have it.
Already in her “Report,” Arendt identifies larger implications in the postwar Germans’
daily practice of self-deception. She connects it to a more deep-rooted species of lying: the kind
of lying carried out by totalitarian regimes in general and the Nazi regime in particular. The
totalitarian state policy and practice of dismissing facts – “all facts can be changed and all lies can
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be made true” – ultimately leads to the governed subjects’ complete inability to “distinguish
between facts and opinion” (ANR 344). Thus, as Arendt reports, lying has interfered with the
denazification process, but not just in the form of self-conscious dishonesty. Rather, according to
the reporter’s observations, Germans are no longer capable of telling the truth even if they wanted
to (ANR 347). Totalitarian rule may have been officially defeated, but this declared victory – as
well as the official policy of “denazification” – proves utterly powerless with respect to the
entrenched and inconspicuous traces of that defeated rule.359
Arendt’s findings with regard to the civic situation in postwar Germany are corroborated
by recent historiography. In his study on what he calls “past-political” legislation of the late 1940s
and early 1950s, the historian Norbert Frei offers an account of the widespread resistance to the
postwar policies of denazification among the German electorate, which would ultimately be
mirrored in the amnesty laws proposed in 1949 and 1950 by the emerging federal government of
Germany.360 Similarly, postwar historiography was largely focused on the so-called
Täterforschung, programmatically unconcerned with researching the uncomfortable phenomenon
of popular Nazi support.361 Unwillingness to look at the recent past seems to have characterized
the widespread postwar attitude in Germany. As Arendt highlights in her report, silence seems to
have been the response.
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In Search of Sociability: Efforts of Reconstruction and Transformation
Arendt’s “The Aftermath of Nazi Rule. A Report from Germany” can be read as a record
of conversations and, more importantly, a commentary on their failures. Attempts to carry out a
conversation are reported throughout the piece. One particularly poignant example is a
conversation in the flatland, in which only one of the interlocutors is a Jew. As Arendt reports, this
type of conversation consists of two parts. After the visitor, formerly a German citizen but now in
exile, introduces herself as a Jew to her German interlocutor, the latter preemptively aborts this
conversation by listing the immense difficulties that Germans have had to endure. In this manner,
the conversation devolves into an act of accounting, settling of scores: “[...] and if the object of
this little experiment happens to be educated and intelligent, he will proceed to draw up a balance
between German suffering and the suffering of others, the implication being that one side cancels
the other and we may as well proceed to a more promising topic of conversation” (ANR 342-3).
The troubling premise of this conversational deflection is a kind of zero-sum conception in which
human relation is understood in terms of measurable suffering: suffering of countable individuals
that can be then added up into comparable sums. Audible in Arendt’s account of this dialogical
failure, which her interlocutor proposes to mend by selecting a more palatable thematic conduit, is
an indirect critique of a certain kind of human relation: one based on sociability or Geselligkeit.
For Arendt, this relation is similarly structured around an additive logic.362
Precisely the idea of sociability or Geselligkeit was being mobilized by various socially
engaged and politically liberal figures in postwar projects of civic reconstruction.363 As Arendt’s
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1949-1950 report makes clear, the aftermath of the war in Germany was characterized by utter
destruction not only of shared physical space but also of social and moral bonds. Moreover,
nothing was certain about how these bonds might be recovered through politics and policy in the
near future.364 The Allied approach to this question was based on the concomitant projects of
denazification and reeducation. A pedagogical approach was envisioned by some Germans as well:
Through a studious devotion to the German canon, the Germans would rebuild their country on
the basis of its illustrious cultural heritage. In this vein, the historian Friedrich Meinecke famously
proposed the establishment of Goethe-Gemeinden, in which Germans would have an opportunity
to congregate on Sundays in order to recite passages from classical German literature for their
personal and, additionally, societal, edification.365 With the Weimar “Republic” representing an
undesirable recent memory, the mind was to be transported to a more distant past and a more
agreeable Weimar association.366
That the undertaking of reeducation entailed a political self-education through a practice
of civic participation on the part of the German populace was the view of a number of
democratically oriented public figures in postwar Germany.367 The press was an important
instrument in this project, and one of the above-mentioned proponents of democracy, journalist
and political scientist Dolf Sternberger, was commissioned by the American occupation authorities
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with a reeducation-oriented journal.368 Endowed with an aspirational and quasi-expressionist
title,369 the Heidelberg-based Die Wandlung would be issued monthly from November 1945 to
December 1949. In order to achieve its aim of rebuilding Germany’s destroyed “bürgerliche
Gesellschaft,” the journal proposed a program of instilling into its readers a respect for the values
and practices of sociability: free and non-purposive interaction.370 In contrast to the Nazi model of
community as Volksgemeinschaft, this interaction would not be externally dictated, be it by
political authority or by material necessity.371 In the absence of a concrete path for Germany’s
political reinstatement, Die Wandlung meant to offer a discursive substitute.
In his reconstruction of this project of “self-education to democracy” as a remedy for
postwar civic disintegration, Sean A. Forner highlights its underlying model of the self as an
autonomous and rational authority: “Rather than approach ‘the masses’ as objects – of exclusion,
organization, or paternalist concern – [Germany’s engaged democrats] imagine them as the selfcivilizing subjects of a self-constituting public, that is, of “the people” as the sovereign ground of
sovereign authority.”372 It seems, however, that this idealizing vision of human beings as perfectly
rational subjects and of human coexistence as an aggregate of such subjects exemplified the
widespread postwar understatement of the National Socialist Volksgemeinschaft as a historical
fact. Seeing in it nothing but a propaganda myth, postwar German historiography largely declined
to study it as a real phenomenon with roots much more deep-seated than what the ideal of self-
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actualizing reason was capable of accessing.373 Notably, as Jakob Norberg explains, the editors of
Die Wandlung did not see their project of promoting sociability as itself political; rather, it was
envisioned as a preparatory stage on the way to proper politicization, which meant participation in
a democratic society.374 In this light, the Heidelberg project of Die Wandlung bears an
unmistakable resemblance to the Weimar project of Die Horen from one and a half centuries
earlier, it too an avowedly apolitical enterprise that nevertheless had the metapolitical ambition of
preparing humanity for a genuine politics. The gesture of rejecting the specific here and now as a
satisfactory enough impulse for a thinking of and engagement in politics in medias res is common
to both projects. The kind of past-inspired contemplative gaze of Die Horen is reoriented as a
future-directed aspiration of Die Wandlung.
In addition to Sternberger, several other “engaged democrats” – among them, the
philosopher and influential postwar public figure Karl Jaspers – belonged to the journal’s editorial
board. Jaspers’s postwar societal engagement was a departure from his usual inclination. Prior to
1945, the philosopher, under whose supervision Hannah Arendt had completed her doctoral
dissertation several years before 1933, had consciously espoused an apolitical attitude, drawing a
firm distinction between culture and politics. While, by way of the sociologist Max Weber, Jaspers
had eventually recognized the significance of politics, he had preferred not to get involved
himself.375 His focus had resided, rather, with questions of culture: specifically, with the necessity
of cultural regeneration and the role of Bildung in it. Guided by this strict division of labor, Jaspers
had sought to contribute to the world through his specific talent for philosophy and pedagogy,
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leaving the task of politics to those more temperamentally inclined to it.376 However, in the urgency
of the immediate post-war years, the philosopher saw himself assume the role of a public figure as
one of the few German intellectuals and so-called inner emigrants uncompromised by
collaboration with the Nazis, although not distinguished by a vocal criticism of the regime
either.377 After the war, forced by the circumstances to summon his talents away from an isolated
grappling with eternal questions, Jaspers recognized the need to respond to the recent past in a
public manner by addressing multitudes of people here and now, contributing public statements in
the form of lectures and articles.378 Moreover, Jaspers was one of the first in his country to pose
the question of responsibility for the atrocities of the Holocaust: His 1946 book Die Schuldfrage
argued, not uncontroversially in postwar Germany, that a thoroughgoing confrontation by the
Germans with the recent past was a necessary condition for the possibility of Germany’s
reconstruction in the wake of the utter devastation brought about by the Nazi rule. Distinguishing
between four types of guilt – criminal, political, moral, and metaphysical – Jaspers argued against
those who deemed the Germans universally guilty and a priori incorrigible.379 Jaspers posited
instead that his compatriots would have to grapple with their involvement in National Socialism
on an individual basis. One path to such confrontation and transformation seemed to lie through
civil conversation, afforded by such journals as Die Wandlung.
It was Jaspers, too, who authored a programmatic foreword (“Geleitwort”) to the first issue
of the Heidelberg monthly, which came out in November 1945. Stating at the outset, “Wir machen
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kein Programm,” the philosopher nonetheless enumerates the range of possible topics for solicited
contributions towards the end of his succinct text:
Erinnerung aber wird nicht genügen. Aus der Erinnerung wird beseelt, was heute zu tun
ist. Die Gegenwart und die Zukunft sind unsere Aufgabe. Alles Denken, das für sie
wesentlich sein kann, soll in dieser Zeitschrift Raum finden, Politik, Wirtschaft, Technik,
Recht, Wissenschaft, Kunst und Dichtung, Theologie und Philosophie. Nicht die
Geschichte, sondern dieses Gegenwärtige, so hoffen wir, wird den Hauptraum einnehmen
[...] So wollen und müssen wir versuchen, wie wir uns denkend in dieser ungeheuren Not
zurechtfinden.380
Notable in this list is the foregrounding of politics, Politik, as an editorially welcome topic; equally
notable is the placement of the traditionally apolitical fields, namely, “Wissenschaft, Kunst und
Dichtung, Theologie und Philosophie,” at the list’s end. This conception of politics as a topic of
thinking, Denken, recalls Schiller’s restricted authorization of politics only as a subject of the
“philosophischen Geist.”381 In this light, Jaspers’ 1945 leading word, Geleitwort, recalls Schiller’s
1794 announcement, Ankündigung, both of them introductions to the programmatically
transformative projects of Die Wandlung and Die Horen respectively. Both texts articulate highly
programmatic editorial visions; both are presented as responses to the immediate political
circumstances; their common impulse consists in some form of education or (re)formation.
Whereas Schiller’s Ankündigung emphatically rejected the present, protecting the “Geist und
Herzen des Lesers” from the hazardous “Anblick der Zeitbegebenheiten,”382 Jaspers welcomes
“die Gegenwart” as “unsere Aufgabe.” Yet the later project, too, sets up a border: “Nicht die
Geschichte, sondern dieses Gegenwärtige, so hoffen wir, wird den Hauptraum einnehmen.”
History, understood as remembrance, “Erinnerung,” is to be respectfully displaced into the
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background. Likewise, whereas Schiller announced his project as emerging from the authority of
an “achtungswürdige Gesellschaft” about to impart its wisdom to the journal’s subscribers, Jaspers
rejects the idea of intellectual authority: “Niemand von uns ist Führer, keiner ist Prophet, der giltig
sagte, was ist und was zu tun sei.”383 However, even as he insists on the collective undertaking at
stake in Die Wandlung, Jaspers, too, invokes the telos of a common Geist: “Miteinander bauen wir
nicht nur die Welt unseres materiellen Daseins, sondern den Geist und die Sitte unserer
Gesellschaft [...] Aber der Einzelne ist machtlos. Er bedarf des öffentlichen Geistes, der ihn trägt.
Dieser Geist ist unser aller Verantwortung.”384
Whereas Schiller programmed the exclusion of politics into his project of social
transformation through aesthetic edification, Jaspers grants politics a primus-inter-pares status
within his own project of rebuilding. A conspicuous exclusion of “politics” is revised with its
conspicuous inclusion. It is as though “politics,” having shown the horrors it is capable of when
left unattended, is no longer to be ostracized; rather, it should be welcomed back into the fold of
thinking – “Alles Denken, das für sie wesentlich sein kann, soll in dieser Zeitschrift Raum finden”
– and socialized into a peaceful coexistence with other disciplines.385 However, this reinstatement
of politics into the realm of possible thought and speech – and, indeed, the journal’s prologue
appeals to the Germans with a concrete plea “zu sprechen, ihre Gedanken mitzuteilen”386 – is not
quite the fundamental reversal it appears to be. As conceived by the programmatically prodemocratic journal, politics is not only one among many possible fields of human activity but also
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one of the numerous objects of thinking and thus conceptual administration. It is regarded as one
among several possible angles from which to inquire into human existence, all of them united
under the aegis of thinking, Denken. In this postwar vision, shaken to its core although it may be,
politics appears to have gained no unique significance. Ultimately, this editorial stance does not
depart very far from its classical predecessor, sharing with it a speculative perspective on its subject
matter.
Through Jaspers’ invitation, Hannah Arendt, too, contributed to Die Wandlung, although
not without reservations. She considered her potential contributions to this publishing enterprise
to be a “form of return” to Germany, which was not a self-evident matter for her.387 In one of her
first postwar letters to Jaspers, Arendt outlined her conditions for such a homecoming,
simultaneously drawing a connection between her concrete situation in the world and a key
principle of her worldview:
Meine nicht-bürgerliche oder literarische Existenz beruht darauf, daß ich dank meines
Mannes politisch denken und historisch sehen gelernt habe und daß ich andererseits nicht
davon abgelassen habe, mich historisch wie politisch von der Judenfrage her zu orientieren
[...] Sie werden mich nicht mißverstehen, wenn ich Ihnen sage, daß es für mich nicht ganz
leicht ist, an einer deutschen Zeitschrift mitzuarbeiten.
Eines aber erscheint auch mir klar: wenn Juden in Europa bleiben sollen können, dann
nicht als Deutsche oder Franzosen etc., als ob nichts geschehen sei. Mir scheint, keiner von
uns kann zurückkommen (und Schreiben ist doch eine Form des Zurückkommens), nur
weil man nun wieder bereit scheint, Juden als Deutsche oder sonst was anzuerkennen;
sondern nur, wenn wir als Juden willkommen sind. Das würde heißen, dass ich gerne
schreiben würde, wenn ich als Jude über irgendeinen Aspekt der Judenfrage schreiben kann
[...]388
Jaspers acknowledged Arendt’s reservations, seeing to it that her first article in Die Wandlung,
“Organisierte Schuld,” be accompanied by a note from the editors informing the readers in

387

On this point, see Olga Kirschbaum, “Hannah Arendt, 1945–1950,” Arendt Studies 1 (2017): 111-132, esp. 124.

388

Arendt/Jaspers Briefwechsel, 67.

141

Germany of the overseas author’s express wish.389 At another point in the same letter, Arendt
clarified that, in order to remain recognizable as a Jew, she had opted to keep her birth name after
marrying her husband, Heinrich Blücher.390 Read together, these comments suggest that one thinks
historically and politically not when one acquires an abstract theory of world politics, but rather
when one takes one’s point of departure from one’s concrete circumstances and speaks into the
public realm from that vantage point. From her husband, Arendt says, she adopted the ability to
think historically and politically, yet thinking historically and politically meant not adopting her
husband’s name. It meant remaining visible as a Jew in her literary, public-facing existence.
Arendt’s contributions to Die Wandlung would prove pivotal for her work, later
reappearing in her massive Origins of Totalitarianism, which Arendt herself characterized as a
“historical study and political analysis.”391 Although these articles would also prove to be some of
the journal’s most impactful offerings, their impact did not reside in generating the journal’s goal
of polite or sociable conversation. Controversial by virtue of their relentless tone and method,
Arendt’s texts in Die Wandlung demonstrated her profound skepticism about the journal’s program
of revivifying bürgerliche Gesellschaft and Geselligkeit, particularly as a serious political
project.392 Not only did she doubt the ability of Geselligkeit to offer a remedy against the aftermath
of totalitarianism but, more importantly, considered the very notion of bourgeoisie or “bürgerliche
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Gesellschaft” to be structurally prone to the totalitarian path in the first place.393 Devoid of tangible
political significance, sociability, as Arendt saw it, nonetheless had the pernicious antipolitical
effect of socializing human beings into economically determined creatures: beings incapable of
acting in the strong sense of the word and therefore incapable of political and thus, in Arendt’s
view, plurally human existence.394 As Jakob Norberg reconstructs Arendt’s position, “Sociability
may very well possess discursive dimensions, but it precludes the articulation of dissent and for
Arendt, only mutual contestation qualifies as politics.”395 Taking her lead from the journal’s
“Geleitwort,” Arendt did, then, talk about politics in her articles, but in such a way as to revise its
position in the emphatically broad list of sanctioned topics of conversation and objects of
cognition. Contrary to the editorial suggestion of leaving history behind, Arendt did not shy away
from “Geschichte,” relentlessly probing the circumstances and premises that made possible the
journal’s immediate situation – “Wir haben fast alles verloren”396 – and impetus.
If the founding of Die Wandlung occasioned Arendt’s virtual return (Zurückkommen) to
Germany, the journal’s closing in December 1949 coincided with her first physical return to the
country since 1933 – followed by a second departure from it, now accompanied by a report.
Significantly, the last issue of Die Wandlung included a pivotal article by Arendt: “Es gibt nur ein
einziges Menschenrecht,” a version of which would reappear in her Origins of Totalitarianism.397
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In this article, Arendt reflects on the structural presuppositions of “the peculiarly modern touches
of physical homelessness, social rootlessness, and political rightlessness” that she would bring up
in her “Report from Germany” several months later (ANR 342). In her last Die Wandlung article,
Arendt contests the notion that a single human being is adequately understood as an instantiation
of the general concept “human,” to which definitional rights can be ascribed. For Arendt, essencebased rights – i.e., rights based on the human understood as a universal concept398 – are not
adequate to the given, terrestrially experienced reality of human existence. The spatiotemporal
reality that this existence has accrued by the mid-twentieth century is such that the map of the
world has been wholly divided into legal-political units: “Nur bei vollständiger Organisiertheit des
Menschengeschlechtes konnte der Verlust der Heimat und des politischen Status identisch werden
mit der Ausstoßung aus der Menschheit überhaupt.”399 This means that any human being, once
banished from his or her locus of citizenship, loses his or her citizenship rights without, however,
being able to – automatically, definitionally – acquire such rights anywhere else. This means, too,
that such a stateless and rightless human being may indeed be “human” according to an abstract
definition but, in concrete legal terms, becomes the complete opposite of the human being
envisioned as a grand, universal concept. Highlighting Arendt’s striking formulation “Ausstoßung
aus der Menschheit,” Werner Hamacher interprets Arendt’s notion of the right to have rights as a
“prelegal premise, a protoright, in which it is left open, what a human may be, who a human may
be”: “[...] this privilege is preceded neither by a natural nor a historical determination of man, of
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humanity, and its humanness.”400 In this manner, then, Arendt’s article carries out a crucial
reversal: Instead of taking her point of departure from an idealizing concept of the human being
(des Menschen) contained in the notion of human rights (Menschenrechte) – an essentializing
idealization that from the outset discards as mere accidents such infelicitous situations as flight
and exile – Arendt insists on the limit situation instead: on the situation of flight, exile,
homelessness. Dethroning it from its Enlightenment-era idealization, Arendt brings the notion of
Menschsein down to earth – down, that is, to the temporally constrained space: a space that is
constituted by temporal accidents, one that knows no pre-determined necessity.

Authoritative Silences: Benn and Heidegger
Some of the postwar silence and lack of response to the past that Hannah Arendt noted in
her 1950 report from Germany was authored by Gottfried Benn. In an open letter titled Berliner
Brief, Juli 1948, his third publication after the war,401 Benn declined an invitation to publish in
Merkur, a culturally conservative and eventually influential Southern German journal.402 With this
missive, the poet abstracted himself from the public sphere, reverting to his prewar stance of civic
detachment. Concurrently gestating a poetics of stasis in his lyric cycle Statische Gedichte, Benn
evidently considered the past, which Arendt insisted on in her report, to have passed. He was more
concerned with the immediate present. Admittedly, Benn’s vision of this present was presented
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through the familiar lens of a grand oppositional narrative: “Die Lage ist bedauerlich, denn neue
Elemente sind vorhanden, das Abendland möchte einen neuen Absprung wagen. Es ist für mich
kein Zweifel, daß eine zerebrale Mutation im Anzug ist, niedergehalten von allem, was
Öffentlichkeit heißt [...].”403 As though undeterred by the colossal failure of the Nazis’ regenerative
project, the poet held on to the rhetoric of renewal and transformation (“einen neuen Absprung,”
“zerebrale Mutation”). It appears that some of the same anxieties of degeneration and decay that
had propelled Benn’s essayistic output in the late 1920s and 1930s continued to animate him even
after the devastating collapse of the organized crusade against those ills’ purported causes.
Dispatched from the fallen capital into the geopolitically divided ether, Benn’s Berliner
Brief explicitly thematizes the question of “politics.” The poet’s vantage point is certainly
unexpected: Rather than point to the atrocities only recently perpetrated by the Nazi regime, he
imputes the decline of “Abendland” – a word with its own conservative geopolitical implications404
– precisely not to the concrete mechanisms of that regime’s terror apparatus but rather to something
quite abstract, namely, political concepts:
Das Abendland geht nämlich meiner Meinung nach gar nicht zugrunde an den totalitären
Systemen oder den SS-Verbrechen, auch nicht an seiner materiellen Verarmung oder an
den Gottwalds und Molotows, sondern an dem hündischen Kriechen seiner Intelligenz vor
den politischen Begriffen. Das Zoon politikon, dieser griechische Missgriff, diese
Balkanidee – das ist der Keim des Untergangs, der sich jetzt vollzieht. (BB 282).
Promptly requalifying universal concepts (“politische Begriffe”) into a regional error (“dieser
griechische Missgriff”), Benn evidently does not consider the current year of 1948 to be an
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aftermath of something, i.e., of a specific political cataclysm with specific preconditions and
specific consequences. According to Benn’s non-conformist historiography, this something – the
“Untergan[g], der sich jetzt vollzieht” – is very much still in the process of taking place.
Polemizing against democracy – “als Staatsprinzip das Beste, aber zum Produktiven gewendet
absurd!” – Benn reiterates his long-held conviction that art, as “alles Primäre,” is incompatible
with the secondary phenomenon of the public (Öffentlichkeit) and its procedures of deliberation
and debate (BB 283). “Gegen diese Öffentlichkeit meine eigenen tragischen Gedanken halten,”
declares the poet, “ist nicht mein Beruf. Ich trage meine Gedanken alleine [...]” (BB 283-4). Benn’s
diatribe against the “zoon politikon” goes hand in hand with a refusal to respond to, and engage
with, the surrounding world, a refusal declared by the poet in a performative and programmatic
manner. In a self-exculpatory gesture akin to the one reported by Arendt in her “Aftermath,” Benn
presents himself as a victim, universally ostracized “von den Nazis als Schwein, von den
Kommunisten als Trottel, von den Demokraten als Prostituierter, von den Emigranten als Renegat,
von den Religiösen als pathologischer Nihilist” (BB 281).405 With an adamantly isolationist tone,
Benn insists on his first-person stance, refusing to leave it for any external territory, be it via
emigration or public engagement: “Und damit leben Sie wohl und nehmen Sie Grüße aus dem
blockierten, stromlosen Berlin [...] Aber es ist die Stadt [...] deren Elend ich jetzt heimatlich
ertrage, in der ich das zweite, das dritte und nun das vierte Reich erlebe und aus der mich nichts
zur Emigration bewegen wird” (BB 285, my emphasis). Seemingly distancing himself from his
1933 glorification of the Third Reich as a “neue Epoche des geschichtlichen Seins,”406 Benn now
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presents it as merely one in a series of several equally ephemeral political programs – programs
that his self-contained ich is now wise enough to keep track of from a distance. Even as he thus
appears to deride “das dritte [...] Reich,” the poet simultaneously also normalizes it in neglecting
to point out this particular regime’s and program’s unprecedented atrocity.407 Silent about the
sociopolitical reality surrounding him, the poet withdraws into spiritual and aesthetic depths of his
own mind. For Hannah Arendt, precisely this state of withdrawal and refusal to act – whether in
deed or thought – constitutes the condition of possibility for totalitarian takeover. Not so much a
freely available – personal – stance among others, apolitical silence and dismissal of the public
realm is, on Arendt’s account, a prerequisite for the possibility of sociopolitical totalization and
ultimately extermination of those incapable of being accommodated within the programmatic
borders of the totality.
Significantly, Benn’s vocal silence and self-isolation after the war did not prevent him from
achieving an impressive comeback on the literary scene.408 In 1951, only a few years after his
Berliner Brief, the poet would be honored with the first postwar award of the prestigious Georg
Büchner Prize, which had just been reinstated and upgraded from a regional distinction to a
Germany-wide literary accolade. Crucially, this national recognition coincided with Benn’s highly
influential lecture on the problems of lyric poetry, his 1951 “Probleme der Lyrik,” which, first
delivered to a university audience, developed a theory of autonomous poetics. Reminiscent of
those postcards reported on by Arendt that anachronistically depicted Germany’s prewar
landmarks, Benn’s address invoked a similar kind of postcard: “Meine Damen und Herren, wenn
Sie am Sonntag morgen Ihre Zeitung aufschlagen, und manchmal sogar auch mitten in der Woche,
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finden Sie in einer Beilage meistens rechts oder links unten etwas, das durch gesperrten Druck und
besondere Umrahmung auffällt, es ist ein Gedicht.”409 With these words, Benn welcomed his
audience into a weekly routine’s idyllic present tense, crucially appealing to the atemporal
authority of “ein Gedicht” – a symbolic cultural object that, regardless of the cataclysms outside
of its “besondere Umrahmung,” guarantees a sense of continuity.
Benn was not the only illustrious figure who assumed a silent stance after the war. And, of
course, the parallels I have intermittently outlined between Hannah Arendt and Gottfried Benn are
somewhat arbitrary. After all, they neither knew each other nor referred to each other’s writings.
However, the link between the German poet and the exiled German-Jewish political theorist
appears less arbitrary when one considers the resemblance between Benn’s profile and that of the
philosopher Martin Heidegger, one of the early influences on Arendt’s thought.410 It was during
her trip to Germany in 1949-1950 that Arendt talked to Heidegger for the first time after seventeen
years, their last prewar correspondence consisting of Arendt’s inquiry about Heidegger’s alleged
support for the Nazis and his prompt denial of such allegations.411
Similar to Benn, Heidegger can be associated with the interwar phenomenon loosely
known as the Conservative Revolution. Similar to Benn, Heidegger entertained visions of national
rebirth and regeneration, locating the potential for their realization in the National Socialist
movement and regime. Similar to Benn, Heidegger expressed vocal support for the Nazis in the
spring of 1933,412 although unlike Benn he also took the extra step of officially joining the Nazi
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party. Similar to Benn, this public association did not last very long – here, too, due to the Nazis’
ultimate disinterest and not due to any moral epiphany on the part of the collaborating intellectual
himself. Similar to Benn, Heidegger’s association with the Nazis has led to the justifiable question
of a substantive connection between the philosopher’s earlier thought and later deed. After the
war, both found themselves constrained by and resentful of the Allies’ denazification policies,
although neither one publicly condemned the crimes committed by the Nazis. When granted the
permission to teach again, Heidegger opened his first lecture by reciting several of Benn’s poems
– a piece of news that the poet was delighted to receive and saw as a personal validation.413 In
what follows, I would like to devote brief reflections to the figure of Heidegger, without, however,
pretending to do justice to the uneasy question of the potential structural affinities between his
thought and the Nazi ideology.414
Before 1933, Heidegger in Freiburg – just like Karl Jaspers in Heidelberg – had cultivated
his own scholarly-philosophical legacy within the institutional walls of the university, an elite site
of cultural preservation. Venerated by the Bildungsbürgertum, the professorial class at large
considered itself to be the guardian of German high culture and Bildung against the pernicious
effects of modern mass society.415 Conforming to the Bildungsbürgertum’s general interwar
anxiety about Weimar Republic’s nascent processes of democratization, both Heidegger and
Jaspers endeavored to preserve the cherished cultural heritage: a misguided subsumtion of
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complex and multifaceted sociopolitical crises under an overarching cultural one.416 Abstracting
themselves from the public sphere, Jaspers and Heidegger adhered to culturally conservative
convictions, albeit in dissimilar ways and to varying degrees. In contrast to Heidegger, for instance,
Jaspers’ conservative impulses led him neither to embrace völkisch views nor to collaborate with
the Nazi regime. Heidegger, in his administrative position as rector and Führer417 of Freiburg
University,

participated

in

carrying

out

discriminatory

policies

and

practices

of

Gleichschaltung,418 and the philosopher’s eventual resignation from the rectorate did not deter him
in his support for the National Socialist movement, which he still expected to bring about a national
rebirth in Germany.419
As Adam Knowles has recently demonstrated, the disposition of silence was particularly
significant in Heidegger’s case: Beyond characterizing his personal attitude – but also
sociopolitical stance – it also represented an important intellectual preoccupation for the
philosopher.420 If Germanic folklore proved a fertile source of inspiration and respite for many
adherents to the specifically völkisch brand of conservatism in Germany, Heidegger’s remedy
against the evils and noises of modernity consisted in the Schillerian gesture of turning away from
the spatiotemporal confines of the Weimar Republic and towards the supratemporal realm of the
Greeks.421 Consonant with the Nazis’ own philhellenism, Heidegger’s version inspired his research
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seminars in the 1930s422 – which, incidentally, were supplemented by a 1936-37 lecture on
Schiller’s Ästhetische Briefe. What Heidegger was specifically interested in recovering from the
Greeks was the allegedly authentic, Greek form of philosophical questioning.423 This detour, he
believed, would afford nothing less than a regeneration of the German essence – not unlike
Friedrich Schiller’s own regenerative ambitions in Die Horen one and a half centuries earlier.
This ambitious turn to the Greeks found a vivid articulation in Heidegger’s infamous public
address titled “Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität,” which he delivered on May 27,
1933 on the occasion of being inaugurated a month earlier as the new rector of Freiburg University.
Similar to Benn’s enthused vision of mere intellectuals’ inadequacy to their extraordinary
historical moment, Heidegger’s text calls for a decisive transformation of Wissenschaft from mere
knowledge acquisition to an originary questioning. In an anaphorically incantatory manner, his
text arrives at a kind of apotheosis of questioning, das Fragen:
Das Fragen ist dann nicht mehr nur die überwindbare Vorstufe zur Antwort als dem
Wissen, sondern das Fragen wird selbst die höchste Gestalt des Wissens. Das Fragen
entfaltet dann seine eigenste Kraft der Aufschließung des Wesentlichen aller Dinge. Das
Fragen zwingt dann zur äußersten Vereinfachung des Blickes auf das Unumgängliche.424
We can only attain this kind of privileged philosophical questioning, Heidegger warns, “wenn wir
uns wieder unter die Macht des Anfangs unseres geistig-geschichtlichen Daseins stellen. Dieser
Anfang ist der Aufbruch der griechischen Philosophie.”425 Heidegger’s central question and
ultimatum in this speech – “ob wir als geschichtlich-geistiges Volk uns selbst noch und wieder
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wollen” – further highlights the fundamental historical-existential stakes of his invitation to return
to the origins of (Greek) philosophy.426
In an article written in 1945 and titled “Das Rektorat 1933/1934. Tatsachen und
Gedanken,” Heidegger neglected to reflect on the recent past by, for instance, critically assessing
any specific instances of wrongdoing or flawed thinking on his part. Instead, the philosopher, too,
appeared to succumb to the “irresistible stream of history,” gauging the world’s evils with
planetary dimensions: “[...] die universale Herrschaft des Willens zur Macht innerhalb der
planetarisch gesehenen Geschichte. In dieser Wirklichkeit steht heute Alles, mag es
Kommunismus heißen oder Faschismus oder Weltdemokratie.”427 With the Bennian gesture of
indifferently listing quite different political projects, Heidegger, similar to Benn, dismisses the
public realm, unwilling to engage with it: “[...] weil [...] mir nicht daran liege, [...] meine Person
ins öffentliche Gerede zu bringen.”428 Despite Heidegger’s attempts to exculpate himself, the
French-Zone denazification commission found grounds to bar him from teaching and lecturing.
Despite this ban, however, the philosopher was able to achieve a successful comeback on the
postwar intellectual scene. Already in January 1950, one of the things Hannah Arendt was able to
report from Germany to New York was that “In Deutschland ist wieder alles von Heidegger
überschwemmt.”429
Heidegger’s philhellenic rhetoric – with some of its troubling overtones from 1933 –
reemerged in an early postwar text: the lecture titled “Was ist das – die Philosophie?,” which
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Heidegger delivered in 1955 at an eponymous conference (“Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?”)
organized by Jean Beaufret, a philosophy instructor and Heidegger evangelist in France.430 The
German philosopher’s lecture was paradigmatic on several levels. As a lecture – as opposed to a
printed text – it carried a certain oracular weight. Its title alone – “Was ist das – die Philosophie?”
– augured a heavy task: one of answering the question “what is” not just for any field but the
eminent field of philosophy. The added significance stemmed from the location of the lecture:
outside of Germany, on the territory of a former geopolitical adversary and one of the postwar
occupation forces. In this manner, this border-crossing act by the recently rehabilitated philosopher
would appear to carry unequivocal symbolic significance. Yet the reality of Heidegger’s mission
to France was somewhat different. Organized in a highly scripted manner, the conference in Cerisy
hardly allowed for a free-flowing conversation.431 The gathering was, in fact, quite monologic.432
And if the context of the lecture appeared to call for critical retrospection – recognition, revision
– its thematic content performed a retrospection of a somewhat different kind.
Announcing an inquiry into what philosophy is, Heidegger’s postwar address recalls his
1933 rectorial speech, in which precisely “philosophy” figured prominently. Likewise, the title’s
interrogative formulation pays homage to the rectorial address and its central aim of recovering
the authentic manner of – philosophical – questioning. The deictic gesture inside the question –
“Was ist das [...]?” – is quite intriguing indeed, potentially all-encompassing: What is (all of) this?
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It is as though Heidegger, emerging from his imposed silence, begins to wonder at this, das, limited
by no specific referent. Only after the awe-denoting dash does the object of Heidegger’s wonder
emerge: “die Philosophie.”433 With this text, too, Heidegger promises access to philosophy as
opposed to speech merely about it: “Aber das Ziel unserer Frage ist, in die Philosophie
hineinzukommen, in ihr uns aufzuhalten, nach ihrer Weise uns zu verhalten, d.h. zu
‘philosophieren.’”434 Throughout his address to his listeners, Heidegger alludes to the proper ways
of hearing and attunement: We must, the philosopher warns, “unser Ohr öffnen, freimachen für
das, was sich uns in der Überlieferung als Sein des Seienden zuspricht. Indem wir auf diesen
Zuspruch hören, gelangen wir in die Entsprechung.”435 He begins by replacing the “abgebrauchten
Titel” – “Philosophie” – with its properly heard counterpart: “φιλοσοφία,” a word we utter “wenn
wir [...] das Wort ‘Philosophie’ aus seinem Ursprung hören.”436 Greek words spelled with Greek
letters appear throughout Heidegger’s lecture as though to forestall any unfortunate leakage
through their German spellings. The stakes of such proper transmission are high indeed:437
Speaking to a French audience, Heidegger nonetheless assures them that “die φιλοσοφία bestimmt
auch den innersten Grundzug unserer abendländisch-europäischen Geschichte”438 – as though the
recent geopolitical cataclysm is merely a minor misunderstanding, an error in transmission as it
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were. After trying out several answers to the titular question of his “Gespräch,” Heidegger cautions
that, while useful, they will lead “niemals zu einer echten, d.h. legitimen Antwort auf die Frage:
Was ist das – die Philosophie? Die Antwort kann nur eine philosophierende Antwort sein, eine
Antwort, die als Ant-wort in sich philosophiert.”439 Having dutifully warned us that we are in need
“einer höheren Sorgfalt” when “wir es wagen, ein Gespräch unter dem Titel ‘Was ist das – die
Philosophie?’ zu beginnen,” Heidegger concludes this “Gespräch” by suggestively alluding to a
kind of circle of the initiated, somewhat reminiscent of similar community-founding efforts in
Schiller’s Ankündigung for Die Horen and in Goethe’s Baroness in the Unterhaltungen deutscher
Ausgewanderten: “Aber [unser Gespräch] möchte sich bemühen, alle, die daran teilnehmen, für
eine Sammlung bereit zu machen, in der wir von dem angesprochen werden, was wir das Sein des
Seienden nennen.”440
Heidegger’s 1955 lecture “Was ist das – die Philosophie?” was not a unique effort to think
about philosophy in the early 1950s – a time when many erstwhile truths and authorities had to be
fundamentally called into question. Around the same time, Karl Jaspers and Hannah Arendt
produced their own reflections about “philosophy”: Jaspers – in his 1953 essay “Die Aufgabe der
Philosophie in der Gegenwart”; Arendt – in her 1954 lecture “Philosophy and Politics.” Already
the titles of their respective contributions point to the different paths taken by Heidegger, Jaspers,
and Arendt. In the title of Jaspers’s essay, “philosophy” is surrounded by two not quite
philosophical words: Aufgabe and Gegenwart. As the assignment of an extra-philosophical
purpose and the spatiotemporal specification indicate, Jaspers is interested in philosophy’s
significance and role in and for the present moment. Yet the philosopher universalizes this here

439

Heidegger, GA, 11:18.

Ibid., 9, 26. On Heidegger’s understanding of teaching the history of philosophy as a political task, see Knowles,
Heidegger’s Fascist Affinities, 57.
440

156

and now when he writes, “Philosophie ist überall, wo Menschen sich ihres Daseins denkend
bewusst werden [...] Wo immer eine Welt ist [...] da ist Philosophie.”441 The figure of thinking,
Denken, familiar from Jaspers’s aforementioned Geleitwort to the first issue of Die Wandlung,
comes up here as well. Thus, if Heidegger demarcates the originary space of philosophy as a
special realm to which we first need to acquire access, Jaspers renders philosophy into an
omnipresent element inherent in everything there is. As the bipartite title of Arendt’s lecture
announces, Arendt departs from Heidegger’s and Jaspers’s central concern with “philosophy,”
confronting it, instead, with its other – “politics.” Her own meditation on philosophy leads Arendt
to talk about the notion of plurality, marking an important break from the universalist conception
of the human. In contrast to this notion of humanity as a universal concept, Arendt envisions the
specifically human mode of life as a plurality of singular human beings acting together, “in
concert.”442

Sine Ira et Studio: Thinking Historically
In his reflections on the inextricable relationship between the intellectual and exilic modes
of being, the cultural and literary theorist Edward Said identifies the affect of surprise as a privilege
of the non-conforming intellectual:
So while you are neither winning prizes nor being welcomed into all those selfcongratulating honor societies that routinely exclude embarrassing troublemakers who do
not toe the party line, you are at the same time deriving some positive things from exile
and marginality. / One of course is the pleasure of being surprised, of never taking anything
for granted, of learning to make do in circumstances of shaky instability that would
confound or terrify most people.443
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Said then goes on to list a second advantage of the intellectual-exilic existence:
A second advantage to what in effect is the exile standpoint for an intellectual is that you
tend to see things not simply as they are, but as they have come to be that way. Look at
situations as contingent, not as inevitable, look at them as the result of a series of historical
choices made by men and women, as facts of society made by human beings, and not as
natural or god-given, therefore unchangeable, permanent, irreversible.444
A similar sense for the irreducible contingency and plurality specific to the human condition – “a
series of historical choices made by men and women” – profoundly informs Hannah Arendt’s
thinking. For her, the practice of overshadowing reality with overarching historiographic
constructs is a persistent concern. Significantly, however, Arendt’s diagnosis of flight from reality,
thematized in her “Report from Germany,” is not limited to those directly and indirectly involved
in perpetrating the atrocities of the Nazi regime. In her review of Denis de Rougemont’s 19411942 novel Devil’s Share, Arendt discerns a similar flight from reality in the Belgian author’s
attempt to explain – or explain away – the phenomenon of totalitarianism. Arendt faults de
Rougemont’s account with “evading the responsibility of man for his deeds”445 through an “escape
from reality into a cosmic flight”446 and search for the “deceptive security of those ‘keys to history’
which pretend to explain everything.”447 Even as she uncompromisingly exposes the decisive
insufficiencies of de Rougemont’s novel, however, Arendt highlights its specific value as a
“document humain.”448 Precisely in its insufficiency, she argues, it must be read and understood
as a crucial testament to its time – a testament that documents the deficiency in understanding as
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much at the core of contemporaneous atrocities as attempts to explain them. With this inflection,
Arendt speaks not so much as a historiographer as, rather, a historian working in the archives.
Precisely this kind of flight from reality, too, is at the core of Benn’s 1933 vision of a
history that speaks over human voices – “Wo die Geschichte spricht, haben die Personen zu
schweigen.” This statement understands history as a process that resides above and beyond
individual human beings. Definitionally silencing the latter, Benn glorifies “History” as a selfrevealing process governed by a teleology inaccessible to limited – human – understanding.
Precisely this supra-human notion of history is anathema to Arendt’s thinking: “The historian, by
gazing backward into the historical process, has been so accustomed to discovering an ‘objective’
meaning, independent of the aims and awareness of the actors, that he is liable to overlook what
actually happened in his attempt to discern some objective trend.”449 Contrary to Benn who, in a
stance of wise resignation, watches History unfold, Arendt insists on the human being’s capacity
for new beginnings, which she sees as irreducibly connected to human freedom as an irreducibly
political phenomenon.
The daily practice of forgetting, quotidian erasure of history, which Arendt highlights in
her 1950 “Report from Germany” is consonant with the general importance of history and
historiography for Arendt, a thinker with a “powerfully sensitive historical consciousness.”450
Highlighting Arendt’s crucial Weimar influences, Liisi Keedus argues that her preoccupation with
the question of history is not merely thematic but also methodological: It lies at the very core of
Arendt’s early scholarly formation and thus understanding of how the world might be accessed
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and made into an object of study in the first place.451 Trained in theology and philosophy at the
universities of Marburg and Heidelberg, Arendt partook of the post-World War I transdisciplinary
upheaval, which called into question the dominance, in the nineteenth century, of the approach
later pejoratively labeled as “historicist.”452 Foregrounding an arguably myopic treatment of
historical sources, this approach did not see modern scholarly conceptuality as qualitatively
distinct from the assumptions underlying the experience of distant centuries, pretending to gain
access to them without further ado.453
Arendt’s preoccupation with the past is neither a nostalgic impulse to retrieve a longed-for
image or memory nor disinterested scientific consideration. It stems, rather, from an imperative to
understand the inextricability of the past from the present. Describing the “simple and baffling”
problem at stake in her Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt writes, “[...] all historiography is
necessarily salvation and frequently justification; it is due to man’s fear that he may forget and to
his striving for something which is even more than remembrance.”454 As Arendt sees her task, it
is imperative to challenge “the tradition of sine ira et studio,” a tradition of dispassionate historywriting.455 “The problem of style,” Arendt writes in the same article, “is a problem of adequacy
and of response. If I write in the same ‘objective’ manner about the Elizabethan age and the
twentieth century, it may well be that my dealing with both periods is inadequate because I have
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renounced the human faculty to respond to either.”456 In Arendt’s view, historically informed
thinking emerges not from a neutral historicist stance but rather from an agitated response to that
which is being thought and written about – a response of impassioned anger cited in the formulaic
prescription “sine ira et studio”: without anger and passion.457 Animating Arendt’s thinking about
history, then, is the same problem that troubles her during her 1949-1950 trip to Germany: the
ability and willingness to respond.

Ambivalent Return: Arendt’s Lessing Prize Address
Anger, Zorn, as a Hamburg audience would find out on a Saturday morning in the fall of
1959, was a distinctive affect in the case of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, a venerated exponent of
this audience’s very own literary canon. The audience members would further find out that
separating them from that Lessingian Zorn was something directly related to the construction of
canons: a “Geschichtsbesessenheit und Ideologieverschworenheit,” particularly that of the
nineteenth century but also one that concerned their own time: “gerade im politischen Denken
unserer Zeit noch so wirksam, daß wir ein ganz und gar freies Denken, das sich weder der
Geschichte noch des logischen Zwanges als Krücken bedient, für unverbindlich zu halten geneigt
sind” (MfZ, 15).458 The audience would find out, too, that, unlike the reality-diminishing passions
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(Leidenschaften) of hope (Hoffnung) and fear (Furcht), the passion of anger, Zorn, imparts reality
and is bound up with the world: “Das gesteigerte Realitätsbewußtsein, das als solches Lust ist,
entstammt einer leidenschaftlichen Weltoffenheit und Weltliebe, [...]” (MfZ, 12). Finally, the
audience members would find out that this particular passion also exposes the world (“stellt die
Welt bloß”) and thus directly implicates them, those comfortably sitting in the audience and
finding all of these things out (MfZ, 12).
While Hannah Arendt did not address the German public during her first visit after the war,
she would do so ten years later.459 On September 28, 1959, she delivered a speech titled “Von der
Menschlichkeit in finsteren Zeiten,” on the occasion of being honored with the Lessing Prize “der
Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg” – an honor first granted in 1930 to Friedrich Gundolf, Arendt’s
former literature professor in Heidelberg and an early influence on her thinking.460 The occasional
character of Arendt’s Hamburg address, which she would highlight retrospectively, 461 as well as
its complex situational context have been extensively explored in the more recent scholarship.462
Certainly not blind to the unease of being summoned to receive an honor from a place which she
had previously been judged unworthy of inhabiting – “Wenn man sich so überlegt, wie es denn
eigentlich um Ehrungen und Preise der Öffentlichkeit unter den gegenwärtigen Weltumständen
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bestellt sei [...]” – Arendt was quite ambivalent about the prize and its implications (MfZ, 10).463
Yet, in contrast to Gottfried Benn, who had vocally declined the word offered to him in 1948,
Arendt chose not to retreat from the world, to which, she warned, our attitude or grasp (Haltung)
was ever weaker: “Nichts, scheint mir, ist in unserer Zeit fragwürdiger geworden als unsere
Haltung zur Welt, nichts weniger selbstverständlich als der Einklang mit der Öffentlichkeit, zu
dem die Ehrung verpflichtet und den sie bestätigt” (MfZ, 8-9).464 Whereas in 1946 Arendt had
envisioned coming back to Germany – her “Zurückkommen” through potential publications in Die
Wandlung – only by first introducing herself as a Jew, she does not explicitly introduce herself in
this way to her Hamburg audience in 1959, her references to her Jewish heritage conspicuously
indirect.465
Notably, too, Arendt prefaced the substantive part of her address by pointing out that it was
a free city466 that had decided to grant her the distinction of a literary prize, and that this free city
had tied this prize to Lessing, another intellectual: “Die Auszeichnung, die eine freie Stadt verleiht,
und ein Preis, der sich auf den Namen Lessings beruft, sind eine große Ehrung” (MfZ, 7). Made in
passing, the enigmatic link between freedom and obligation contained here will prove to be a key
thematic concern of Arendt’s speech: specifically, her emphasis on a political, relational space as
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a necessary condition for freedom. As Ingeborg Nordmann proposes, Arendt’s aim in her Lessing
address is nothing less than “Politik anders zu denken.”467 The aim, then, of this chapter’s
concluding pages is to explore the way in which Arendt reflects on the question of politics in this
address from 1959.
Arendt centers her reflections around Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, someone traditionally
considered a church father of German letters468 – a venerable tradition that Friedrich Schlegel, only
sixteen years after Lessing’s death, could identify as “ein blinder Glauben, eine gedankenlose
Gewohnheit, welche bald heilige Überlieferung und endlich beinah unverbrüchliches Gesetz
wird.”469 In the context of postwar Germany, Lessing was granted an even more pronounced
symbolic significance. At this time of profound devastation, the treatment of the so-called classics
as “cultural currency” allowed for a certain, albeit dubious, continuity via the intellectual
tradition.470 Arendt, however, is interested in Lessing as the “Ahnherr und Meister aller Polemik
in deutscher Sprache”: in Lessing who was “ein so durchaus politischer Mensch” (MfZ, 48, 54).
Thus picking up the more peripheral, Schlegelian tradition of calling into question Lessing’s
domestication through institutional veneration, Arendt examines what exactly Lessing’s famous
polemical existence might have meant: “Denn Lessing hat den Einklang in die Welt und die
Öffentlichkeit nie gefunden, wohl auch nie finden wollen, und hat sich doch auf seine Weise ihr
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immer verpflichtet gefühlt” (MfZ, 10). Already at the outset of her prize acceptance speech, which
by convention honors the intellectual in whose honor the accolade has been established, Arendt
focuses on a question quite a bit broader: the question of the world.
The laureate of the 1959 Lessing Prize does not deferentially retreat into the background
in order to honor her canonized predecessor out of merely conventional respect. As Sonja Boos
underscores, even as Arendt’s Lessing Prize address conspicuously skirts oratorical conventions
of acceptance speeches, it simultaneously exceeds a narrowly theoretical reflection, subtly
undermining the stifling sociopolitical premises of the postwar German public sphere.471 Arendt’s
engagement with Lessing in this text is not merely theoretical also in the sense that she does not
locate theses in Lessing’s writings that could serve as supporting evidence for the arguments she
herself is putting forward. Just as Lessing, in Arendt’s eyes, was concerned not so much with
absolute truths as with the situatedness of those truths in the world, Arendt’s aim, too, is not to
present a scientifically objective account of Lessing’s thought but, rather, to explore its relation to
its world. And Lessing, Arendt tells us, “hat die Welt im Zorn und im Lachen erfahren, und Zorn
und Lachen sind ihrem Wesen nach parteiisch” (MfZ, 13). Instead of inquiring into the definitional
attributes or responsibilities of the intellectual as a type or envisioning intellectuality as privately
held knowledge, Arendt is concerned with it as a mode of being in the world.
Accordingly, Arendt approaches her Hamburg audience by dwelling on the nature of the
occasion at hand – the moment of bestowing or receiving an honor (Ehrung). For Arendt, the prize
and the honor are no merely external trappings of recognition that would provide an opportunity
for her to enrich the intellectual canon with a set of remarks about the world as a kind of intellectual
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enrichment. Not so much a merely supplemental acknowledgement of an individual’s
achievements in the world of letters, the act of honoring is, for Arendt, disclosive of the world:
In der Ehrung meldet sich die Welt zu Wort, und wenn wir sie annehmen und für sie
danken, so können wir es nur ohne alle Selbstreflexion im Rahmen unserer Haltung zur
Welt, zu einer Welt und Öffentlichkeit nämlich, welcher wir den Raum verdanken, in den
wir sprechen und in dem wir gehört werden. (MfZ, 8)
As this formulation suggests, Arendt sees herself being addressed by, and therefore responding to,
the world. There is something inextricably linguistic in this moment of honoring: Proposing that
it be given the word (“meldet sich [...] zu Wort”), the world is that to which we owe the space into
which we speak (“in den wir sprechen”). It should be noted that Arendt articulates the relation of
the speakers to their world in the accusative case, as opposed to a perhaps more intuitive dative
formulation (*“in dem wir sprechen”). With this distinctive syntactic choice, the honoree
emphasizes the directionality of the speakers’ speech, illuminating a vital link between this speech
and the world that cannot be secured in place, made into a static infrastructure. Not so much a
space that would contain speakers and their conversations – perhaps a space of sociability,
Geselligkeit – the world is constituted through these conversations in the first place. At stake for
Arendt is relatability and addressability, and not just those who address or are addressed. Indeed,
the accusative case stresses the precarity of the common space – the in-between, das Zwischen –
that Arendt highlights as the object of widespread concern (Sorge): “Aber die Welt und die
Menschen, die sie bewohnen, sind nicht dasselbe. Die Welt liegt zwischen den Menschen, und
dies Zwischen – viel mehr als, wie man häufig meint, die Menschen oder gar der Mensch – ist
heute Gegenstand der größten Sorge und der offenbarsten Erschütterung in nahezu allen Ländern
der Erde” (MfZ, 9). For Arendt, a qualitative change takes place between a single human being and
a space that could be called “public.” By de-coupling the world (Welt) from the individual human
being, Arendt locates the world between human beings instead. On Arendt’s account, this in166

between is the primary character of the world – as opposed to a merely secondary phenomenon
that would materialize additively only after one human being would occupy a spot next to another.
Because, for Arendt, the human being qua political being is irreducibly plural, the Zwischen is
coeval with the specifically human existence in the first place. It might strike one as quite bizarre
that, in diagnosing the key affliction of her time, Arendt shows such apparent disregard precisely
for the individual – or, for that matter, for numerous individuals – and pivots, instead, to a
discussion of that which is not even visible, cannot be inserted into a frame, memorialized,
commemorated: the in-between space, nameless and inorganic. Instead of being used as a secure
prop of tradition withstanding accidental historical turbulences, Lessing emerges in Arendt’s
address to her Hamburg audience as a figure of destabilization.
Even as Arendt insists on Lessing’s commitment and boundedness to the world, she
highlights his characteristic affinity for criticism (Kritik) and thus, presumably, a certain distance
from the world.472 Radically critical is how Arendt characterizes Lessing’s attitude to the world,
differentiating it from a simple binary of approval or disapproval: “Seine Haltung zur Welt war
weder positiv noch negativ, sondern radikal kritisch und, was die Öffentlichkeit anlangte, durchaus
revolutionär; aber sie blieb der Welt verpflichtet, verließ ihren Boden niemals und übersteigerte
nichts in die Schwärmerei einer Utopie” (MfZ, 11). For Arendt, Lessing’s attitude of specifically
radical critique is, counterintuitively, not one of rejecting the world but rather one of remaining
committed to it:
Kritik im Sinne Lessings ist diese Gesinnung, die immer Partei ergreift im Interesse der
Welt, ein jegliches von seiner jeweiligen weltlichen Position her begreift und beurteilt und
so niemals zu einer Weltanschauung werden kann, die von weiteren Erfahrungen in der
Welt unabhängig bleibt, weil sie sich auf eine mögliche Perspektive festgelegt hat. (MfZ,
14-15)
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In this light, if a certain rootedness is at the core of Lessing’s critique of, and holding onto (Haltung
zur), the world and to its ground (Boden), then it is precisely not a tribal one but rather a
fundamentally ambivalent stance: one that, taking sides with the world, does not take sides with
any one particular attribute of, or object in, the world. Lessing’s critique, as Arendt sees it, is an
essentially dynamic practice insofar as it can never congeal into a result or a state. Rather than an
overarching worldview or observation of the world (Weltanschauung), this Lessingian critique is
an act of taking sides with the world (Parteinahme für die Welt): with the world as the very
condition of possibility of relating in the first place. As a critic, one is no neutral observer of the
world (Welt-Anschauer as it were) but is rather inextricably bound up with it. In highlighting this
peculiar and dynamic attitude of partisanship in her portrait of Lessing, Arendt distinguishes him
from Schiller’s postulate of neutrality, non-engagement with, and non-partisanship for, the world
at hand in his program for Die Horen.
For, having paid tribute to Lessing and his relation to the world, Arendt proceeds to talk
precisely about the “finstere Zeiten” mentioned in the title of her speech – a subject matter akin to
the “allverfolgenden Dämon der Staatskritik” which Friedrich Schiller had insisted on banning
from his projected intellectual community a century and a half earlier, one and a half decades after
Lessing’s death.473 More precisely, Arendt proceeds to talk about the implications of not talking
about this previously banned but “allverfolgende” subject matter, thereby indirectly reflecting on
what a project such as Schiller’s in Die Horen would mean not simply for philosophy or even for
the to-be-aesthetically-educated human being but, much more crucially, for the world:
In der Geschichte sind die Zeiten, in denen der Raum der Öffentlichkeit sich verdunkelt
und der Bestand der Welt so fragwürdig wird, daß die Menschen von der Politik nicht mehr
verlangen, als daß sie auf ihre Lebensinteressen und Privatfreiheit die gehörige Rücksicht
nehme, nicht selten. Man kann sie mit einigem Recht ‘finstere Zeiten’ (Brecht) nennen.
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Denjenigen, die in solchen Zeiten leben und von ihnen erzogen worden sind, hat es wohl
immer nahe gelegen, die Welt und ihre Öffentlichkeit gering zu achten, sie so weit als
möglich zu ignorieren, oder auch sie zu überspringen und gleichsam hinter sie zu greifen
– als wäre die Welt nur eine Fassade, hinter der sich Menschen verbergen –, um sich dann
mit Menschen ungeachtet der Welt, die zwischen ihnen liegt, zu verständigen. (MfZ, 2122)
Speaking of “die Zeiten” “in der Geschichte” in the plural and thus suggesting their ubiquity
throughout the historical existence of the humankind, Arendt proceeds to suggest that episodes of
inner emigration – “ein eigentümlich zweideutiges Phänomen” – were not limited to the twelve
years of Nazi Germany (MfZ, 34). In fact, Arendt discerns in the present moment and place – in
the moment, that is, in which her speech is taking place – a similarly troubling retreat from the
world: through an effort to erase the recent past from memory, an effort “‘Vergangenheit zu
bewältigen’” – a phrase Arendt puts in scare quotes, criticizing it as an utterly inadequate attitude
to the past (MfZ, 34). In this manner, the question that preoccupied Arendt in her “Report from
Germany” in 1949-1950 – the question of silence and non-response – resurfaces in her address to
the German public ten years later. In her Lessing Prize speech, too, Arendt insists on speaking
(“Gespräch” or “Sprechen”) “weil dies Gespräch [...] der gemeinsamen Welt gilt, die in einem
ganz präzisen Sinne unmenschlich bleibt, wenn sie nicht dauernd von Menschen besprochen wird”
(MfZ, 43). Without this indispensable practice, the world – the space between individual human
beings – is endangered. Endangered with it is the possibility of human action “in concert” and
ultimately freedom, which, for Arendt, is crucially neither a “Mitgift der menschlichen Natur” nor
“innere Freiheit”: both of them legacies of the philosophically conceived concept, or capture, of
freedom.474 Neither a property of an individual human subject nor a feature of the universal concept
of humanity,475 freedom, for Arendt is “eine weltliche Realität” that, as such, is profoundly
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precarious and dependent for its preservation on human beings acting in concert and speaking
about the world: “Frei sein können Menschen nur in Bezug aufeinander, also nur im Bereich des
Politischen und des Handelns.”476 Against the tradition of expelling politics from theorizations of
the political as it pertains to human beings’ existence and coexistence, Arendt thinks politics as an
inextricable feature of what it means to be human in the first place.
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Chapter 4
Poetic Address: Osip Mandelstam’s “About an Interlocutor” (1913) and Paul Celan’s “Die
Dichtung Ossip Mandelstamms” (1960)

An intellectual is like a shipwrecked person
who learns how to live in a certain sense
with the land, not on it, not like Robinson
Crusoe whose goal is to colonize his
little island, but more like Marco Polo, whose
sense of the marvelous never fails him, and
who is always a traveler, a provisional guest,
not a freeloader, conqueror, or raider.
– Edward Said, “Intellectual Exile: Expatriates and Marginals” 477

Paul Celan may not have objected to being called a poet in the same way that Hannah
Arendt protested against being called a political philosopher. Yet, like Arendt, Celan did object to
certain traditional conceptions of the poetic vocation. Calling into question the concept of poetry
understood as expression or edification, Celan similarly did not accept the notion of a poet as a
self-contained lyric I in full mastery of, and therefore essentially indifferent to, its surroundings.
In a similar way, Arendt’s objection to being counted among political philosophers was directed
at this profession’s underlying conception of the human being as a sovereign entity that is at its
best and most essential when left within its own internal borders. For Arendt and Celan, openness
to something outside of oneself was an irreducible characteristic of being human tout court. It was
thus also a precondition for their respective engagements with the world: whether through political
theory or poetry, a question of politics or a question of poetics. In this manner, then, Celan’s and
Arendt’s objections to traditional conceptions of their respective vocations were no narrowly
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professional considerations. Rather, these objections gave voice to a profound concern with the
human being’s relation to the world.

Part I: Osip Mandelstam’s “About an Interlocutor”
Das Gedicht kann, da es ja eine Erscheinungsform der Sprache und damit seinem Wesen
nach dialogisch ist, eine Flaschenpost sein, aufgegeben in dem – gewiß nicht immer
hoffnungsstarken – Glauben, sie könnte irgendwo und irgendwann an Land gespült
werden, an Herzland vielleicht. Gedichte sind auch in dieser Weise unterwegs: sie halten
auf etwas zu.478
With these words, Paul Celan reflects on a poem’s precarious capacity for conveying – qua
Flaschenpost (message in a bottle) – although he promptly qualifies the transitive implication of
this act with the more intransitive notion of “sailing towards something” (“auf etwas zuhalten”).
The origin of Celan’s reflection on poems’ peculiar metaphoricity479 is often located in Osip
Mandelstam’s first published essay, “O sobesednike” (“О собеседнике,” 1913).480 Centered
around the figure of the interlocutor (alternatively: conversation partner, collocutor)481 as
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constitutive for lyric poetry, Mandelstam’s essay envisions the poem as a message in a bottle
thrown overboard in the moment of shipwreck and marked with no specific addressee. As Barbara
Wiedemann has shown, however, this early text by Mandelstam may have actually been read by
Celan only as late as June 1961482 and thus after his composition of the Bremen prize acceptance
address (January 1958), in which the metaphor of the Flaschenpost quoted above appears.483 Even
if no genetic link can be identified between the two poets’ crucial use of this metaphor, it does
point to a remarkable affinity between their respective visions of poetry. In what follows, I would
like to take a closer look at Mandelstam’s early text in preparation for a subsequent consideration
of Celan’s radio essay “Die Dichtung Ossip Mandelstamms.”484 By examining more closely
Mandelstam’s theory of the poetic interlocutor, I hope to offer a helpful qualification of the parallel
frequently drawn between Mandelstam’s and Celan’s arguably dialogical poetics.485 All too
readily, the attribute “dialogical” suggests two conversation partners – poet and reader – who
happen to coalesce in the moment of poetic reception, which is not quite what Mandelstam presents
in his essay.
The main thesis of “About an Interlocutor” is that poetic language is never confined to its
moment of articulation but, rather, always comes into being with a view to a space beyond itself,

Barbara Wiedemann, “Eine Flaschenpost auf Atemwegen: Paul Celans zweite Begegnung mit Ossip
Mandelstamm,” Sprachkunst: Beiträge zur Literaturwissenschaft 36 (2005): 69-97, esp. 72-73.
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namely, a future, albeit unspecified, addressee. Through the aforementioned epistolary metaphor
to be discussed at a later point in this chapter, Mandelstam formulates the pivotal analogy of his
essay’s poetic theory: “Like the poem, the letter,” he writes “isn’t addressed to anyone in particular.
Nevertheless, both have an addressee: the letter’s is the person who will accidentally notice the
bottle in the sand; the poem’s is a ‘reader in posterity.’”486 Having previously used synonymous
terms such as “addressee” and “listener,” Mandelstam uses the titular term sobesednik
(“interlocutor”) for the first time only toward the middle of the essay: “Rejection of an
‘interlocutor’ [sobesednik] passes like a red thread through all of Balmont’s487 poetry and greatly
diminishes its value. In his poems, Balmont is always slighting somebody, looking down his nose
at him, contemptuously. This ‘somebody’ is the secret interlocutor” (OS, 60). Twice in this crucial
sentence Mandelstam uses tentative scare quotes in referring to the elusive figure he has announced
in his essay’s title. Given that the source of lyric poetry has traditionally come to be located in the
lyric “I,”488 it is especially notable that the young Mandelstam’s theory of poetry turns instead
towards something like a lyric “you.” Why was it important for the poet to invite this
“interlocutor,” this “somebody,” onto the stage of poetics?

Literary-Historical Background
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Mandelstam opens his five-section essay with a polemic against the poetic school of
Symbolism, accusing the Symbolists of an unwillingness to confront a crucial question: “To whom
does the poet speak? It’s a disturbing question, and very contemporary, because to this very day
the Symbolists have avoided posing it sharply” (OS, 58). This, in Mandelstam’s eyes, is no small
transgression, for he regards this question to be inherent in any act of speech:
Symbolism completely neglected the, as it were, contractual relationship, the mutuality that
accompanies an act of speech. (I speak, and that means that I am listened to, and not for
nothing, not out of kindness, but because there is an obligation). The Symbolist poets
turned their attention exclusively to acoustics. (OS, 58-59)
The young Mandelstam admired, was influenced by, and later distanced himself from the leading
figure of Russian Symbolism Viacheslav Ivanov.489 The latter’s 1904 essay “Poet i chern’” (“The
Poet and the Mob”) – a reflection on the poet’s antagonistic relationship to the world – is one of
the points of departure for Mandelstam’s “About an Interlocutor.”490 Both Ivanov and Mandelstam
turn to the Russian poet Aleksandr Pushkin’s provocative poem “Poet i tolpa” (“The Poet and the
Crowd,” 1828), but with starkly different conclusions. Reading Pushkin’s depiction of the
antagonism between the poet and the crowd as a diagnosis of an epochal schism,491 Ivanov
ultimately sees a path toward the two poles’ reconciliation: a path that lies through the
“mythopoetic” realm of “genuine symbols.” Articulating his Symbolist program, Ivanov explicates
such symbols – “limitless in their meaning” – as those that “utter in [their] innermost (hieratic and
magic) language of hint and suggestion something unverbalizable, inadequate to the external
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word.”492 As I will discuss below, no such reconciliation appears possible to Mandelstam, who
deciphers a somewhat different diagnosis in Pushkin’s poem: the poet’s irreducible rejection of
precisely a friendly, receptive crowd.
Decoupling poetry from any transcendent authority, Mandelstam insists on its terrestrial
orientation. With his critique of Symbolism, he fits in the turn-of-the-century Russian literary
landscape, which saw this hitherto dominant poetic school being supplanted by so-called
“Acmeism.”493 First formulated by the poet Nikolaj Gumilyov in 1912 (“Letter on Russian
Poetry”),494 the term “Acmeism” contains the Greek word akme (“peak,” “summit”) and, although
difficult to define, broadly calls for a concrete, thing-oriented495 poetry that, in lieu of otherworldly
symbolism, would focus on the here and now.496 In addition to Mandelstam, this new poetic trend
counted among its several practitioners such poets as Nikolai Gumilyov and Anna Akhmatova.
Although the twenty-one-year-old Mandelstam may have missed the March 1912 meeting at which
“Acmeism” was officially hatched,497 the transition attempted by this new poetic stance acutely
preoccupied the young poet. He made two programmatic attempts to articulate the specifically
Acmeist vision of poetry: the 1913 essay “O sobesednike”498 as well as the essay “Utro

492

Ibid., 2:712, 713 (my translation).
On the complicated relationship between Russian Symbolism and Acmeism, see Jane Garry Harris, Osip
Mandelstam (Boston: G.K. Hall & Co., 1988), 13-30.
493

494

Ibid., 19.

On Acmeism’s Dinglichkeit, see Annette Wegberger, Postsymbolistisches Schreiben. Studien zur Poetik des
Akmeismus und Osip Mandel’stams (Munich: Verlag Otto Sagner, 2005), 67.
495

496

For an overview of Acmeism’s self-understanding, see Harris, Osip Mandelstam, 18-23.

497

Nikita Struve, Osip Mandelshtam (London: Overseas Publication Ltd, 1990), 14.

498

On this essay as programmatic for Acmeism, see Mandelstam, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 2:476.

176

Akmeizma” [“The Morning of Acmeism,” written in 1913 but not published until 1919].499 To be
sure, Mandelstam was not alone in his preoccupation with the question of communication
(obshcheniye)500 in poetry. Fellow Acmeist Nikolai Gumilyov likewise explored this question in
an essay laconically titled “Tchitatel’” (“The Reader”). A brief sketch of Gumilyov’s theory of the
reader will offer a glimpse into a conception of poetry that, while contemporary with and
seemingly akin to Mandelstam’s own, is nonetheless much less radical.
Composed around 1919-1920 and published posthumously, the essay “Tchitatel’” was
likely conceived as a preface to a comprehensive theory of poetry, which Gumilyov planned to
title “Theory of Integrated Poetics.”501 Examining the relationship between the poet and the reader,
the essay adopts a generic-taxonomic approach intimated in the title of another essay by Gumilyov,
titled “Anatomy of a Poem.” Ultimately, this inquiry into the nature of the reader is meant to shed
light on the concept of poetry, the central object of the poet’s interest. The gesture of
hierarchization structures much of the essay’s argument. Thus, Gumilyov prefaces his discussion
of the reader by distinguishing between poetry and prose. Conceding that it may be impossible to
spot an uncontaminated case of either, the poet nonetheless diligently lists the main marks of
distinction between the two: typography, phonetics, composition, and choice of images.
Furthermore, having from the essay’s very first line defined poetry as a medium of expression for
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the human being’s personality,502 Gumilyov glorifies the uniqueness of the authentically poetic
consciousness, locating its essence in the sense of knowing something hitherto unknown and being
overcome by a “catastrophic” need to say it.503 In his implicitly poetocratic vision,504 Gumilyov
imagines the poet as someone who, rising above his contemporaries, is in a position to enlighten.
Positing that “the poet always addresses someone, some listener,” Gumilyov proceeds to identify
a number of such possible addressees: “Sometimes it is a sort of mystical interlocutor, a friend or
beloved not yet appeared, sometimes it is God, Nature, the People ...”.505 The poet-taxonomist then
goes on to identify and criticize the most common types of readers – “naive,” “snobbish,” and
“ecstatic” – in order to, finally, uncover the rare readerly type:

the “reader-friend.”506

Exceptionally empathetic, this ideal reader vicariously lives through the moment of poetic
creation: “A beautiful poem enters his [the reader’s] consciousness as an immutable fact, changes
him [the reader], determines his feelings and actions.”507 The relationship diagnosed by Gumilyov
between the poet and his reader-friend is peculiarly symbiotic. On the one hand, while recognizing
the ideal imagined reader as the necessary condition for poetry’s ability to “fulfill its task of
ennobling the human race,” Gumilyov nonetheless subordinates this imagined reader to the poet
who, after all, is “marked by God’s favor.”508 At the same time, however, Gumilyov endows the

From its opening sentence, Gumilyov’s essay offers an anthropocentric view of poetry: “Poetry for man is one of
the methods of expressing his personality and manifests itself by means of the word, the sole instrument that satisfies
its [the personality’s] requirements”: Nikolai Gumilyov, “The Reader,’” in On Russian Poetry, trans. David Lapeza
(Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1977), 25.
502

503

Ibid, 25.

504

Gumilev, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 7:534.

505

Ibid.

506

Ibid.

507

Ibid.

508

Ibid.

178

reader with the right to place demands on the poet: “What the reader has a right to and, therefore,
ought to demand of the poet will be the subject of this book.” 509 As I will show below, precisely
this kind of reciprocal interaction between the poet and the reader would be significantly
inadequate for Mandelstam’s vision of poetry. In contrast to Gumilyov’s conception of poetic
reception as confluence and identification, Mandelstam’s is dissociative and defamiliarizing.

Addressing with Poems
Structured around the prefix so-, which, akin to the Latin con-, means “with,” the Russian
word sobesednik is indicative of a certain simultaneity. Likewise, this word’s English rendering as
“interlocutor” implies the simultaneity of a back-and-forth in real time between two speaking
subjects situated one across from the other. Despite this appearance of conversationality, the figure
of the interlocutor in Mandelstam’s essay “O sobesednike” proves to be quite unfamiliar upon a
closer look. To be sure, Mandelstam’s poetological essay is already notable in its disregard for the
expected question of genre – namely, “What is poetry?”. However, equally noteworthy is the
essay’s decision to bypass such a generic approach with respect to its titular figure of the
interlocutor – in direct contrast, for instance, to Gumilyov’s tactic. Mandelstam’s essay offers
nothing like a profile of this coveted figure, information that would be useful for poets and readers
alike: poets would finally be able to locate an appreciative audience for their poems, while readers
would learn the proper manner of inheriting the fruits of poets’ divinely inspired labor.
The poetic interlocutor envisioned by Mandelstam proves to be elusive of definition,
unknowable and unlocatable in advance. “We don’t know,” writes the young poet, “we never know
where such listeners might turn up...” (OS, 58). That is, at the moment of the poem’s emergence,
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nothing can be known about its potential recipient, and not much of a generally applicable theory
can be formulated on this subject. By using the indefinite article to render its non-existent
counterpart in Russian, Sidney Monas’s translation of the essay’s title – “About an Interlocutor”
– is able to convey the indeterminable nature of this recipient of poems – or, more precisely, a
recipient of a poem.
While poetry, for Mandelstam, is not the only kind of language that reaches out to someone
else, it does so differently from other forms of speech. Thus, having posited that a familiar
interlocutor can only inspire one to say something familiar, Mandelstam distinguishes poetry from
what he calls “literature” (literatura): “The difference between literature and poetry is the
following: the litterateur always addresses a concrete listener, a living representative of the epoch.
Even if he prophesies, he has in view a contemporary of a future time” (OS, 61). The specific
manner in which Mandelstam articulates this distinction is worth a closer look. Differently from
Gumilyov’s distinction between “poetry” and “prose,”510 Mandelstam does not refer to any
essential features – e.g., meter, theme, form – based on which one could learn to distinguish
“poetry” from mere “literature.” For Mandelstam, this distinction is not based on either “poetry’s”
or “literature’s” generic essence. Rather, by invoking the figure of the interlocutor, Mandelstam
highlights the irreducibly relational aspect. His only requirement is that this relation be marked by
non-predictability from the poet’s point of view. When Mandelstam distinguishes poetry from
literature as a podium-capable medium, he thereby disables poetry from constituting or
constructing a simultaneous audience. It is important that the structure of address which

Cf. Jane Garry Harris’s rendering of Mandelstam’s literatura as “prose”: “The difference between prose and poetry
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representatives of his age. [...] The poet is bound only to his providential addressee” (Osip Mandelstam, The Complete
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Mandelstam sees inscribed in every poem as poem is tied to a singular addressee, not a collectively
plural one. It prevents poetry from organizing a community of readers enchanted by a singular
voice and made into a community through that shared unidirectional enchantment in the first
place.511
For Mandelstam, the main characteristic of “literature” consists in its didactic potential and
therefore rootedness in the time contemporary to, or subsequent from, it:
What the litterateur has to say, he pours out to his contemporaries on the basis of the
physical law of unequal levels. Consequently, the litterateur is obliged to be “above,”
“better” than society. Instruction is the central nerve of literature. For this reason, the
litterateur has to have a pedestal. Poetry is another matter. The poet is bound only to his
providential interlocutor. He’s not obliged to be above his epoch or better than his society.
(OS, 61-62)
The litterateur’s function is to enlighten. The relationship between this practitioner of literature
and his or her audience is based on a framework of progress: as the audience becomes increasingly
filled with light, the point at which the litterateur’s instruction is no longer necessary is approached
– presumably, an anticipated endpoint society should strive for. The underlying temporality is
teleologically determined, bound towards the endpoint of societal progress. Literature, in this
sense, is envisioned by Mandelstam as a function of the social infrastructure, assigned a purely
instrumental function of humankind’s enlightenment. In distinguishing “poetry” from “literature,”
Mandelstam rejects the latter’s infrastructure of predictability and manageability. What one can
further observe from this passage is that, in contrast to his determination of “literature,”
Mandelstam’s corresponding determination of “poetry” is articulated in a largely negative manner.
“Poetry,” Mandelstam claims, “is another matter.” Indeed, while positive formulations of
literatura (“literature”) abound in the short essay, one is hard-pressed to locate an equally positive
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formulation of what poeziya (“poetry”) might look like – based on what definitional criteria, that
is, one might identify an instantiation of it in the real world. In the poet’s view, it cannot be
integrated into, or subsumed under, a pre-given framework. Likewise, impossible to calculate in
advance or account for post factum, poetry cannot become a foundation for something else.
One should not overlook the surprising character of this non-instrumental conception of
poetry, for, surely, many a poem has indeed been written for such and such socially prescribed
purpose; and, certainly, it has, on countless occasions, been demanded of poets that they comply
with priorities prescribed to them by higher authorities. To be sure, Mandelstam acknowledges as
much, commenting on the aforementioned poem by Pushkin, “The Poet and the Crowd”:
The people of whom this rabble is concretely composed, the “philistines of society,” would
permit him [the poet] “to give them bold lessons,” and would in general be ready to hear
out almost anything, so long as the poet’s message had the precise address: “such-and-such
rabble.” [...] There have been whole epochs when the charm and essence of poetry was
brought as a sacrifice to this far from harmless demand. (OS, 62)
Admittedly, the distinction between “literature” and “poetry” has a long and complex history, and
Mandelstam’s deployment of it is no isolated occurrence at the time.512 His rejection of an
instrumentally conceived “literature” as the opposite of “poetry” can be likened to many similar
attempts in the history of poetics to stake out a space for a literary or poetic language that would
not derive its legitimacy from its socially utilitarian value. Two such attempts have been discussed
in the preceding chapters: Friedrich Schiller’s and Gottfried Benn’s respective searches for an
autonomous poetics. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent Mandelstam’s early poetics in
fact calls for an autonomy of poetry. Contrary to Benn’s location of poetry’s origins in the pre-

On the Ancient Roman understanding of “literature” as a state of literacy, which would begin to shift in the second
half of the eighteenth century, see Giovanni Gullace “‘Poetry’ and ‘Literature’ in Croce's La Poesia,” The Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 19.4 (Summer 1961): 453-461, esp. 459. On the distinction between “Dichtung” and
“Literatur” in the contemporaneous German context, see Lepenies, Die Drei Kulturen. Soziologie zwischen Literatur
und Wissenschaf, 265-281.
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rational and mythogenic depths of the poet’s consciousness that are addressed to no one,513
Mandelstam insists on poems’ definitionally unavoidable address to someone else.

Throwing Bottles Overboard: A Poetological Vision
At this point, it would be instructive to look more closely at the composition of
Mandelstam’s essay – specifically, at the moment in which it introduces the figure of the
“interlocutor.” The essay opens by addressing an audience: “What is there about a madman, tell
me, that produces the most frightening impression of madness?” (OS, 58).514 This opening question
is quickly succeeded by an answer from the point of view of a “we”:
In the madman, we fear for the most part that uncanny, absolute indifference that he turns
toward us. Nothing frightens a man more than another man who has no concern for him.
There is deep significance in that cultivated pretense, that politeness, we continually use in
order to emphasize a certain interest in each other. (OS, 58, my emphasis)
As though appealing to some unaccountably primordial psychic predisposition, the first-person
plural perspective consolidates itself in a common object of fear – the non-seeing pupils of a
“madman” – whose commonly acknowledged horror consists in its disregard for those across from
it, i.e., from the objects of its own sight. The horrifying aspect of the non-seeing pupils stems from
their disregard for the expectation of mutual recognition in communal existence. In view of this
essay’s rejection of poetry as a didactic medium, it is bizarre that it should open with this set-up
of communal agreement by formulaically asking an imagined audience to concede a commonly
known fact. Only after several paragraphs of convincing his audience that a poet is not, in fact, a
madman because, as it turns out, he does address someone, Mandelstam moves on to his essay’s
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announced subject matter: the figure of the interlocutor. The subsequent part of the essay is then
devoted to articulating the moment in which, as Mandelstam sees it, a poem becomes a poem –
the moment in which it is encountered by its distant interlocutor.
What is particularly interesting, however, is the moment of transition from the opening
section, which I have just sketched out, to what comes after it: from a situation of conventionally
determined communal address to that of unexpected, unpredictable encounter. This moment of
encounter is delayed one more time, however, as the opening section’s expository-theoretical
appeal to an understanding audience makes itself heard in the second section’s terse opening
statement: “Everybody has friends” (OS, 59). Referring to an evident reality and appealing to a
communally shared interpretation of that reality, the question that directly follows – “Why doesn’t
the poet turn to his friends, those people who are naturally close to him?” – remains unanswered.
For, abruptly leaving behind this pragmatic question of friendship and its utilitarian potential for
poetic ends, the next sentence ousts the quintessentially self-evident opening figure of “everybody”
(“Everybody has friends”), turning instead to that of the moryeplavatel’ (“seafarer”).515 On this
new path, Mandelstam, offers a brief vision of something quite unimaginable and unpredictable,
separated by a mere sentence break from the appeal to a shared, quotidian reality:
Everybody has friends. Why doesn’t the poet turn to his friends, to those people who are
naturally close to him? The shipwrecked seafarer throws a sealed bottle into the sea at a
critical moment, and it has his name in it and what happened to him. Many years later,
walking along the dunes, I find it in the sand, I read the letter, I learn when it happened,
the testament of the deceased. I had a right to do this. I did not unseal someone else’s letter.
The letter sealed in the bottle was addressed to its finder. I found it. That means, then, that
I am its secret addressee. (OS, 59, translation slightly modified)
The montage of the vision offered here is quite peculiar. The undeniably poignant scene of a
seafarer’s last act of communication – which can no longer be of any use to him – is matter-of-
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factly followed by the depiction of a dune-wanderer’s accidental discovery of the messagecontaining bottle. Two quintessentially nomadic figures, the seafarer and the dune-wanderer
experience an inexorable intervention from an outside force and pure chance. Goal-oriented though
it might have been, the seafarer’s journey is cut short by the unmanageable force of the sea. The
dune-wanderer, for his part, has no choice but to stumble upon an unexpected obstacle in his sandy
path. Notable in both cases is the shifting ground underneath the two travelers: Sea and sand alike
tend to guarantee no firm foundation and only sometimes correspond to the calculable prediction
of how the forces in question may play out. Mandelstam’s choice of the sea as the opening setting
for his poetological vision is quite intriguing, evoking but also subverting relevant topoi. The
traditional topos of the poet as the nostos-accomplishing Odysseus, which Judith Ryan has
proposed to replace with the figure of the perpetually revising Penelope,516 is swiftly thrown
overboard in Mandelstam’s vision of a fatal shipwreck. Similarly, in Friedrich Gundolf’s 1914
lyric cycle Staatsgedichte, the topos of the state as a ship is made politically productive,
constituting a glorious locus of confluence between the poet and the state.517 Notably, in Gundolf’s
depiction, the sea has become firm ground, making the act of deboarding unnecessary: “Kein
landen gilt: wir sind das land das schwimmt/ Beladen mit den erden und den wogen/ Hinfahrend
auf der kugel kühnem bogen/ Der in sich mündend ewig anfang nimmt.”518 By thus imposing a
cyclical order on the maritime element, Gundolf seems to safeguard against the traditionally feared
and denigrated uncontrollability of the sea – “dieses von Gott niemals erschaffenen Restes des
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uranfänglichen Chaos,” to use Bernhard Siegert’s formulation.519 This compensatory topos of the
ship and of the ship as a topos likewise fails in Mandelstam’s vision. Here, after all, the ship has
been wrecked.
As we find out several lines later, the peculiarly disruptive vision offered by Mandelstam
anticipates the analogy that anchors his theory of the poetic act as an encounter. Yet Mandelstam
once again delays the laconic statement of the pivotal analogy – this time, by interpolating a poem:
My gift is poor, nor loudly rings my voice
And yet I live – and on the earth, my being
Means something dear to someone:
My distant heir will find it
In my verses; who can tell? my soul
Will turn out to be bound with his in tie
And as in my generation I found a friend
So will I find a reader in posterity.
“Reading Boratynsky’s poem,” Mandelstam adds directly after quoting the poem, “I have the same
feeling I would have if such a bottle had come into my hands” (OS, 59). As a comparison,
Mandelstam’s analogy should and does contain the necessary elements: a literal term, a figurative
term, and a tertium comparationis. However, as we can see in retrospect, the poet compiles these
elements in a somewhat peculiar manner. To begin with, Mandelstam not only does not announce
the analogy as analogy to his reader but also introduces the figurative set of terms first: the
shipwrecked sailor, the bottle, and the dune-traveler. Only then does he introduce the analogy’s
literal terms: the quoted poem and the first-person comment that “I have the same feeling I would
have if such a bottle had come into my hands.” In Mandelstam’s analogy, the tertium
comparationis thus distills into a sense of the unexpected yet providential encounter, common to
the bottle-finder and poem-reader. This means, however, that the first part of the figurative term –

Bernhard Siegert, “Der Nomos des Meeres,” in: Politiken der Medien, eds. D. Gethmann and M. Stauff
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the depiction of the shipwrecked sailor – has become superfluous, for it has no counterpart in the
analogy’s literal term. No quasi-shipwrecked poet makes it to the other side of things. An
unexpected aspect of Mandelstam’s analogy, then, is that it does not foreground the traditionally
central figure of poetological reflection: the poet. By displacing his poetic theory away from the
poet as the creator of poems, Mandelstam goes beyond the Gumilyovian egocentric conception of
poetic creation, according to which it is precisely the poet who, overwhelmed by the need to
dispense poetic insight into the world, stands front and center. By letting an actual poem intervene
between the analogy’s figurative and literal terms, Mandelstam’s central analogy does not so much
serve as a secondary, decorative correspondence to an already essentially constituted primary idea,
as it appears to enact the non-teleological structure of that which the poet is trying to theorize in
his essay, namely, the moment of poetic encounter or relation: the moment in which the poem
stumbles upon its unforeseen reader. Entirely accidental, this poetic encounter follows no
prescriptive roadmap, intervening into the matrix of quotidian regularity. Definitive of the poetic
relation, as Mandelstam sees it, is that it may not have happened. “The air of a poem is the
unexpected” (OS, 61). In a similarly unexpected manner, the introduction of the poetic encounter
takes place in Mandelstam’s own essay.
It is important to distinguish between a poem’s imagined addressee and its eventual reader.
For Mandelstam, the mysterious addressee and the accidental reader coincide precisely because
the place of the poem’s addressee is left open from the outset: decoupled from the poet’s
consciousness and volition and governed entirely by chance. If, on Gumilyov’s account, the
moment of poetic reception consolidates the connection between the mind of the poet and that of
the reader in a kind of atemporal present tense, Mandelstam’s is marked by anonymity and
absence: Just as the future interlocutor is absent to the poem’s author, this author is absent to the
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accidental interlocutor stumbling upon the poem. The Mandelstamian poetic relation or encounter
takes place precisely in the structural rupture between the poet and the addressee.
Once thrown into the sea, the bottle with the message in it ceases to belong to anyone in
particular.520 Indeed, in a sense, the finder of the bottle can be said to be possessed by the bottle:
Using the verb okhvatyvaet (“comes over someone,” but, if read literally, “seizes, grasps”) to
characterize the effect of this finding on the unexpectant recipient, Mandelstam writes, “[...] the
feeling of the providential seizes [okhvatyvayet] the one who has found it.”521 The bottle-finder’s
cognitive faculties are quite irrelevant in this moment: The message in the bottle is stumbled upon
by chance and, once stumbled upon, it pre-occupies its finder. The admittedly catastrophic moment
in which the seafarer facing imminent death throws the bottle overboard is nonetheless marked by
a matter-of-fact attitude: The necessity stems not from the seafarer’s conscious will but rather from
uncontrollable external circumstances. Thus, differently from Gumilyov’s conception of the poetic
event as a function of the poet’s uncontainable promethean need to bestow something upon the
world, Mandelstam locates the sense of the overwhelming not on the side of the poet but, rather,
on the side of the recipient, the interlocutor.
Contributing to the urgency of Mandelstam’s depiction of the bottle-finding episode is the
abrupt shift from the previous section’s expository mode to one of enactment. Right after the event
of the shipwreck is mentioned, the first-person singular pronoun I suddenly comes up repeatedly:
“Many years later, walking the dunes, I find it in the sand, I read the letter, I learn when it happened,
the testament of the deceased. I had a right to do this. I did not unseal someone else’s letter. The
On the affinity between the figure of “someone” (“niekto”) in Mandelstam’s essay – very close to the pronoun
“nikto” (“no one”) – and Celan’s notion of Niemand in the title of his poetry volume Niemandsrose, see Broda, “An
Niemand gerichtet,” 209.
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letter sealed in the bottle was addressed to its finder. I found it. That means, then, that I am its
secret addressee” (OS, 59, emphasis mine). Notably, this is the first time that the first-person
pronoun is uttered in this essay – apart from the parenthetical citation of a general fact in the
essay’s opening section (“I speak, and that means I am listened to [...]”). Emerging right after the
mention of the shipwreck yet not in any determinable causal lineage to it, the first-person pronoun
is notably first uttered by the figure of the distant interlocutor, not the lyric subject or the poetic
voice. Thus, speaking from the perspective of the bottle’s finder, and not that of its sender,
Mandelstam’s poetological text crucially revises the first-person singular perspective as the
authoritative lyric origin. Also noteworthy is the shifting character of the first-person singular
pronoun in this passage. Within the span of only a few lines, the pronoun “I” speaks, first, for the
– unannounced – metaphorized finder of the bottle; then, it speaks for the lyric I in Boratynsky’s
poem cited by Mandelstam; and finally, it speaks for the finder of the poem, presumably the
speaker of Mandelstam’s own essay. In a peculiar conflation of perspectives, the actual lyric I –
the first-person singular pronoun uttered in Boratynsky’s poem – stands between the “I” of the
figurative bottle-finder and the “I” if the literal poem-finder. In this context, Mandelstam’s polemic
against the egocentric overuse of the first-person singular pronoun by the Symbolist poet
Konstantin Balmont is particularly significant:
His [Balmont’s] need for self-assertion is quite pathological. He cannot say “I” sotto voce.
He screams ‘I.’ ‘I am’ – an abrupt pause, – ‘I who play thunder.’ In Balmont’s poetry, the
‘I’ has definitely and unfairly tipped the scales against the ‘non-I’ as if it were so much
fluff. Balmont’s shrill individualism is unpleasant. This is not the quiet solipsism of
Sologub, offensive to nobody, but individualism at the expense of someone else’s ‘I.’ Note
how Balmont loves to catch you by surprise with his direct and harsh ‘thou’: in these
passages he is like a bad hypnotist. Balmont’s ‘thou’ never finds an addressee, whizzing
past like an arrow that has burst loose from a too tight bowstring. (OS, 61)
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In this manner, the groundbreaking character of Mandelstam’s theory lies in the fact that it thinks
poetry not from the point of view of the “I” or from the point of view of the “you,” but rather from
the point of view of the non-coincidental in-between.
What is the point of the shipwreck episode in an essay that otherwise seemed to start out
quite didactically? After all, Mandelstam could have changed out of the poet’s attire into that of a
scholar and composed a treatise on the nature of poetry. He could have posited what poetry is and
what it does by differentiating it from other linguistic genres on generic grounds: by erecting
borders. Yet, isn’t precisely the notion of the border called into question by the essay’s central
figure of the bottle thrown into the raging sea and found in shifting sand? For all its seemingly
facile imaginative appeal, the message-in-a-bottle metaphor is not as light as it may appear.
Contained in it is an irreducible rupture: irreversible despair (and thus a break with the future) as
well as ultimate ignorance about where it might land (and thus a break with the past). In a way,
this metaphor seems to operate on a suspension of consciousness as a final authority on the making
and sending of messages. A peculiar figure of the poem emerges in this early essay by the young
Mandelstam: the poem as a kind of wanderer whose unpredictable movement calls into question
the validity of borders as such. What seems to emerge in Mandelstam’s essay, even if
inadvertently, is a profoundly medial, relational understanding of poetry: By singling out the
moment of the wholly accidental discovery of a bottle in the sand – and analogously, the accidental
discovery of a poem – Mandelstam singles out the movement and the in-between space inherent
in the relation that is a poem. The defining feature of a poetic text, for Mandelstam, is its capacity
for relation and encounter.
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In direct contrast to the traditional way of conceptualizing poetic activity as inward-bound,
Mandelstam calls this orientation into question, proposing a radically different route – toward
Mars, quite a re-orientation indeed:
It isn’t about acoustics one should concern oneself: that will come of itself. More likely,
about distance. It’s boring to be whispering to a neighbor. It’s infinitely tedious to pressuredrill one’s own soul (Nadson). But to exchange signals with Mars – without fantasizing, of
course – that is a task worthy of a lyric poet. [...] Maybe, for these lines to reach their
address, it will take the same hundreds of years that it does for the light of a planet to reach
another planet. As a result, Sologub’s lines continue to live after they have been written,
as events, not merely as tokens of emotional experience [perezhivaniya] [...] (OS, 63)
Significantly, Mandelstam’s parenthetical remark – “without fantasizing, of course” – implies that
this figure of Mars invoked here does not spring from a poem-maker’s hyper-creative imagination
that, not sufficiently engaged on planet Earth, would think up an alternate universe. Rather,
Mandelstam highlights an a priori aspect of the poetic word: distance and such that it has not been
brought nearer through exploration and colonization. In this way, exchanging signals with Mars –
this “task worthy of a lyric poet” – is a task without precedent, incapable of relying on any
preexistent system of communication. Consequently, the route of exchange between the poet and
the planet cannot serve as a mere means to an end: as a vehicle for transporting a packaged meaning
from Earth to Mars and from Mars to Earth.522 Qualifying his conjecture about the possible number
of years it might take a poem to arrive at its destination with a crucial “maybe,” 523 Mandelstam
underscores that this is not a matter of predictability based on statistically generalizable laws.
Notably, too, he rejects the notion of perezhivaniya – literally, “living through” or, more
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figuratively, “emotional experience” – as inadequate for talking about poetry. Pertaining to the
interiority of the (lyric) subject, this word finds itself in a timeless present continuous tense that
can be preserved within a poem for future generations’ edification or empathy. In contrast,
Mandelstam sees poems as events that live on as singular temporal interventions.
When Mandelstam suggests that it is not “acoustics” one should be concerned about but
rather “distance,” he is once again invoking the Symbolists’ preoccupation with poetic sound
effects.524 In this manner, he deemphasizes the narrowly intersubjective concern. The
Mandelstamian poem, rather than being dialogically directed at a conversation partner who, akin
to Gumilyov’s ideal reader (reader-friend), would empathize with the received missive, radiates
into space, aimed at no pre-conceived point of destination. Importantly, Mandelstam specifies:
And so, if individual poems (in the form of missive or dedication) can actually address
concrete persons, poetry as a whole is always directed at a more or less distant, unknown
addressee, in whose existence the poet may not doubt without doubting himself.
Metaphysics has nothing to do with it. Only reality can call to life another reality. A poet
is not a homunculus and there is no reason why one should ascribe to him the characteristics
of spontaneous generation. (OS, 64)
This once again underscores that Mandelstam is not prescribing certain criteria that would have to
be fulfilled by a poem in order to count as a poem. This is why individual poems may, as
Mandelstam concedes, address specific people. Concerned with “poetry as a whole,” Mandelstam
hardly has in mind the genre “poetry” but rather the most fundamental characteristic of a poem:
Even if a particular poem addresses a specific person, this poem as poem – and not simply as a
private message – is at the same time also directed at a distant addressee who cannot be known in
advance.
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Mandelstam sees the self-transcendence inscribed in the specifically poetic language as
fundamentally different from communication between two contemporaries sharing a common time
– communication in which, in Mandelstam’s view, nothing principally new can be said. Thus,
Mandelstam casts his conception of a poem’s interlocutor against the relationship of friendship –
namely the relationship proper to humans qua co-existing and communicative beings: “Everybody
has friends. Why doesn’t the poet turn to his friends, to those people who are naturally close to
him?” (OS, 60). Differently from the Gumilyovian ideal of the “reader-friend” selflessly willing
to be engulfed by the befriended poem,525 Mandelstam rejects the relation of friendship as
structurally monolingual and homogeneous. For Mandelstam, this is language as a means to an
end, unencumbered by foreignness. The discursive infrastructure in which its speakers co-exist is
structurally incapable of opening up its borders to an un-predictable and un-localizable other.
Paradoxically, then, precisely in its ability to connect speakers to one another, non-poetic language,
as Mandelstam conceives of it, isolates.
Having succinctly posited that “There is no lyric without dialogue,” Mandelstam pinpoints
self-alterity as a definitive feature of poetic language: “Yet the only thing that pushes us into the
arms of an interlocutor is a desire to be surprised by our own words, to be captivated by their
novelty and unexpectedness (OS, 63). This is a rather defamiliarizing claim: wondering at one’s
own words implies that one does not exactly “own” these words. For Mandelstam, then, the poetic
act is primarily one of self-distancing: becoming foreign to him- or herself, the poet becomes his
or her own bewildered interlocutor. This vision defies the assumption of a unified, self-same
authorial origin, out of which poetic pronouncements would emanate. Rather, taking place in the
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mode of chancing upon,526 the poetic encounter estranges the poet from the poem and estranges,
too, the poet from this poet’s language.527 Sent on its way with no specific address, the poem
speaks without a means of recognizing, or being recognized by, its eventual reader. A poem’s
interlocutor may materialize at any given moment. In this way, the poetry which the young
Mandelstam has in mind is not a private matter. Interrupting the intimate bond between the poet
and the poet’s words, Mandelstam’s vision of poetry opens up, radiates something like a public
space.
For all its brevity and shortage of theoretical development, this 1913 essay by the young
Osip Mandelstam is nonetheless quite ground-breaking.528 Admittedly, “About an Interlocutor”
appears to offer a rather rigid notion of poetry, insisting as it does on a distinction between “poetry”
and “literature” and contending that certain poems do not qualify to be considered poems in the
first place. And yet, this text transcends the boundaries of generic prescription by inscribing into
the poetic act a radically open gesture of transgressing, of reaching out.529 Precisely, then, in
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seemingly narrowing down the scope of what counts as poetry, Mandelstam fundamentally
expands its purview. Brushing away the local concerns of poetry conceived as a learnable,
atemporal craft of rendering supposedly prosaic thoughts in poetic form, Mandelstam focuses on
its fundamental kernel: poetry considered as a poem, as a singular occurrence – and thus a temporal
phenomenon that opens up, or radiates, a space beyond itself. By highlighting the act of reaching
out to an unlocalizable interlocutor, Mandelstam offers a vision of poetry that is eminently
political. Admittedly, its irreducible political dimension does not consist in a preference for politics
as a subject matter. To be sure, in Mandelstam’s view, a poem may deal with a political subject
matter, but as soon as its audience can be located in a particular place and time, the verses
articulating this political topic cease to be poetry.530 The fundamentally political disposition of
what Mandelstam is willing to call a “poem” resides in its refusal to circumscribe the boundaries
of its outreach, to prescribe its audience in advance, to create a vocally enchanted community. The
sheer openness which Mandelstam traces at the core of the poetic address offers a vision of beingtogether that is fundamentally different from the one structured by homogenizing speech. In his
later autobiographical piece Fourth Prose (1930), Mandelstam, who was at that time being
persecuted with false accusations of plagiarism, would offer precarious visions of poets and poems
that read almost like a complex, pained intensification of his 1913 theorization of the distant,
indeterminate, detached character of poetry as address: “I divide all the works of world literature
into those written with and without permission. The first are trash, the second – stolen air.”531
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Although Mandelstam vehemently rejects the contemporaneous poetic movement of
Futurism – Acmeism’s rival in dethroning and replacing Symbolism as the dominant poetic
movement in Mandelstam’s Russia – paradoxically, with this early essay the young Mandelstam
projects a future-oriented poetics. Crucially, his poetic vision opens up a space between a poem’s
moment of articulation and its existence thereafter, displacing the poetic into a kind of threshold
territory. However, differently from literature’s utilization of language in the present as a starting
point for a prescribed future and differently, too, from the futurist attempt to invent a future and
posit it in the present, Mandelstam’s interlocutor-bound poetics reaches out to a distant and nonlocalizable – yet emphatically real – moment outside of itself. Here, futurity is not separate from
but constitutive of the present moment of poetic articulation.
In a letter to writer and editor Hans Bender from November 18, 1954, Paul Celan, too,
insists on a certain distance in poetry as he rejects the possibility of Nachbarschaft for the event
that is the emergence of a poem:
Dichtung, sagt Paul Valéry irgendwo, sei Sprache in statu nascendi, freiwerdende Sprache
[...] Ich fürchte, es gehört zum Wesen des Gedichts, daß es die Mitwisserschaft dessen, der
es ‘hervorbringt,’ nur so lange duldet, als es braucht, um zu entstehen... Denn gelänge es
dem Dichter, das freiwerdende Wort zu belauschen, es gleichsam auf frischer Tat zu
ertappen, so wäre es damit wahrscheinlich um sein weiteres Dichtertum geschehn: ein
solches Erlebnis duldet keinerlei Wiederholung und Nachbarschaft.532
It is as though the poet only comes into being when read by a distant interlocutor. Notably, it is
also in this letter that Celan admits to not knowing the definitional borders of poems’ specifically
poetic quality: “[...] und doch: das Wie und Warum jenes qualitativen Wechsels, den das Wort
erfährt, um zum Wort im Gedicht zu werden, weiß ich auch heute nicht näher zu bestimmen.” 533
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Unsure of the qualitative – something that could be attributed to the poem as such – Celan
nonetheless singles out the relational aspect of the poem’s essence: the essential thing about poems
– “[...] es gehört zum Wesen des Gedichts” – is that they do not tolerate authorial ownership and
cognizance (Mitwisserschaft).

Part II: Paul Celan’s “Die Dichtung Ossip Mandelstamms”
On July 8, 1959, during a stay in the mountainous Swiss region Sils, Paul Celan receives a
request from the journalist and literary scholar Werner Weber to send some poetry from up there,
where Celan is staying, down to where he, Weber, is: “Und könnte es Sie locken, mir etwas
herunter zu spenden, Lyrik oder so...?”534 Celan, without sending the requested originals of lyric
poems, promises, instead, an attempt at translation:
Auf meinem Tisch liegt die Jeune Parque: vielleicht kann ich hier die fehlenden fünfzig
Verse übersetzen, vielleicht. (Übersetzungen: Annäherungsversuche, manchmal, selten,
kommt einem auch der andere und des anderen Sprache ein wenig entgegen: Gott hat die
Sprachen kaum im Hinblick auf ihre Übertragbarkeit geschaffen...).”535
In his parenthetic reflection on the act of translating, Celan notably refers to it in the plural
(Übersetzungen)

and

punctuates

its

path

with

several

pauses

–

“(Übersetzungen:

Annäherungsversuche, manchmal, selten, [...])” – thereby calling into question an overarching
concept of translation that could function as an exemplary conduit for this always singular and
uncertain act of reaching out. Rather than conceiving of translations as accomplishable acts of
decoding and substituting, the poet highlights their doubly tentative nature – evident both in the
notion of “approach” (Annäherung) as well as “trial” or “attempt” (Versuch). Significantly, too,
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Celan envisions translation not as an active enterprise on the part of the translator but as an
experience that happens to this translator: a rare occurrence – hesitant even in its rarity
(“manchmal, selten”) – of being approached, faced with or accommodated (entgegenkommen) by
the other and the other’s language. What Celan says here about translations anticipates what he
will have to say about poems.
Paul Celan’s poetological statements have been so firmly etched into the discourse on his
poetry that one almost takes their granular exactitude for granted.536 However, as can be surmised
from his refusal, in November 1954, to contribute to the writer and editor Hans Bender’s anthology
on the poetic craft (Handwerk) – a notion of poetry advocated by Gottfried Benn in his 1951
“Probleme der Lyrik”537 – the poet did not always have a well-articulated poetics at his disposal:
“[...] – und doch: das Wie und Warum jenes qualitativen Wechsels, den das Wort erfährt, um zum
Wort im Gedicht zu werden, weiß ich auch heute nicht näher zu bestimmen.” 538 Notably, as he
reports a certain difficulty in approaching this question (näher bestimmen), Celan articulates it in
terms of change (Wechsel) and thus a transformation or translation. At stake in Celan’s admission
to Bender is a definitional question for the field of poetics: the question of what the essence of a
poem is. Celan’s use of the definite article points to the fundamental nature of the border in
question: If only, that is, one could pinpoint this essential and yet so elusive transition through
which the word (das Wort) – and thus, metonymically, language, sense, thought539 – has to pass in
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order to turn into the word in the poem (“das Wort im Gedicht”). Yet, directly preceding Celan’s
admission of definitional hesitancy is a note about the circumstantial: “Die Lebensumstände, das
Leben in fremdem Sprachbereich haben es mit sich gebracht, daß ich mit meiner Sprache viel
bewußter umgehe als früher – und doch: das Wie und Warum [...].”540 The circumstances, then, of
daily life in a foreign language have led the poet to a much more conscious attitude toward
language – yet, not exactly toward language as such (i.e., the word) or even the poet’s native
language more narrowly. Rather, the possessive pronoun in Celan’s formulation “mit meiner
Sprache” would perhaps be more accurately interpreted as the poet’s singular relation to his
language: most certainly, no private language inaccessible to others but also not a simple relation
of possession.541
Four years later, Celan will offer a similar remark about language – specifically, in
reference to the language of contemporary German poetry: “Freilich ist hier niemals die Sprache
selbst, die Sprache schlechthin am Werk, sondern immer nur ein unter dem besonderen
Neigungswinkel seiner Existenz sprechendes Ich, dem es um Kontur und Orientierung geht.
Wirklichkeit ist nicht, Wirklichkeit will gesucht und gewonnen sein.”542 In response to a survey
about the surveyed authors’ current creative projects, Celan offers a succinct reflection about
“deutsche Lyrik” and the different path it has had to go compared to that of its French counterpart.
This poetry, Celan reports, “verklärt nicht, ‘poetisiert’ nicht.”543 Hardly a question of prosody or
national idiosyncrasy, his remark refers, rather, to German poetry’s immediate, circumstantial
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environment: “dürsterstes im Gedächtnis, Fragwürdigstes um sich her.”544 In response to a
question about his authorial, creative visions and projects, Celan answers, instead, by responding
to what he sees outside, before and around him. The only seemingly autonomous notion of the I,
“ich,” in Celan’s remark is, upon closer look, bound by its existentially singular angle of
inclination. Notably, too, the “reality” to which Celan responds is not simply “da,” as Gottfried
Benn would have claimed: an inescapable datum that would prescribe and determine one’s
response. Rather, as Celan suggests, this reality, “Wirklichkeit,” has to be sought in the first place
– a search that would be impossible without reaching out beyond the confines of an autonomous
I, lyric or otherwise.
It is noteworthy that Celan’s reflections on the nature of poetry emerge increasingly at a
crossroads of circumstances.545 These circumstances involve steps to approach the other and the
other’s language. Among them, for instance, is Celan’s renewed interest in philosopher Martin
Heidegger’s thought on language and poetry546 as well as his encounter – as reader and translator
– with a fellow poet, Osip Mandelstam.547 Short of discovering a compass toward definitional
poetological truths, these circumstances – “das Wie und Warum,” as it were – allow to trace a
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practice, if not a theory, of that transition that the word might have to pass through, or perhaps be
derailed by, in order to become a word in a poem.
The occasion that allows some of these paths to intersect is Celan’s introduction of a
foreign poet to the German-speaking audience by way of a radio essay. Commissioned by the
Norddeutscher Rundfunk in February 1960, the assignment succinctly informs Celan as follows:
“Am 19. März haben wir eine 20 Minuten-Sendung mit Gedichten von Ossip Mandelstamm im
Programm. Freilich soll die knappe Hälfte davon ein biographisch-analytischer Kommentar über
den Autor sein.”548 With professional brevity, the prompt relays a). that a transmission of
someone’s poems has been planned, and b). that these poems should be made more approachable
by way of a clarifying commentary about their author. The resulting broadcast bears the title
borrowed from Celan’s translation of a poem by Mandelstam: “Die Freiheit, die da dämmert.
Gedichte von Ossip Mandelstamm, aus dem Russischen übertragen und eingeleitet von Paul
Celan.”549 A clear border seems to have been drawn: The poems, the program’s title announces,
are Mandelstam’s; their introduction and translation – Celan’s. Tasked with introducing and
familiarizing,550 Celan’s radio essay appears at first glance as a particularly familiar version of
translation: compensation for distances – between languages, cultures, and physical spaces.
Having reviewed the script for the radio program, the radio editor, Wilhelm Asche, implies as
much, assuring the poet of the reliability of his essay’s transmission and reproduction: “[...] dieser
Text wird zusammen mit den Gedichten sicherlich ein genaues Bild geben.”551 Celan himself,
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however, reports, “Mir war der Text über den Kopf gewachsen, ihn zu kürzen war schwerer als
ihn zu schreiben.”552
Despite its occasional and ostensibly instrumental character, Celan’s radio essay
nonetheless goes beyond a transparent reproduction of a foreign subject matter into a familiar
language. Rather, it articulates an increasingly dense meditation on the nature of the poem (das
Gedicht), which Celan intersperses with six poems by the to-be-introduced poet – poems that, as
the title of the radio program indicates, are presented in Celan’s translation.553 Celan’s effort to
transmit Mandelstam’s Dichtung – translatable both as “poetry” but perhaps also as the process
whereby “poetry” takes shape – begins to articulate a poetics that, in lieu of the word’s qualitative
change from non-poetic to poetic, comes up against an inextricable boundedness to the other and
the other’s language. Similar to Arendt’s sketch of Lessing in a meditation on crucial questions of
what politics might mean, Celan’s radio essay on Mandelstam offers a reflection on what poetry
might mean.554 In a way, the necessity of this other-oriented gesture is contained precisely in its

552

Fremde Nähe, 366.

The scope of this chapter does not permit an analysis of Celan’s translations of Mandelstam’s poems or their
placement within the radio essay. For a reading of Celan’s translations of Mandelstam’s poems in this essay, see Anna
Glazova, “The Poetry of Bringing about Presence,” MLN 123 (2008), 1114-23. On the role of translation in Celan’s
poetics, see Leonard Olschner, “Grenzgänge und Gegenwart. Notizen zu Celans Poetik der Übertragung,” in
Unverloren. Trotz allem. Paul Celan Symposium Wien 2000, ed. Hubert Gaisbauer, Bernard Hain, and Erika Schuster
(Vienna: Mandelbaum Verlag, 2000), 244-264; for a discussion of the contemporaneous reception of Mandelstam’s
translations with respect to the problematic of translation adequacy, see Barbara Wiedemann, “‘gezeitigte Sprache’.
Paul Celans Mandelstamm-Übertragungen aus dem Mai 1958,” in Zwischentexte: literarisches Übersetzen in Theorie
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apparent contingency. It is a worldly gesture, distinct from an isolated thinker’s concern with
eternally valid truths.
Preceding the May 1960 news of Celan’s recognition with the Georg Büchner Prize by a
couple of months, this radio essay acquires further significance as an inadvertent precursor to what
has come to be regarded as Celan’s main poetological statement: his address “Der Meridian,”
delivered by the poet on October 22, 1960 in Darmstadt, Germany, on the occasion of accepting
the aforesaid prize and recognition. Key passages from the radio essay reappear in the acceptance
speech: Celan’s introduction of a foreign poet and his poems reemerges in an account of his own
poems and, ultimately, a reflection on poetry.555 From this angle, “Die Dichtung Ossip
Mandelstamms” seems crucial for the emergence of Celan’s poetics: this Dichtung itself but also,
and perhaps no less significantly, the act of its introduction and transmission.
Of course, it is a quite contingent circumstance that Celan’s reflections on “Die Dichtung
Ossip Mandelstamms” take the shape of a radio essay. Nevertheless, this circumstance can be
situated within a broader logic of cultural production and a renewed, albeit questionable, energy it
experienced in Germany in the 1960s.556 Speaking publicly in post-war Germany was not a selfevident matter, and the uneasy gesture on the part of exiled intellectuals of stepping out and
addressing an audience whose members may well have contributed to the speakers’ exclusion and
expulsion – and thus to their inability to speak and address in the first place – has been rigorously
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explored.557 In Celan’s oeuvre, the texts usually considered under this angle are his prize
acceptance addresses: one of them delivered in 1958 in Bremen and the other in 1960 in Darmstadt.
As a radio broadcast, Celan’s introduction of Mandelstam is embedded into the tradition
of the radio as a centralizing instrument of culturalization, as a Rundfunkübertragung, whose
generic function consists in centralizing and unifying by way of transmitting common information
– from a single origin, to as many listeners at once as possible, about something that concerns all
of them.558 The radio, we will recall, was a crucial medium for Gottfried Benn’s self-presentation,
allowing him to centralize and amplify his poetic voice. The posture, afforded by the radio, of
broadcasting unique wisdom to an audience without at the same time having to interact with this
audience was eagerly adopted by Benn. Here, one may recall a particularly poignant instance of
this consolidating practice: Benn’s dogmatic radio addresses to the German nation from the spring
of 1933, “Der neue Staat und die Intellektuellen” and “Antwort an die literarischen Emigranten.”
In the latter, the poet broadcasts precisely about the medial exclusivity of the national community
he is addressing:559
Nur die, die durch die Spannungen der letzten Monate hindurchgegangen sind, die von
Stunde zu Stunde, von Zeitung zu Zeitung, von Umzug zu Umzug, von
Rundfunkübertragung zu Rundfunkübertragung alles dies fortlaufend aus unmittelbarer
Nähe miterlebten, Tag und Nacht mit ihm rangen, selbst die, die das alles nicht jubelnd
begrüßten, sondern es mehr erlitten, mit diesen allen kann man reden, aber mit den
Flüchtlingen, die ins Ausland reisten, kann man es nicht.560
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Most flagrant in this unabashedly verbose and broadly transmitted address is its denial to the other
of the bare minimum: the ability to speak. To be sure, the refugees may certainly speak, but their
speech will be utterly futile, sent into thin air and not received by authentic speakers – speakers
bound to their homeland with an immediate bond (“aus unmittelbarer Nähe”) of direct experience
and engagement. As Benn’s words imply, one’s capacity to transmit to the other is confiscated
once one steps outside of the threshold of the national borders, whose radius is circumscribed by
the national radio. The ominous shadow of Benn’s nationally broadcast demand for a common
tongue that is an immediately shared experience sets Celan’s radio essay and its gesture of
transmission into sharp relief. Whereas Benn appeals to a first-person plural standpoint easily
translatable into the ubiquitous third-person man (“mit diesen allen kann man reden”), the very
possibility of such a shareable, transmittable perspective is a profound problem in Celan’s
introduction of Mandelstam. To be sure, Celan, too, uses the pronoun man – yet not as a transparent
substitute for an all-encompassing wir but, rather, as a defamiliarizing indication of its indirect
provenance, of an elsewhere from which this report about Mandelstam originates: “1913 erscheint
in Petersburg ein schmaler Gedichtband: ‘Der Stein.’ Diese Gedichte haben, das erkennt man,
Gewicht, man möchte sie [...] selbst geschrieben haben.”561
Written a year before the construction of the Berlin Wall, Celan’s radio essay on
Mandelstam is marked by circumstances of separation and exclusion. Here, one poet, living away
not only from his no longer existent homeland562 but also from places where his native German is
spoken, is trying to bring something closer to speakers of German in Germany – most of whom
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may nominally share a language with this poet, but likely from a vastly different angle. 563 To be
brought closer is the poetry of another poet: one whose poetic language earned him not only
expulsion from the literary profession but also exile – within the borders of the Russian-speaking
territory, within his “homeland.”564 Having died under dire circumstances on his way to a forced
labor camp in 1938,565 the Russian-Jewish poet was now, in March 1960, posthumously censored
by the Soviet state, unknown not only to the German-speaking audience but also to most of his
fellow speakers of Russian. On this suppression, Celan comments in the preface to the 1959
volume of his translations of forty poems by Mandelstam: “In Rußland, der Heimat dieser
Dichtung,

zählen

die

Gedichtbände

Ossip

Mandelstamms

[...]

noch

immer

zum

Totgeschwiegenen, Verschollenen, allenfalls am Rande Erwähnten.”566 Notably, too, the radio
essay on Mandelstam and his poetry coincides with Celan’s own experience of persecution through
slanderous accusations of plagiarism – attempts to erase the accused poet’s singular poetic
voice.567 Written in the wake of the unspeakable consequences of the national – linguistic, cultural,
intellectual – totalization hailed by Benn, Celan’s “Die Dichtung Ossip Mandelstamms” reads as
a particularly poignant missive from one literary emigrant about another, directed toward the
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speakers of the German language, in Germany – a defiant gesture of poetry against exclusionary
borders, categories, and idioms.
Although the rest of this chapter will focus on Celan’s radio essay without direct
engagement with the poet’s Büchner Prize acceptance speech, I would like to devote brief
reflections to the context of the latter in order to delineate, in turn, the context of Celan’s reflections
on Mandelstam, which would prove to be an important precursor for “Der Meridian.” Having been
originally instituted as a distinction of merely local significance, the Georg Büchner Prize had, in
1951, been upgraded into a nationwide recognition for all literary achievement in the German
language: “der Literaturpreis der deutschen Akademie für Sprache und Dichtung.”568 Notably, the
committee chairing this academy consisted of representatives of the so-called “Innere Emigration”
– this term’s alleged author, Frank Thieß, among them – i.e., those who had remained in, but not
collaborated with, the Nazi state, and who often regarded this circumstance as itself a praiseworthy
distinction and cultural-political privilege.569 Taking place only two years after the “new
beginning” of 1949, the transformation of the prize and its prestige more or less coincided with
the re-emergence of Germany as a nation state: a reemergence that was significantly conditioned
by a desire to shed the enormity of the recent past. It was this collective phenomenon of the past’s
repression, however, that the poet honored with the Büchner Prize in1960, Paul Celan, whose
parents had been killed in the Nazis’ internment camps, could hardly partake in.570
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Notably, the 1951 mandate of the Büchner Prize echoed a key prewar cultural framework,
specifying that the award was to be conferred “an einen Dichter oder Schriftsteller.”571 Gottfried
Benn, who had devoted considerable energy to crystallizing a particular version of this distinction
and whose own acceptance speech would touch on the perennially fascinating question of “das
Mysterium der Kunst,” emerged as the winning nominee in the inaugural year of the honor’s
reemergence.572 The choice of Gottfried Benn as the inaugural honoree was quite telling: Here was
someone who had lent enthusiastic and early support to the Nazi regime, but also someone who,
as Judith Ulmer points out, crucially contributed to the programmatic separation of politics from
poetics in the West-German lyric poetry of the 1950s.573
If Mandelstam dismissed the act of addressing one’s contemporaries as inadequate to
poetry, Celan in his “Meridian” prize acceptance speech does precisely that: He addresses his
contemporaries, and does so with an undeniable insistence. Throughout his speech, the phrase of
address “Meine Damen und Herren” appears with great frequency. Accomplished by this repetition
is a subtle subversion of the apparently narrowly poetological character of this text, which has
often been pointed out.574 As Kristina Mendicino has argued, the specific manner in which this
apostrophe recurs throughout “Der Meridian” accomplishes a crucial rhetorical performance that
exposes and calls into question a certain tradition of rhetoric and speech.575 Alexandra Richter has
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similarly drawn attention to this repetition in her analysis of the political implications of the
question of attention in Celan’s “Der Meridian.”576 The repetition of this phrase does not only
expose the speaker’s gesture of address, here and now, but also suggests a certain sense of despair,
as though the ones being addressed, seemingly so close, somehow prove hard to reach.577 Even as
he addresses his contemporaries, Celan stresses the precarious character of this address, as though
aware of the possibility of reception failure.578 Celan, for his part, does not make it easy for the
Damen und Herren in his audience. His incredibly complex text, marked by citations, references,
and interruptions, conspicuously neglects to talk of Lyrik, a collectively palatable subject matter.579
Instead, it focuses on punctual, singular poems (Gedichte). To be sure, already this plurality must
have estranged the audience, defamiliarizing the expected difficulty of the elevated, eveningfilling580 subject matter toward a much harder difficulty that would implicate this very audience in
this address, Ansprache, and its claim, Anspruch. In his preparatory notes for “Der Meridian,”
Celan writes, “[...] es bedarf des personaler Gegenwart, es bedarf des Gesprächs; Gespräch{e} und
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Unterhaltung, das ist zweierlei; Gespräche nehmen in Anspruch, sie strengen an.”581 In the year
1960, the Georg Büchner Prize and the ceremony of its conferral experienced a profound jolt. A
significant contribution to the specific rupture, carried out by Celan’s Büchner Prize acceptance
address – a rupture within the poetic tradition but also its constitution through rhetorical and
oratorical conventions – had been made by the poet’s essay about Osip Mandelstam, which, like
the Büchner Prize address itself, had been transmitted on the German radio waves.582

An Estranging Introduction
One could reasonably expect Celan’s essay of introduction to serve as a path toward
familiarization and reconciliation: as a helpful mediator between an unknown poet and an
unknowing audience. However, from the outset, Celan oddly insists on a certain estranging quality
of the to-be-introduced poet and his poems: “[...] man möchte sie, wie die Dichter Georgij Iwanow
und Nikolaj Gumiljow bekennen, selbst geschrieben haben, aber – diese Gedichte befremden”
(DOM 215). Introduced with an adversative “aber” and a dash, the word “befremden” cannot be
assimilated easily into its surroundings and yet insistently intervenes three more times in the course
of the essay’s introductory passages.583 This word does not lend itself easily to translation. Most
idiomatically rendered as “to disconcert,” it also contains an echo of its components – the transitive
prefix be- and the adjective fremd – suggesting not only that a certain foreignness is contained in
the subject being introduced but also that the quality thus verbalized could affect the recipients of

581

Celan, Der Meridian. Endfassung. Vorstufen, 132.

On the significant implications of this transmission in the case of “Der Meridian,” see Boos, Speaking the
Unspeakable, 65-69.
583
After three insistent iterations, befremden comes up once more – this time without italics: “Die zwanzig Gedichte
aus dem Gedichtband ‘Der Stein’ befremden” (DOM 215).
582

210

this introduction as well. The to-be-introduced poems appear strange, take by surprise, but perhaps
also distance, render foreign – a veritable predicament for an essay of introduction.
Despite the reportedly estranging character of Mandelstam’s poems, Celan rejects a series
of three composite nouns – seemingly fitting translators of novelty and strangeness – as these
poems’ characterizations: they are neither “word-music’ [Wortmusik] nor “tone-colors”
[Klangfarben] nor “mood-poetry” [Stimmungspoesie] (DOM 215). All three of them in some way
synesthetic,584 these terms seek to unite two disparate semantic elements in order to cross a certain
border by poetic means, as it were – surely, a possible solution to the puzzle about the qualitative
transition the word has to go through in order to become the word in the poem.585 Celan further
contrasts Mandelstam’s poems with the poetic practice of spatiotemporal overreach – futurism:
“Diese Verse sind, im Gegensatz zu dem sich gleichzeitig Raum greifenden Futurismus, frei von
Wortschöpfungen, Wortballungen, Wortzertrümmerungen; sie sind keine neue ‘Ausdruckskunst’”
(DOM 215). Here, too, rejecting a series of composite words, Celan distinguishes between the
specific novelty of Mandelstam’s language and that of futurism, which is supposed to derive from
the artistic technique of neologizing. By rejecting the notion of a new art of expression,
Ausdruckskunst – which is also Celan’s term for the poetic style and movement of expressionism586
– Celan simultaneously rejects two key components of lyric poetry: its artistic presentation and its
expressive potential.
With his largely negatively formulated introductory report, Celan sets Mandelstam’s
attitude toward language apart from the more familiar one: language as a posterior translator of
I thank Kirk Wetters for calling my attention to the synesthetic character of these three nouns as well as to Celan’s
rejection of a poetics of synesthesia.
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and instrument of familiarization with something essentially prior to and separate from it. Rather
than lying outside as an object importable into poetry, the estranging factor identified by Celan in
Mandelstam’s poetic language is inextricably bound up with this language itself. It seems, then,
these to-be-introduced poems estrange, befremden, in a strange manner. To be sure, Celan’s
insistence on the estranging quality of Mandelstam’s poems could be a borrowing from the
philologist Gleb Struve’s biographical-critical preface to the 1955 two-volume edition of
Mandelstam’s writings, which Celan worked with when writing his radio essay. However, whereas
Struve uses the neutral, or even positively charged, verb udivlyat’ (“to surprise,” “to cause
wonder”) and related adjective udivitel’nyj (“wondrous” or “wonderful”) to characterize the effect
of Mandelstam’s poems,587 Celan not only intensifies it by choosing a word that connotes a sense
of being disconcerted, estranged, alienated, but he also insists on it four times in the span of the
essay’s compact opening remarks.

Philosophical Echoes and Their Transmission
From another angle, Celan’s vocabulary of wonder-causing estrangement also recalls
Martin Heidegger’s invocation of the Greek verb thaumazein, which the philosopher translates
into German as “Erstaunen” (“to wonder”) and interprets as the authentically philosophical
predisposition in his 1955 essay “Was ist das – die Philosophie?” – Heidegger’s authoritative and,
in some sense, inaugural postwar meditation on the essence of philosophy. In this address,
delivered on foreign ground (Cerisy-la-Salle, Normandie) but on a fundamental topic, Heidegger,
too, takes on the role of mediator, translator, and introducer. Under the shield of the familiar first-
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person plural pronoun wir, the German-speaking thinker transmits to speakers of French essential
missives about philosophy, which he mines from its original language, Ancient Greek: “Wir sind
durch das griechisch gehörte Wort unmittelbar bei der vorliegenden Sache selbst, nicht zunächst
bei einer bloßen Wortbedeutung.”588 Holding on to the Greek words, presumably for fear of
spilling some of their original authority via translation, Heidegger writes, “Das Erstaunen ist als
πάθος die ἀρχή der Philosophie.”589 Moreover, by reaching over for the properly heard Greek
word, Heidegger wants to bypass the obstacle of mere words in order to gain immediate access to
the thing itself (“bei der vorliegenden Sache selbst”): the fundamental question of what philosophy
is. Heidegger, too, appears to be concerned with questions of hearing and transmission.
Reminiscent of Celan’s 1954 wonder about the qualitative change necessary for the word to pass
through in order to become the word in the poem, Heidegger is in search of a path toward the
entrance into philosophy: “Aber das Ziel unserer Frage ist, in die Philosophie hineinzukommen,
in ihr uns aufzuhalten, nach ihrer Weise uns zu verhalten, d.h. zu ‘philosophieren’.”590 The
philosopher-guide is concerned with identifying the qualitative change necessary for the word –
the thought – to become the word and the thought in philosophy (“die Philosophie”).
Even as Heidegger seems to acknowledge the wondrous nature of his inquiry’s subject
matter by interrupting the flow between the question (“Was ist das”) and its object (“die
Philosophie”), he wants to balance this situation out:
Unser Sprechen muß dem, wovon die Philosophen angesprochen sind, ent-sprechen. Wenn
uns dieses Ent-sprechen glückt, dann ant-worten wir im echten Sinne auf die Frage: Was
ist das – die Philosophie? Das deutsche Wort „antworten“ bedeutet eigentlich soviel wie
ent-sprechen.591
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The philosopher lends an attentive ear to a speech (“Sprechen”) authentic enough to be an “Entsprechen” and one that could be translated with no leftovers (“soviel wie”) as the German word
(“das deutsche Wort”) “ant-worten.” With this origin-seeking equation, Heidegger pinpoints the
notion of Entsprechen, which, starting from his 1936 essay “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes,”
frequently resurfaces in the philosopher’s later theories about language and poetry.592 Most readily
rendered in English as the verb “to correspond,” the word entsprechen appears to contradict
Heidegger’s signature critique of truth as correspondence, although, to be sure, the philosopher’s
elusive use of the term outmaneuvers this merely apparent contradiction.593
In a preparatory note to his radio essay on Mandelstam, Celan, who owned and likely read
Heidegger’s essay about the essence of philosophy,594 seems to refuse to lend an ear precisely to
the idiosyncratic subtlety of Heidegger’s terminology of correspondence. The poet, for his part,
insists on an irreducible foreignness that cannot be canceled out:
Das Gedicht ist hier der Ort, wo das Angeschaute und sprachlich Wahrgenommene – das
Genannte – mit seiner Zeit in ein Spannungsverhältnis tritt zum Anschauenden und
Sprechenden. *Das Fremde bleibt fremd, es ‘entspricht’ [und antwortet] nicht ganz, es
behält seine [ihm Relief und Erscheinen (Phänomenalität) verleihende] Opazität. (71)
Shortly, we will encounter the final version of these notes, but in this incipient articulation they
bear witness to a peculiar borrowing from Heidegger. Without outright rejecting the philosopher’s
vocabulary, Celan interjects into its wholesome linguistic equation a number of diacritic
correctives that call into question the possibility of uncompromised transmission from the

On Celan’s critique of Heidegger’s notion of Entsrpechen, see David Brierley, “Der Meridian”: ein Versuch zur
Dichtung und Poetik Paul Celans, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1984, 203 ff.; Lyon, Unresolved Conversation,
118-119, 130-132; Seng, Auf den Kreiswegen der Dichtung, 157.
592

On Heidegger’s ambiguous concept of correspondence, see Susan Bernstein, “Correspondances – Between
Baudelaire and Heidegger,” MLN 130 (2015): 614-621.
593

594

Lyon, Unresolved Conversation, 220.

214

purportedly originary language of thinking. Celan envisions the poem as a place of confrontation
and tension within and through language: “[...] das Angeschaute und sprachlich Wahrgenommene
– das Genannte [...].” In this linguistically hesitant note about (poetic) language there emerges the
gesture of approaching, reminiscent of Celan’s note to Werner Weber from July 1959: There,
trying to approach translation, Celan attributed the gesture of coming closer and against
(“entgegenkommen”) not to the translator but to the to-be-translated other and this other’s
language. Here, in this slightly later preparatory note, Celan similarly locates the gesture of moving
toward (“tritt zum”) not in the one who is speaking but in that which is spoken, perceived through
language.
Whereas Heidegger imagines philosophy as a coveted destination, into which one finds
entrance through appropriate hearing and transmission (“griechisch gehört”) and in which one
finds refuge through appropriate conduct (“nach ihrer Weise uns zu verhalten”), Celan sees the
poem as the space in and through which something takes place – and not just a univocal something
but rather a relation and, moreover, a relation of tension. This way, the moment of approach,
tension, and non-identity intervenes into Celan’s reflections on the question at stake in his
Mandelstam radio essay, namely, what a poem is. Differently from the ultimately harmonious state
of wonder in Heidegger, the tension of foreignness and strangeness envisioned by Celan in the
space that is a poem precludes the possibility of definitional, qualitative borders.
Whereas Heidegger wants to carry out a smooth transmission from the philosopher-guide
to his keen listeners, Celan’s vision of the poem is much more indirect. Instead of filling in the
gaps left by the negatively formulated opening remarks about the strangeness of the to-beintroduced poet and poems, Celan proceeds to an exceedingly circuitous definition of the poem,
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one that, several months later and in a slightly altered form, will reemerge in the poet’s “Meridian”
speech:595
Das Gedicht ist hier das Gedicht dessen, der weiß, daß er unter dem Neigungswinkel seiner
Existenz spricht, daß die Sprache seines Gedichts weder ‘Entsprechung’ noch Sprache
schlechthin ist, sondern aktualisierte Sprache, stimmhaft und stimmlos zugleich,
freigesetzt im Zeichen einer zwar radikalen, aber gleichzeitig auch der ihr von der Sprache
gesetzten Grenzen, der ihr von der Sprache erschlossenen Möglichkeiten eingedenk
bleibenden Individuation. (DOM 215, Celan’s italics)596
Once again rejecting the notion of Entsprechen, which Celan inflects slightly as Entsprechung,597
the poet borrows, and decisively edits, another word from Heidegger’s vocabulary:
Individuation.598 At a crucial definitional locus in his 1927 magnum opus, Being and Time,599
Heidegger stakes out his vision of philosophy:
Sein und Seinsstruktur liegen über jedes Seiende und jede mögliche seiende Bestimmtheit
eines Seienden hinaus. Sein ist das transcendens schlechthin. Die Transzendenz des Seins
des Daseins ist eine ausgezeichnete, sofern in ihr die Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit der
radikalsten Individuation liegt. Jede Erschließung von Sein als des transcendens ist
transzendentale Erkenntnis. Phänomenologische Wahrheit (Erschlossenheit von Sein) ist
veritas transcendentalis.600
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Curiously, it is also in this paragraph that the philosopher will preemptively apologize for the
imminent awkwardness of his diction, citing as an excuse the peculiarity of the subject matter –
Being (Sein) as opposed to mere beings (Seiendes) – and an absence of adequate linguistic tools
to capture it.601 At this definitional juncture, however, Heidegger writes not only quite clearly but
also with the authority of Latin philosophical terminology. It is noteworthy, then, that, in a passage
appearing to correspond to Heidegger’s vocabulary, Celan unapologetically puts forward an
emphatically convoluted reflection, and does so in an effort to introduce and translate the poetic
language of another. Heidegger’s definitional consideration subordinates everything, albeit
structurally and not literally, to a transcendent beyond: Being (“Sein”). Celan’s, in contrast,
foregrounds that which is most concrete, bound to its here and now: the poem (“das Gedicht”).
Likewise, differently from Heidegger’s declaratively articulated statements, in which
individuation is mentioned merely as a distinct moment within the ontological hierarchy, Celan
weaves his reflection on individuation from a tightly interconnected series of past and present
participles (“freigesetzt,” “gesetzt,” “erschlossen,” “bleibend”). Beginning with “the poem” (“das
Gedicht”), this participial chain arrives at “individuation” at the very end of the sentence. The link
between “the poem” and “individuation” lies in the possessive pronoun dessen (“whose” or “of
the one who”): “Das Gedicht ist hier das Gedicht dessen, der [...].” Both emphatically bound and
open at once, this pronoun allows Celan’s essay to step beyond a narrowly biographical report and
to venture instead into a meditation on poetry tout court. However, rather than offer a genericpoetological definition, Celan envisions poetry in terms of a single, concrete poem whose
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singularity lies in its inextricable tie to a dessen. The poem as poem is of someone: of someone,
more precisely, who is aware of their singular moment of speaking – what Celan here and
elsewhere calls “angle of inclination of one’s existence” (“Neigungswinkel seiner Existenz”).602
In explicating this enigmatic “dessen,” Celan, in lieu of a biographical portrayal, defines
this genitive in terms of a relation:
Diese Gedichte sind die Gedichte eines Wahrnehmenden und Aufmerksamen, dem
Erscheinenden Zugewandten, das Erscheinende Befragenden und Ansprechenden; sie sind
Gespräch. Im Raum dieses Gesprächs konstituiert sich das Angesprochene,
vergegenwärtigt es sich, versammelt es sich um das es ansprechende und nennende Ich.
Aber in diese Gegenwart bringt das Angesprochene und durch Nennung gleichsam zum
Du Gewordene sein Anders- und Fremdsein mit. (DOM 216)
Yet, rather than presenting the relata as pre-existing entities that can enter into relations with one
another within time,603 Celan emphasizes their irreducible boundedness to, and constitution
through, the moment of encounter. Once again, constructed around a series of nominalized
participles, Celan’s characterization of “these poems” shifts the substantive meaning away from
its usual carrier: i.e., nouns that are a posteriori capable of performing certain actions (finite
conjugated verbs). These poems, namely, are someone’s precisely not in the sense of being the
product of this someone’s autonomous genius – in fact, Celan’s formulation decisively calls any
such autonomy into question, registering, rather, this someone’s irreducible relation to something
or someone else. The participle allows Celan’s characterization of the poem to evade the border
between the speaking and the spoken and to remain rather in the liminal space between them.

“Existence” (Existenz) is, of course, likewise a technical Heideggerian term used by Heidegger to characterize the
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As much as Celan’s diction in this passage resembles Heidegger’s, the poet nonetheless
complicates the philosopher’s analysis of the human mode of being as “Ek-sistenz” by probing an
in-between, a space of tension:
Es ist dieses Spannungsverhältnis der Zeiten, der eigenen und der fremden, das dem
mandelstamm’schen Gedicht jenes schmerzlich-stumme Vibrato verleiht, an dem wir es
erkennen. (Dieses Vibrato ist überall: in den Intervallen zwischen den Worten und den
Strophen, in den „Höfen“, in denen die Reime und die Assonanzen stehen, in der
Interpunktion. All das hat semantische Relevanz.) Die Dinge treten zueinander, aber noch
in diesem Beisammensein spricht die Frage nach ihrem Woher und Wohin mit –
„offenbleibende“, „zu keinem Ende kommende“, ins Offene und Besetzbare, ins Leere und
Freie weisende Frage. (DOM 216)
Somewhat counterintuitively identifying the not easily recognizable characteristic of tension
(Spannungsverhältnis) as a mark of recognition (“an dem wir es erkennen”), Celan insists on
alterity as a constitutive feature of Mandelstam’s poems.604 We have already encountered this
relation of tension between times (“Spannungsverhältnis der Zeiten”) in Celan’s preparatory notes,
where he corrected Heidegger’s synchronizing verbs “entsprechen” and “antworten” with the
verdict “Das Fremde bleibt fremd.” Here, in the broadcast version of that remark, Celan insists
that the strangeness of these to-be-introduced poems lies not in their self-contained essence but,
rather, in their constitutive transcendence of themselves: in their relatedness. Resonating in Celan’s
notion of individuation is perhaps something like relation, tension.
In his reflections on the role of time and language in Mandelstam’s poetry, Celan singles
out the non-finite verb form as a definitive aspect of Mandelstam’s own poetic language:
Diese Frage [nach ihrem Woher und Wohin] realisiert sich nicht nur in der „Thematik“ der
Gedichte; sie nimmt auch – und eben dadurch wird sie zum „Thema“ – in der Sprache
Gestalt an: das Wort – der Name! – zeigt eine Neigung zum Substantivischen, das Beiwort
schwindet, die „infiniten“, die Nominalformen des Zeitworts herrschen vor: das Gedicht
bleibt zeitoffen, Zeit kann hinzutreten, Zeit partizipiert. (DOM 216, Celan’s italics)
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This passage is characterized by a double move of translation. First, Celan renders the familiar
Latin borrowing “Verb” with its much less familiar German equivalent “Zeitwort” – presumably
to underplay the connotation of “word” (verbum) and to highlight instead that of “time” (Zeit).
However, in order to further illuminate the peculiar role of time in Mandelstam’s poems, Celan
opts for a rare Latin rendering of a possible German verb: “Zeit partizipiert.” Entangling
grammatical categories with their concrete implications, this peculiar word choice does not so
much correspond to Mandelstam’s original Russian as it recalls Celan’s own prominent use of
participial constructions – i.e., “infinite” verb forms – in his description of Mandelstam’s poems.
One might recall, too, that nominalized non-finite verb forms are prevalent in Heidegger’s idiom
– the present participle Seiendes and the infinitive Dasein are just two crucial examples. Why, one
might ask, does Celan attribute to Mandelstam’s poetic idiom a linguistic idiosyncrasy much more
characteristic of his own diction?605 It is certainly noteworthy that, in an effort to familiarize radio
listeners with someone else’s poetry, Celan critically engages with the language of yet someone
else altogether. In lieu of an accurately corresponding transmission, Celan’s radio introduction of
Mandelstam is marked by an insistent interference.606
Given the unmistakable traces of Heidegger’s language in Celan’s essay on Mandelstam,
it is curious that Celan, in the preface to his 1959 translations of forty poems by the latter, uses a
word – Vorhandensein – that will strike anyone familiar with Heidegger’s terminology as
decidedly unexpected in a discussion of something as elevated as poetry: “Der mit diesem Buch
dem deutschsprachigen Leser vorgelegten Auswahl [...] soll zunächst die Chance gegeben sein,
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die unter den vielen die erste jeder Dichtung bleibt: die des bloßen Vorhandenseins.” 607 Used by
Heidegger to represent one of the modes of being, the term “vorhanden” has been translated as
“present-at-hand” to render the sense of merely inner-temporal mode of being.608 And yet,
precisely this mere availability is what Celan identifies as indispensable to poems. Differently from
Heidegger’s ontological hierarchization of modes of being from more to less deficient, Celan
points to poems’ irreducible vulnerability, against which no fundamental-phenomenological
analysis can offer a safeguard. Rather, as Celan seems to insist, poems inevitably rely on the
precarious gestures of translation and transmission.
Celan concludes his essay of introduction with a note on Mandelstam’s self-reported
affinity for a grammatical category from the past, the Latin gerundive:
In einer seiner letzten Veröffentlichungen, dem 1932 in der Leningrader Zeitschrift
‚Swesda‘ erschienenen Armenischen Tagebuch, finden wir auch einige Aufzeichnungen
zu Fragen der Dichtung. In einer dieser Notizen erinnert sich Mandelstamm an seine
Vorliebe für das lateinische Gerundiv. “Das Gerundiv – das ist das Mittelwort der
Leideform der Zukunft.” (DOM 221, Celan’s italics).
Here, Celan is referring to Mandelstam’s 1933 prose piece Journey to Armenia, in whose
penultimate chapter Mandelstam writes: “—What tense would you like to live in? – I would like
to live in the imperative future participle, in the passive voice – in the having-to-be.”609 Having
rejected a series of composite nouns as possible designations for Mandelstam’s poetry in the
beginning of his essay, Celan closes it by invoking a concept composed of not one but three
composite nouns: “das Mittelwort der Leideform der Zukunft.” As Bernhard Böschenstein has
pointed out, this formulation is a bizarre substitution for the familiar Latin grammatical
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designations: Partizip, Passiv, Futurum.610 In contrast to Heidegger’s appeal to Latin philosophical
terms (e.g., “veritas transcendentalis”) at the beginning of his introduction to philosophy proper,
Celan concludes his own introductory text and its apparent task of familiarization by
defamiliarizing the most perfunctory tools of language and thought: grammatical concepts, that,
qua invisible infrastructure, would seem to transcend the necessity of translation in the first place.
Peculiarly tangible and concrete, these superfluously translated German words – “Mittelwort,”
“Leideform,” “Zukunft” – stick out as irreducibly foreign, belying the apparent neutrality of
linguistic terminology and its promise of translation as correspondence and equivalence, without
remainder.
Somewhat abruptly concluding his sketch of Mandelstam’s poetry with the word Zukunft,
Celan reaches out beyond this introductory text’s borders, as though pointing to a dimension of
the to-be-introduced poet and poetry that cannot be congealed into an individual image, contained
within a familiar frame, and preserved in a transmissible, introducible past. To be sure, Celan’s
reference to something that is yet to come (“Zukunft”) is peculiarly ecstatic, oriented beyond itself
and toward something or someone else. Yet, differently from a neutrally structural-Heideggerian
sense, it is also bound up with a foreshadowing of something irreducibly concrete and ontic, to use
Heidegger’s vocabulary: a “suffering” latently legible in the word “Leideform.”611 Notably, too,
these final remarks, meant to conclude an essay of introduction, are cited from the to-be-introduced
poet’s own reflections on questions of poetry (Dichtung). In this manner, Celan’s essay ends with
a peculiar intertwining of a concrete life and poetry, insisting on a notion of the latter that does not
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lend itself to a generically atemporal definition: a poetry, that is, that always takes place as singular
poems, inextricably bound to concrete moments in, and relations to, time.

Translating Poems
On March 26, 1960, a week after the transmission of Celan’s essay about Mandelstam by
the Norddeutscher Rundfunk in Hamburg, Celan sends some reflections on translation to the
aforementioned journalist and literary scholar Werner Weber, on the occasion of his, Celan’s,
recently completed translation of Paul Valéry’s long poem “La jeune Parque” – a fragment of
which the poet had promised to the critic in place of the originally requested Lyrik:
Denn die Sprachen, so sehr sie einander zu entsprechen scheinen, sind verschieden –
geschieden durch Abgründe [...] Ja, das Gedicht, das übertragene Gedicht muß, wenn es in
der zweiten Sprache noch einmal da sein will, dieses Anders- und Verschiedenseins, dieses
Geschiedenseins eingedenk bleiben. [...] Aber wieviele sind es heute, die solche Aspekte
des Dichterischen überhaupt wahrnehmen? Das Gedicht wahrnehmen als menschliche –
und mithin einmalige und vom Geheimnis der Einmaligkeit begleitete – Präsenz? Wieviele
sind es wohl, die mit dem Wort zu schweigen wissen, bei ihm bleiben, wenn es im Intervall
steht, in seinen ‘Höfen’, in seiner – schlüsselfernen – Offenheit, das Stimmhafte aus dem
Stimmlosen fällend, in der Systole die Diastole verdeutlichend, welt- und
unendlichkeitssüchtig zugleich [...]612
This passage unmistakably echoes the radio essay, where, in a parenthetical note, Celan
highlighted the significance of Interpunktion in Mandelstam’s poems: “(Dieses Vibrato ist überall:
in den Intervallen zwischen den Worten und den Strophen, in den ‘Höfen’, in denen die Reime
und die Assonanzen stehen, in der Interpunktion. All das hat semantische Relevanz.)” (DOM 216).
In this manner, then, the radio essay’s reflection on what it might mean to write poems is echoed
in the letter’s reflection on what it might mean to translate poems. As the resonance between them
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indicates, these two concerns – writing poems and translating them – are not strictly separated for
Celan. Once again departing from Heidegger’s focus on language in the singular (die Sprache),
Celan writes of languages in the plural (“die Sprachen”). In doing so, the poet envisions language
from the perspective of its a priori difference, thereby subverting the familiar notion of translation
as a posterior correspondence between an original and a copy. For Celan, the seeming
correspondence (“entsprechen”) of languages to one another – insofar as uniform tools of
communication – is destabilized by the unbridgeable separations between them: “Denn die
Sprachen, so sehr sie einander zu entsprechen scheinen, sind verschieden – geschieden durch
Abgründe [...].” Here, moreover, the notion of correspondence and adequation, repeatedly invoked
and revised by Celan elsewhere, acquires an added connotation. While the word “entsprechen” in
this passage is most readily read datively in its familiar meaning “to correspond,” its proximity to
the word “Sprachen” in Celan’s formulation – “Denn die Sprachen, so sehr sie einander zu
entsprechen scheinen, sind verschieden [...]” – brings out the verb’s (admittedly nonidiomatic)
accusatively negative resonance: ent-sprechen.613 That is, as much as they seem to do so, languages
in the plural, Sprachen, cannot “de-language” one another into a single, originary language, can
never cancel one another out without a remainder. No perfectly fitting translation could ever
conceal the poem’s a priori translatedness. In this light, what seems like a merely appositive
specification – “das Gedicht, das übertragene Gedicht” – suggests, more strikingly, that a poetic

In his reading of Celan’s poem “Aus dem Moorboden,” which reads Benjamin and Kafka, Werner Hamacher also
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text, for Celan, is by definition a translated one, oriented beyond itself. The mode of being of the
poem – and not just of the translated poem but of every poem as translated – is then not so much
the Heideggerian Sein, Being, as a Geschiedensein. It is as though, through a practice of translation
and transmission, Celan’s poetological concern has undergone a transformation: The poet’s 1954
poetological hesitancy about translating the word into the word in the poem has, by 1960, been
revised into a question of “the poem, the translated poem.”
In his letter to Weber, Celan inscribes “poems” into his remarks on translation, tersely
stating, “Gedichte sind Geschenke.” As at several other points in his letter, Celan implicitly
references Heidegger’s vocabulary – here, specifically, the philosopher’s understanding of a poem
(Gedicht) as a gift (Geschenk).614 Yet, here too, Celan revises the philosopher’s neutrally accretive
equation (“Gedichte sind Geschenke”), punctuating it with several stumbles and correctives:
“Gedichte – ja, Gedichte sind Geschenke; Geschenke – aus wessen Hand?” Celan’s revision is
further legible when he not only downplays the poet-translator’s feat of handling the
untranslatable615 but also situates this elliptically implied poet on the receiving end of the donation
(Geschenk) that is a poem. In an odd abdication of authority, Celan registers his wonder at having
been approached by his German translation, Die junge Parze: “Mir erscheint es noch heute
wunderbar, daß dieses Gedicht zu mir kam [...].” Instead of producing the poem in full mastery of
its composition and meaning, the poet is visited, approached by the poem. Notably, too, the poem,
which Celan recalls to have come toward him, is the German translation, Die junge Parze, and not
the French original, La jeune Parque.
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Two months later, once again declining Hans Bender’s request for collectible poetological
insight, Celan will take up this figure of the hand and its insistence on the inextricable boundedness
of the poem to a moment of encounter and relation:
Handwerk – das ist Sache der Hände. Und diese Hände wiederum gehören nur einem
Menschen, d.h. einem einmaligen und sterblichen Seelenwesen, das mit seiner Stimme und
seiner Stummheit einen Weg sucht.
Nur wahre Hände schreiben wahre Gedichte. Ich sehe keinen prinzipiellen Unterschied
zwischen Händedruck und Gedicht.616
In considering a poem to be in no essential way different from a handshake – seemingly, nothing
but a conventional, almost perfunctory gesture of greeting – Celan in fact emphasizes the poem’s
other-directedness: its boundedness to a singular moment of encounter, its exposure to an
irreducibly singular other. It can hardly be overstated how peculiar this conception of poems is.
Traditionally and since the emergence of poetic and artistic autonomy at the end of the eighteenth
century, poems – particularly, of the lyric variety – are considered under the umbrella of the poetic
genius, of individuality, and their mode of entering the world is traditionally that of expression or
exteriorization, Ausdruck. Against this tradition of poetic provenance, Celan proposes a relational
conception of a poem as a singular moment of encounter that, as such, is situated in an irreducibly
liminal space, between two hands, as it were.
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Mai 1958.” In Zwischentexte: literarisches Übersetzen in Theorie und Praxis, edited by
Claudia Dathe, Renata Makarska, and Schamma Schahadat, 165-196. Leipzig: Frank &
Timme Verlag, 2013.
Wilson, W. Daniel. “The Political Context of Weimar Classicism.” In The Literature of Weimar
Classicism, edited by Simon Richter. 347-368. Rochester: Camden House, 2005.
Wolff, Kurt H. “On the Landscape of the Relationship between Hannah Arendt and Martin
Heidegger.” American Sociologist 28, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 126-136.
Young-Bruehl, Elisabeth. Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1982.

240

ProQuest Number: 28320350
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality and completeness of this reproduction is dependent on the quality
and completeness of the copy made available to ProQuest.

Distributed by ProQuest LLC ( 2021 ).
Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author unless otherwise noted.

This work may be used in accordance with the terms of the Creative Commons license
or other rights statement, as indicated in the copyright statement or in the metadata
associated with this work. Unless otherwise specified in the copyright statement
or the metadata, all rights are reserved by the copyright holder.

This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17,
United States Code and other applicable copyright laws.

Microform Edition where available © ProQuest LLC. No reproduction or digitization
of the Microform Edition is authorized without permission of ProQuest LLC.

ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 - 1346 USA

